Supplementary information to the report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan (A/HRC/61/25), 27 February 2026

I. Mandate, methodology and legal framework

1. The Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan is mandated by the Human Rights Council to, inter alia: monitor the situation of human rights in South Sudan; determine and report the facts and circumstances of alleged violations and abuses of human rights and related crimes, including sexual and gender-based violence; collect and preserve evidence of and clarify responsibility for alleged crimes, and make such information available to the transitional justice mechanisms to be established under the 2018 Revitalized Agreement for the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. The Commission is further mandated to make recommendations to prevent the further deterioration of the situation, and to provide guidance on transitional justice. [1]

2. The Commission applies a 'reasonable grounds to believe' standard of proof in its reporting and presents findings on the basis of international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and domestic law of South Sudan. Particular reference is made to the Revitalized Agreement, given its supremacy as the legal framework during South Sudan's transitional period, and the Council's recognition of the Commission's work as relevant to the transitional justice institutions to be established under Chapter V of the Agreement.

3. In 2025, the Commission conducted missions within South Sudan, meeting with victims and survivors, family members of victims and survivors, witnesses, internally displaced persons, government officials, justice sector actors, members of civil society and the media and other stakeholders. It collected witness statements, conducted meetings, organized focus-group discussions, gathered records and evidence, and developed analyses.

4. Guided by the principles of confidentiality and "do no harm," the Commission has omitted identifying information for witnesses and sources in the report. The evidence collected and a list of confidential sources for the report are preserved in the Commission's confidential archives, pursuant to its mandate to support future accountability mechanisms.

II. Sources used in the report[2]

5. In addition to the confidential records held by the Commission, selected non-confidential sources of information used for the report and additional notes are listed below.

Section I: Introduction

Paragraph 3, on Ugandan People's Defence Forces (UPDF), and arms embargo implications:

[1] The Commission's full report and further more information on its mandate is available at www.ohchr.org/cohrsouthsudan.

[2] The adoption of an annex accompanying the report is a departure from the Commission's recent approaches to reflecting sources in reporting. This change was made to adapt to a reduction in the available word count for the present report, which was imposed in 2025 on the basis of financial constraints faced by the United Nations. In this context, the use of an annex enables the Commission to dedicate greater attention to the human rights situation within the report itself.

- "South Sudan: Protection of civilians and adherence to peace agreement critical to preventing all-out war, warns UN Commission," 27 March 2025, available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/03/south-sudan-protection-civilians-and-adherence-peace-agreement-critical.
- Interim report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan, S/2025/768, paras. 45—49, available at https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/768.

Paragraph 4, on escalating displacement:

- Datasets published on South Sudan by United Nations entities indicate that in January 2025, there were 1.8 million internally displaced persons and 528,000 refugees, totalling 2.3 million people displaced in the territory of South Sudan. By December 2025, there were 2.6 million internally displaced persons (the majority fleeing conflict in South Sudan) and 602,000 refugees (the majority fleeing conflict in Sudan), constituting a total of 3.2 million persons displaced in the territory. See https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-humanitarian-snapshot-january-2025 and https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-humanitarian-snapshot-december-2025.

Section III: Political and security developments

Paragraph 13, on risks of a return to full-scale war:

- "South Sudan: UN Commission urges immediate political de-escalation as renewed fighting in Jonglei puts civilians at grave risk," 18 January 2026, available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/01/south-sudan-un-commission-urges-immediate-political-de-escalation-renewed.

Paragraph 14, on unlawful military checkpoints and revenue sharing:

- "Plundering a Nation: how rampant corruption unleashed a human rights crisis in South Sudan," 16 September 2025, A/HRC/60/CRP.5, para. 197, available at https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/cohrsouthsudan/a-hrc-60-crp-5.pdf.
- "State of Impunity: the persistence of violence and human rights violations in South Sudan," A/HRC/52/CRP.3, 3 April 2023, paras. 39, 45, 65, 163, available at https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session52/A_HRC_52_CRP.3.pdf
- South Sudan Governors Forum resolutions, December 2024, resolutions 2 and 3.
- Statement by SPLM/A-IO statement spokesperson, 13 February 2025, on file, and available on the Facebook page of "Col Lam Paul Gabriel," at https://www.facebook.com/lam.paul.gabriel.2025/posts/pfbid02LXjBSTenXDY5tBmS5pPQTvRbftyrF43mkC85PBsMzxqhjJG2tbqYutjsDHDEocwnl?__cft__[0]=AZX6Fd0YoRF-CN1yeFmoAsng8-LGuAi434wJKATv57pgpfIPdRWIeb2mYQ9bzw9YxWSQbHzzr04gKplnd9xK1TAVjxDBug0jJUFuvALjqx6UGN3_k2h49JxDWDMu6IDXgryDIB6pj5L7pr1oepAsWvLme0mgebIR4QskJVLCCgaQHeDqYpfR2R8NClh3_bdM0GM&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R.

Paragraph 15, on armed violence during 2024, and the evacuation incident in 2025 in Nasir:

- A/HRC/58/27, 21 February 2025, para. 11, available at https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session58/advance-version/a-hrc-58-27-aev.pdf.

- President Salva Kiir, televised address to the nation, 7 March 2025.
- UNMISS, "UNMISS personnel killed and injured during attack on UN helicopter in Nasir, South Sudan," 7 March 2025, available at https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/unmiss-personnel-killed-and-injured-during-attack-un-helicopter-nasir-south-sudan.
- "South Sudan's leaders must avert another deadly crisis and uphold peace agreement, urges UN Commission," 8 March 2025, available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/03/south-sudans-leaders-must-avert-another-deadly-crisis-and-uphold-peace.

Paragraph 16, on UPDF aerial operations and SPLM-IG's "hostile" counties declaration:

- "UPDF Troops Urged to Uphold Discipline and Professionalism Ahead of South Sudan Deployment," 20 March 2025, available at https://www.updf.go.ug/operation-mlinzi-wa-kimya/updf-troops-urged-to-uphold-discipline-and-professionalism-ahead-of-south-sudan-deployment/.
- "Strategic Response of the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU) to the Nasir Incident and Reinvigoration of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). (Date of Incident: 4th March 2025, Location: Nasir County, Upper Nile State)." 26 April 2025.

Paragraph 17, SPLM/A-IO and South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF) statements:

- SPLM/A-IO, "Resolution on the illegal indictment and suspension of H.E. Dr. Riek Machar Teny (FVP), and other political detainees," 15 September 2025, on file.
- Office of the SSPDF Spokesperson, statement of 12 October 2025, on file, and available on the Facebook page of "Maj. Gen. Lul Ruai Koang PSC," at https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid02YqQ5ms4SQxpWqTqZhFb2U9osd9BVTrinqsGf6WanMBy6aEg9aqJdnvvfKJLpWthl&id=61560223273506.
- SPLM/A-IO National Committee for Information and Communication, statement of 27 December 2025, on file and available on the Facebook page of "Paul Mai Deng," at https://www.facebook.com/pal.mai.3/posts/pfbid0byXrCJH91p9GSQebkJ8pQdPeuNAUnNs5NMfPRBmCGwMAM1GPQRfPgJFctYPxi6iAl.
- Office of SSPDF Spokesperson, statement of 30 December 2025, on file, and available on the Facebook page of "Maj. Gen. Lul Ruai Koang PSC," at https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=122191299278340775&set=pcb.122191299308340775.

Paragraph 18, on armed violence in Warrap State:

- UNMISS, human rights reports issued for 2025, available at https://unmiss.unmissions.org/en/human-rights-reports.
- On partisan disarmament efforts in Warrap State, see also: A/HRC/49/78, 15 February 2022, para. 79, available at https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/A_HRC_49_78_AdvanceEditedVersion.pdf; A/HRC/52/26, 31 January 2023, paras. 76-81, available at https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session52/A-HRC-52-26-AdvanceEditedVersion.pdf; and A/HRC/58/27, para. 34 (see link above).

Paragraph 19, on the detentions, prosecutions and suspensions of SPLM/A-IO leaders:

- African Union Peace and Security Council, press statement, 31 March 2025, available at: https://papsrepository.africanunion.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/bae96bc0-17a9-414b-8d58-f767b729c48a/content. See also its communiques of 12 June and 15 August 2025, available at: https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-from-the-1283rd-meeting-of-the-peace-and-security-council-held-on-12-june-2025-on-updated-briefing-on-the-situation-in-south-sudan and https://papsrepository.africanunion.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/dc639789-27f0-48bd-b940-eef4aaed77fc/content.
- Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, press briefing, 11 September 2025.
- Republican decree, South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation news, 11 September 2025.

Paragraph 20, on the collapse of the 2015 peace agreement in 2016:

- A/HRC/37/CRP.2, 23 February 2018, paras. 40, and 271—272, available at https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session37/Documents/A_HRC_37_CRP.2_EN.docx.

Paragraph 21, on rotations of senior officials and jurists by decree:

- Republican decrees 208/2025 and 209/2025 of 28 May 2025, in which the President relieved and replaced the Chief Justice and the Deputy Chief Justice.
- Republican decree of 20 August 2025, appointing Adut Salva Kiir.
- On constitutional safeguards for chief justices see Transitional Constitution, section 134.
- See also A/HRC/58/27, para. 13 (see link above).

Section IV: Armed conflict and violence

A. Emblematic situations (Western Equatoria State)

Paragraph 26, on past armed violence:

- A/HRC/49/CRP.4, 21 March 2022, paras. 107—121, available at https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/A_HRC_49_CRP_4.pdf.
- A/HRC/52/26, paras. 82—86, and A/HRC/58/27, paras. 19—31 (see links above).

Paragraph 27, SPLM-IG's justification for dismissing Futuyo, and peace monitors' findings:

- Government response to UNMISS Human Rights Division, June 2025, page 12, available at: https://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2025-10/unmiss_hrd_brief_on_violence_affecting_civilians_january_to_march_2025_goss_response.pdf.
- Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM), violation reports 2025/02 and 2025/03.
- Revitalized Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC), "Quarterly report on the status of implementation of the R-ARCSS from 1st January to 31st March 2025," para. 20, available at https://jmecsouthsudan.org/index.php/reports/rjmec-quarterly-reports.

Paragraph 28, on administrative changes in Nadiangere:

- Radio Tamazuj, "W. Equatoria acting governor rescinds Nadiangere Administrative Area status," 7 April 2025, available at https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/w-equatoria-acting-governor-rescinds-nadiangere-administrative-area-status.
- HSBA and Small Arms Survey, "Making the Enemy: The War in Western Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazal States," December 2025, pages 3—4, see: https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/highlight/new-hsba-situation-update-war-western-equatoria-and-western-bahr-el-ghazal-states. HSBA report, December 2025 page 3.

Paragraph 31, on UNMISS operations:

- UNMISS had established a temporary operating base in Tambura Town in July 2021. See A/HRC/49/78, paras. 63—76 and footnote 86 (see link above). See also A/HRC/58/27, para. 24 (see link above).
- UNMISS, "Statement attributable to UNMISS Spokesperson – on ambush of peacekeepers in Western Equatoria," 4 September 2025, available at https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/statement-attributable-to-unmiss-spokesperson-ambush-of-peacekeepers-western-equatoria.
- Radio Tamazuj, "Fears of violence grow after UN peacekeepers leave Tambura," 23 January 2026, available at https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/fears-of-violence-grow-after-un-peacekeepers-leave-tambura.

Paragraph 32, on commanders previously named as bearing responsibility for violations:

- See: A/HRC/49/78, para. 75; A/HRC/52/26, paras. 84—86; and A/HRC/58/27, para. 31 (see links above).

A. Emblematic situations (Upper Nile and Jonglei states)

Paragraph 33, on renewed armed conflict in January 2026:

- "Commission urges immediate political de-escalation…" 18 January 2026, see above.
- "South Sudan: UN Commission warns incitement and command failures risk mass atrocities, ethnic mobilisation and further unravelling of peace agreement," 26 January 2026, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/01/south-sudan-un-commission-warns-incitement-and-command-failures-risk-mass.

Paragraph 34, the background to armed violence and failures to mitigate escalation in Nasir:

- On armed violence in 2021, see S/2021/784, para. 22, https://docs.un.org/en/S/2021/784. See also CTSAMVM, violation report 2021/08.
- On armed violence and calls for mitigation during 2024, see A/HRC/58/27, para. 11 (see link above).
- On the reported "ultimatum" issued by garrisoned soldiers, see for example Radio Tamazuj, "Nasir calm after night of scary gunfire," 24 January 2025, https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/nasir-calm-after-night-of-scary-gunfire.
- On statements by authorities, see the South Sudan People's Defence Forces statement of 20 February 2025, on file, and available on the Facebook page of "Maj. Gen. Lul Ruai Koang PSC," at https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid02VkzjadtRBumgxZaYbNws26fP1yicfxR2Mti5Q7efmejLZXcDyvRZPq7dGfC73erCl&id=6

1560223273506. See also the Facebook post by the Office of the Governor of Upper Nile on 7 February 2025

- One Citizen Daily, "Military recalls personnel from Nasir," 20 February 2025, https://onecitizendaily.com/index.php/2025/02/20/military-recalls-personnel-from-nasir/.
- On calls for a neutral force deployment in February 2025, see for example UNMISS, "UNMISS urges parties to uphold peace deal following escalations in Upper Nile and Western Equatoria," 18 February 2025, https://unmiss.unmissions.org/unmiss-urges-parties-uphold-peace-deal-following-escalations-upper-nile-and-western-equatoria.

Paragraph 35, on General Johnson Olony:

- Statement by the office of the spokesperson for South Sudan People's Defence Forces, 21 January 2025, on file, and available on the Facebook page of "Maj. Gen. Lul Ruai Koang PSC," at https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid0xCRsW8i15z16oiqRENzhmcPUMkqY6r1Y8zpgsmpdk1bP46ikXQJNDrNUwAwE4KWzl&id=61560223273506.
- A/HRC/52/CRP.3, paras. 160—183 (see link above).

Paragraph 39, on the directive to remove checkpoints along the Nile River:

- Statement issued by South Sudan People's Defence Forces on 25 April 2025, on file with the Commission. See also Eye Radio, "CDF orders removal of checkpoint along White Nile," 25 April 2025, https://www.eyeradio.org/cdf-orders-removal-of-checkpoints-along-white-nile/.

Paragraph 41, on famine warnings issued:

- Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), "IPC acute food insecurity and acute malnutrition analysis, April 2025—July 2025," 12 June 2025, https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_South_Sudan_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Malnutrition_April_July2025_Report.pdf.

Paragraph 44, on humanitarian operations and government restrictions imposed:

- Press conference at Juba International Airport involving the Minister of Humanitarian Affairs, broadcast by SSBC, May 2025, on file.
- United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and World Food Programme (WFP), "Conflict, displacement and disease drive food insecurity and malnutrition to alarming levels in parts of South Sudan," 12 June 2025, https://www.fao.org/newsroom/detail/conflict--displacement-and-disease-drive-food-insecurity-and-malnutrition-to-alarming-levels-in-parts-of-south-sudan/en.
- Joshua Craze and Joseph Falzetta, "Fogbow operations in South Sudan and beyond raise red flags for faltering aid system," 16 June 2025, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/investigations/2025/06/16/fogbow-operations-south-sudan-raise-red-flags-aid-private-sector.
- WFP, "WFP airdrops food to prevent catastrophe as hunger surges in conflict-hit parts of South Sudan," 7 July 2025, https://www.wfp.org/news/wfp-airdrops-food-prevent-catastrophe-hunger-surges-conflict-hit-parts-south-sudan.
- UN OCHA, "South Sudan: Humanitarian Access Snapshot (July 2025)," 7 August 2025, https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-humanitarian-access-snapshot-july-2025.

- IPC, "Acute Food Insecurity and Malnutrition Snapshot, September 2025—July 2026," 4 November 2025, https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_South_Sudan_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Malnutrition_Sept2025_July2026_Snapshot.pdf.
- WFP, "WFP calls for safe humanitarian access as conflict escalates in South Sudan's Jonglei State," 30 January 2026, https://www.wfp.org/news/wfp-calls-safe-humanitarian-access-conflict-escalates-south-sudans-jonglei-state.
- Médecins Sans Frontières, "South Sudan Government Blocking Opposition-Held Areas from Humanitarian Access," 30 January 2026, available at https://www.facebook.com/MSFSouthSudan/posts/pfbid0x2W1Es6j5DYXd9dJ17kMAAztMgBLedRhKRrtMcEq1RHmxxut67UWBZGLuAqPGETvl?rdid=hSMfz8RcfkmvWAS2#.

Paragraph 45, on evacuation orders and statements attributed to armed forces:

- UN OCHA, "South Sudan: Humanitarian Snapshot (December 2025)," 23 January 2026, https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-humanitarian-snapshot-december-2025.
- SPLM/A-IO, statement of 27 December 2025, on file (see link above).
- SSPDF, statement of 30 December 2025, on file (see link above).
- SSPDF statement of 25 January 2026 on "operation enduring peace," on file, and available on the Facebook page of "Maj. Gen. Lul Ruai Koang PSC," at https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid02DcYJMcEgm32iR8msdZneTaj2iqzepZjERFpz8WUFzzhDxUBw1tjFBC51da1YkJhvl&id=61560223273506.
- "South Sudan: UN Commission warns incitement and command failures risk mass atrocities, ethnic mobilisation and further unravelling of peace agreement," 26 January 2026, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/01/south-sudan-un-commission-warns-incitement-and-command-failures-risk-mass.

Paragraph 46, on displacement figures:

- OCHA, monthly humanitarian snapshots published from January 2025 to January 2026.
- OHCA, "South Sudan: Conflict in Jonglei State Flash Update No. 3 (as of 30 January 2026)," 30 January 2026, https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-conflict-jonglei-state-flash-update-no-3-30-january-2026.

B. Airstrikes

Paragraph 49, on the scale of airstrikes:

- The Commission identified aerial bombardments during 2025 in seven of South Sudan's states. Incidents were not identified, but cannot be fully excluded given information limitations, in Lakes State, Northern Bahr el Ghazal State and Eastern Equatoria State.

Paragraphs 52 and 56, on air operations by Ugandan People's Defence Forces:

- Panel of Experts on South Sudan established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2206 (2015), interim report, S/2025/768, 26 November 2025, paras. 47-49 and annex 17.
- A series of since-deleted posts to the X account of UPDF Chief of Defence Forces Muhuoozi Kainerugaba ("Official Twitter account of Gen.Muhoozi Kainerugaba, Chief of Defence Forces (UPDF) and SPA/SO"; www.x.com/mkainerugaba) are on file with the Commission.

- Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs / Ugandan People's Defence Forces, "UPDF Refutes Alleged Use Of Chemical Weapons In South Sudan," 28 March 2025, https://www.updf.go.ug/press_statement/updf-refutes-alleged-use-of-chemical-weapons-in-south-sudan/.

Paragraph 57, on the repurposing of the SPLM/A-IO's Wunaliet cantonment by SPLM-IG:

- CTSAMVM address to the RJMEC extraordinary plenary, 7 October 2025, on file.
- Eye Radio, "SSPF launches peacekeeping training centre in Juba," 14 August 2025, https://www.eyeradio.org/sspdf-launches-peacekeeping-training-centre-in-juba/.

Paragraph 60, SSPDF statements on aerial operations in Old Fangak County:

- SSPDF statement on "punitive aerial… actions," on 2 May 2025, on file, and available at https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid0T458yMoX4iac7RWEHuMA8vYhrGjNVgpiP1vQvndE1oRDbdPBxU1kEpbvAxkS4p1Tl&id=6156022327350.
- SSPDF statement on "strategic bombing raids," on 7 May 2025, on file, and available on the Facebook page of "Maj. Gen. Lul Ruai Koang PSC," at https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid0cQ5hqCYzZYkbg6ayLiH2ysf8kVZjrqAK9zXwfUfmYYuvjLmRwbTfwGZvFBGMUsXsl&id=61560223273506.

Paragraph 61, Médecins Sans Frontières statements, and displacement figures:

- For statements by Médecins Sans Frontières, see "South Sudan: MSF strongly condemns deliberate bombing of its hospital in Old Fangak," 3 May 2025, https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/south-sudan-msf-strongly-condemns-deliberate-bombing-its-hospital-old-fangak. See also https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/msf-consequences-attacks-healthcare-south-sudan, https://www.msf.org/left-behind-crisis-south-sudan, and https://www.doctorswithoutborders.ca/south-sudan-msf-healthcare-facility-hit-during-an-airstrike/.
- On displacements, see International Organization for Migration, "Displacement Tracking Matrix – South Sudan, 9 April—28 May 2025," report #82, page 1, https://dtm.iom.int/dtm_download_track/79356?file=1&type=node&id=53151.
- See also "Targeting of MSF hospital may constitute a war crime, says UN Commission, urges immediate halt to hostilities in South Sudan," 6 May 2025, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/05/targeting-msf-hospital-may-constitute-war-crime-says-un-commission-urges.

C. Forced recruitment of boys and young men

Paragraph 64, on SSPDF being responsible for most forced recruitments, going unpunished:

- A/HRC/37.CRP.2, para. 621 (see link above).

Paragraph 65, on SSPDF recruitment campaigns, and the police crackdown on gangs in Juba:

- Radio Miraya, Facebook post of 1 July 2025, https://www.facebook.com/radiomiraya/posts/police-have-launched-a-seven-day-operation-targeting-criminal-gangs-in-juba-foll/1324271669700883/.

- Eye Radio, "623 suspected Juba gangs arrested as CES cracks down on crimes," 2 July 2025, https://www.eyeradio.org/623-suspected-juba-gangs-arrested-as-ces-cracks-down-on-crimes/. Also reported on SSBC evening news on 2 July 2025.
- Florence Miettaux, "South Sudan's youth swept up in gang culture and street violence amid wider conflict," The Guardian, 18 August 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/aug/18/south-sudan-war-gang-culture-youths-conscription.
- Human Rights Watch, "South Sudan: Abusive 'Anti-Gang' Crackdown," 7 January 2026, https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/01/07/south-sudan-abusive-anti-gang-crackdown.
- See also Panel of Experts, S/2025/768, paras. 62—65.

Paragraph 66, on the Giada military barracks:

- See A/HRC/40/CRP.1, 20 February 2019, paras. 305—333, available at https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoHRSouthSudan/A_HRC_40_CRP_1.docx.

Section V: Sexual and gender-based violence

Paragraph 75, on sexual violence as a defining and persistent feature of conflict:

- "Conflict-related sexual violence against women and girls in South Sudan," 21 March 2022, A/HRC/49/CRP.4, (see link above).

Paragraph 82, on the bill countering sexual violence:

- See also A/HRC/58/27, paras. 65 and 81—82 (see link above).

Section VI: Detentions and prosecutions of opposition leaders

Paragraph 84, on the eight individuals prosecuted in a consolidated trial:

- The eight individuals listed on the 11 September 2025 announcement issued by the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs are: Riek Machar Teny; Puot Kang Chol; Gabriel Duop Lam; Mam Pal Dhuor; Gatwich Lam Puoch; Camilo Gatmai Kel; Mading Riek Yak; and Dominic Gatrgok Riek (note variations on these spellings were observed). That same announcement stated that 76 persons who had been detained were subsequently released.
- Although in July 2025 it emerged that one case appeared to have been opened in March 2025, no charges appear to have been made at that time. See Radio Tamazuj, "Govt seeks to lift detained MP's immunity for trial," 28 July 2025, https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/govt-seeks-to-lift-detained-mps-immunity-for-trial.

Paragraph 86, statements by government officials on the case:

- The statement by President Kiir was made in a televised address on 7 March 2025.
- Spokespersons for SSPDF and the National Security Services were among the senior officials who issued public declarations or inferences that the accused were guilty.
- The remarks by senor ministers on 26 April 2025 were at a press conference to launch the Government's "Strategic Response" to the situation in Nasir (see above). Minister of Cabinet Affairs Martin Lomuro gave the main address to media. Minister Michael Makeui also made comments to media: then the Minister for ICT and Postal Services, in November 2025 he was appointed as Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs.

- See also One Citizen Daily, "Transitional gov't to replace Dr. Machar," 28 April 2025, https://www.onecitizendaily.com/index.php/2025/04/28/transitional-govt-to-replace-dr-machar/ and Radio Tamazuj, "South Sudan government eyes Machar's exit," 27 April 2025, https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/south-sudan-government-eyes-machars-exit.

Paragraph 87, on the investigation committee:

- Officially, the lead investigator of the committee was Basilio Thomas Wani, who had been serving as the Police Commissioner of Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State Police Commissioner. See The Radio Community, "Investigator says he never went to Nasir due to insecurity," 27 October 2025, https://theradiocommunity.org/investigator-says-he-never-went-to-nasir-due-to-insecurity-4943.
- The challenges and limited outcomes associated with special investigation committees in South Sudan has been extensively documented by the Commission in past reporting. See for example A/HRC/52/CRP.3, paras. 316—335 (see link above).

Paragraph 91, on the organization and command of "White Army" Nuer militia:

- Violation reports of ceasefire monitors, namely the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, have not established a command relationship between SPLM/A-IO and militia in Nasir. CTSAMVM did not access Nasir after March 2025.
- The Commission has previously noted that gatherings of Nuer youth are inevitably referred to as the "White Army" regardless of the accuracy of the label. In its reports, the Commission has adopted the term "White Army" given this reflects the way in which these forces were described by witnesses. At the same time, it is important to note that term has long roots, reflecting traditions of (de-centralised) self-defence in Nuer communities, and its use outside those communities has been contested and can be ambiguous largely for being applied inconsistently by different actors at different points in time. This has had implications for efforts to determine responsibility for the actions of individuals involved in grave violations against children. For example, in the United Nations Secretary General's annual report on children in armed conflict in 2014, the White Army was defined as "a paramilitary organized group comprising primarily members of the Lou Nuer ethnic group." From 2014 to 2018 the White Army was listed in these annual reports for grave violations against children. In 2019, the White Army was delisted from the Secretary General's reports on children in armed conflict on the basis that "the group no longer showed evidence of clear leadership or structure and ceased to exist." As a result, since 2019 and as of 2025, the White Army is no longer monitored for grave violations against children as part of the United Nations' reporting on children in armed conflict. (This text is adapted from A/HRC/52/CRP.3, fn. 208; see link above).
- See also "Children and armed conflict: Report of the Secretary-General," 20 June 2019, S/2019/509, para. 248, available at https://docs.un.org/en/s/2019/509.

Section VII: Accountability and transitional justice

Paragraph 96, on the commitments to establish transitional justice institutions:

- Establishment of the three complementary transitional justice institutions was first recommended in the report of the African Union's Commission of Inquiry into the 2013 Conflict in South Sudan. Its report was published in

October 2014, and endorsed by the African Union Peace and Security Council at the level of Heads of State and Government in September 2015. The three mechanisms were subsequently adopted and embedded in Chapter V of the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan, and retained in the 2018 Revitalized Agreement, again under Chapter V.

- Enabling laws for the Truth Commission and for the Reparation Authority were enacted in November 2024. See A/HRC/58/27, paras. 86—87 (see link above).

Paragraph 98, on the statement by the transitional justice working group:

- On the 22 December 2025 statement, see The Radio Community, "Truth Commission selection faces criticism over transparency," 23 December 2025, https://theradiocommunity.org/truth-commission-selection-panel-faces-criticism-over-transparency-5125.
- See also "Entrenched repression: systematic curtailment of the democratic and civic space in South Sudan," 5 October 2023, available at https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/cohr southsudan/A_HRC_54_CRP.6_0.pdf.

Paragraph 100, on being "seen to be serious and accountable":

- In the endorsement of the parties to the Revitalized Agreement to again extend the transitional period by two years, in September 2024, the Government acknowledged that "External donors will only chip in if we are seen to be serious and accountable in our expenditure…" Section 6.1.

Paragraph 102, on the Commission's engagement on the Hybrid Court:

- "South Sudan: UN Commission urges AU and UN Security Council to act decisively as crisis deepens, demanding urgent action and renewed commitment to peace, accountability and a credible transition," 13 October 2025, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/10/south-sudan-un-commission-urges-au-and-un-security-council-act-decisively.

Section VIII: Political economy

Paragraph 104, the Commission's September 2025 conference room paper on corruption:

- "Plundering a Nation: how rampant corruption unleashed a human rights crisis in South Sudan," A/HRC/60/CRP.5, (see link above).
- Since the Commission's paper was published, proceedings advanced in the criminal trial in Sweden of two former executives of Lundin Energy AB, who allegedly aided and abetted war crimes perpetrated in South Sudan against civilians between 1997 and 2023 (see para. 117 of the paper, cited above). The trial nears completion, with the prosecution and defence scheduled to present their conclusions during the second half of March 2026. A judgement in this case is expected by May 2026.

Paragraph 106, on the declining pattern of transparency in public financial management:

- As of January 2026, the most recent production metering updates published by the Ministry of Petroleum were March 2024 for DPOC, and July 2025 for GPOC (SPOC production was not published on Ministry website). In March 2025, Minister of Petroleum Puot Kang Chol was one the SPLM/A-IO leaders detained by SPLM-IG, and subsequently prosecuted from September 2025, continuing into 2026.

Paragraph 110, on Crawford Capital Ltd. ownership:

- A/HRC/60/CRP.5, para. 165 (see link above).

Paragraph 112, on debt exposure:

- In February 2025, the United Kingdom High Court ruled South Sudan must repay the African Export-Import Bank. In June 2025, Qatar National Bank sought recognition in a United States District Court of an award from 2024.

Paragraphs 113 and 114, on the sale of Petronas' oil consortia assets:

- As of 31 December 2025, an arbitration case between Petronas and the Government was pending at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. See PETRONAS International Corporation Ltd v. Republic of South Sudan (ICSID Case No. ARB/24/36), https://icsid.worldbank.org/cases/case-database/case-detail?CaseNo=ARB/24/36.
- Although the Aquilon Energy DMCC consortium paid the Government at least $150 million, it is unclear how much was transferred to Petronas.