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Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General

Human rights bodies and mechanisms

Cooperation with the United Nations, its representatives and mechanisms in the field of human rights

Report of the Secretary-General*, **

Summary

In the present report, the Secretary-General highlights activities, policy developments and good practices within the United Nations system and beyond to address intimidation of and reprisals against those seeking to cooperate or having cooperated with the United Nations, its representatives and mechanisms in the field of human rights. The report includes observations on and recommendations for addressing and preventing intimidation and reprisals, and information on allegations of intimidation and reprisals received during the period from 1 May 2025 to 30 April 2026, including follow-up information on cases included in previous reports.

* The present report was submitted to the conference services for processing after the deadline for technical reasons beyond the control of the submitting office.

** The annexes to the present report are circulated as received, in the language of submission only.

I. Introduction

1. The Human Rights Council, in its resolution 12/2, expressed its concern over continued reports of intimidation and reprisals against individuals and groups seeking to cooperate or having cooperated with the United Nations, its representatives and mechanisms in the field of human rights. The Council condemned all acts of intimidation and reprisal committed by Governments and non-State actors against such individuals and groups and invited the Secretary-General to report annually on alleged reprisals, including recommendations on how to address the issue. The present report is the seventeenth report submitted pursuant to resolution 12/2.[1]

II. Activities in response to acts of intimidation and reprisal

2. Forms of reprisal and retaliation for ongoing or past cooperation and intimidation designed to discourage future participation or cooperation with a wide range of United Nations entities at headquarter locations and in the field continued throughout the reporting period.

3. Incidents or trends were addressed within the United Nations system by the Secretariat, including the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and peace operations, as well as by intergovernmental organs, including the Security Council, the Human Rights Council and its special procedure mandate holders, the human rights treaty bodies and other mechanisms. These included the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues and the United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture. The United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) and the Governing Body of the International Labour Office and its Committee on Freedom of Association also addressed reprisal incidents during the reporting period.

4. The Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights, as the senior United Nations official designated by the Secretary-General to lead system-wide efforts to address intimidation and reprisals, continued to engage with Member States, United Nations entities, civil society and other stakeholders to raise awareness of and concern about global trends and incidents. The General Assembly and the Human Rights Council addressed acts of intimidation and reprisal for cooperating with the United Nations in several country and thematic resolutions.[2]

5. The Human Rights Council adopted its resolution 60/23 on intimidation and reprisals for cooperating with the United Nations in the field of human rights, noting the rise in the scale and sophistication of targeted repression across borders. The Council noted with concern the enactment and application of laws and regulations concerning, inter alia, civil society, aimed at or effecting deterrence or hinderance of cooperation with the United Nations. While noting with concern that special procedure mandate holders of the Council are increasingly targeted for the discharge of their mandates, the Council underlined the deterrent effect of such attacks on the ability and willingness of individuals and groups to cooperate with the United Nations.

6. During the reporting period, the presidency of the Human Rights Council received allegations of intimidation and reprisals and continued the practice of addressing credible allegations with the permanent representatives of the States concerned.

7. The special procedure mandate holders of the Human Rights Council continued to dedicate communications, statements and reports to allegations of intimidation and reprisals

[1] See previous reports, available from https://www.ohchr.org/en/reprisals/annual-reports-reprisals-cooperation-un.

[2] General Assembly resolutions 80/114 and 80/137; A/80/219; and Human Rights Council resolutions 59/2, 59/10, 60/2, 60/4, 60/8, 60/13, 60/15, 60/21, 61/4, 61/10, 61/26 and 61/30.

Advance edited version

related to cooperation with them and with the wider United Nations system.[3] The present report includes new allegations from 15 communications concerning 10 States and one other actor (see annex I),[4] and follow-up information from 18 communications concerning 15 States and three other actors (see annex II).[5] Mandate holders noted concerns regarding reprisals due to cooperation with the United Nations, in four reports to the Human Rights Council[6] and three reports to the General Assembly.[7] They also referred to the issue in five media statements concerning four countries and one regarding the States that are members of the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations of the Economic and Social Council.[8]

8. The Committee on Enforced Disappearances, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and the Human Rights Committee received and addressed allegations of intimidation and reprisals.[9] On 21 November 2025, the Committee against Torture adopted a decision in *Bashirahishize et al. v. Burundi*[10] and concluded that, in failing to fulfil its obligation to refrain from reprisals against individuals who cooperated with the Committee, the State Party had violated article 13 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The Committee on Enforced Disappearances noted with concern that some victims decided not to submit urgent action requests for fear of reprisals, particularly following events in three countries.[11]

9. The United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture documented that shrinking civic space continued to hinder grantees' ability to assist survivors and the Fund's capacity to fulfil its mandate. The Fund's grantees faced risks and challenges in obtaining the grants, including because of the use of restrictive legislation governing civil society, the dissolution of legal status, sanctions, and frozen bank accounts. The Fund documented a raid on the office of one grantee and the confiscation of documents by security forces, including reports to the Fund and victims' testimonies.[12]

10. The Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples urged the Human Rights Council to condemn all reprisals, including transnational reprisals, linked to participation in or cooperation with the United Nations, including acts targeting Indigenous representatives and mandate holders.[13] The Forum on Business and Human Rights continued to pay attention to the issue of reprisals. During the opening and closing, the commitment to ensure that the Forum was a safe, inclusive space for constructive dialogue was reiterated from the podium. The information note for participants highlighted the zero-tolerance approach towards reprisals and provided information on reporting procedures.

[3] A/HRC/61/66, paras. 70 and 71.

[4] See BLR 9/2025, CHN 8/2025, CHN 9/2025, CHN 10/2025, CRI 3/2025, DEU 1/2026, FRA 11/2025, GNB 1/2026, LAO 2/2025, LAO 3/2025, RUS 3/2026, VEN 4/2025, VNM 5/2025, VNM 8/2025 and OTH 84/2025. All communications mentioned in the present document are available from https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/Tmsearch/TMDocuments.

[5] See CHN 9/2025, CHN 23/2025, EGY 10/2025, IRN 12/2025, GTM 6/2025, GTM 8/2025, NIC 2/2025, USA 27/2025, USA 38/2025, PAK 6/2025, PAK 11/2025, THA 8/2025, TKM 2/2025, VEN 5/2025, VNM 3/2025, OTH 151/2025, OTH 152/2025 and OTH 153/2025.

[6] A/HRC/61/40, paras. 76–82; A/HRC/61/59, para. 6; A/HRC/60/35/Add.4, paras. 27 and 39; and A/HRC/60/59, paras. 123–133.

[7] A/80/114, paras. 79–83; A/80/137 para. 11; and A/80/219, para. 82.

[8] See https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/04/un-experts-alarmed-law-targeting-lgbt-womens-rights-advocates-and, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/04/strategy-blatant-abuse-counter-terrorism-and-extremism-laws-destroy-russian, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/03/afghanistan-un-experts-demand-immediate-end-taliban-restrictions-women-un, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/11/un-experts-urge-belarus-stop-interfering-legal-profession, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/02/hong-kong-sar-turk-urges-release-jimmy-lai-following-imposition-20-year and https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/04/states-champion-human-rights-defenders-must-consider-candidacy-ecosoc-ngo.

[9] HRI/MC/2026/2, paras. 26–35.

[10] CAT/C/83/D/1141/2022. See also CAT/C/BDI/2/Add.1.

[11] CED/C/28/3, para. 8.

[12] A/HRC/61/27, para. 23.

[13] A/HRC/60/65, paras. 27 and 28.

Advance edited version

11. UN-Women continued to track reprisals against women civil society representatives in relation to their briefings to the Security Council. According to its 2025 survey on the matter, both the number and the percentage of women civil society briefers who self-reported reprisals decreased, compared with the previous four years.[14]

12. The United Nations Youth Office organized activities to promote safe and meaningful youth engagement with the United Nations. During the reporting period, these included an online safety training for more than 2,000 participants, seven safety briefings for around 50 young leaders and youth advocates, two internal capacity-building workshops for about 40 Youth Office staff, and dissemination of the Guidance Note on Safe and Meaningful Youth Participation in United Nations Events ahead of the Economic and Social Council Youth Forum.

13. The Special Rapporteur on environmental defenders under the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention) emphasized that environmental defenders in Central Asia were reportedly reluctant to engage with international human rights mechanisms or attend international meetings for fear of surveillance, harassment or retaliation. He noted that this had been especially notable during his consultation in the region, where several participants did not dare speak and feared the venue was under surveillance.[15] He identified reprisals against environmental defenders for their participation in international environment forums as a key concern. He noted reported arbitrary detention, surveillance and travel restrictions linked to their participation in the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.[16]

III. Policy developments and good practices

14. In March 2026, the Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights sent a questionnaire to Member States on good practices to prevent and address reprisals for cooperating with the United Nations.

15. In the area of protection of victims who allegedly faced intimidation and reprisals, including for cooperation with the United Nations, one Member State mentioned that in 2025 it had funded a project aimed at gaining a better understanding of cases of reprisal. One of the objectives of the project was to strengthen the capacity of the Member State's diplomats and representatives abroad to support and contribute to the protection of defenders at risk, including from acts of transnational repression. The Member State also mentioned that it had raised specific cases of reprisal during Human Rights Council sessions. Another Member State referred to the launching of its Public Policy for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders 2025–2035, which revolved around four key areas, including the prevention of risks and threats against human rights defenders, comprehensive protection for defenders, and access to justice and meaningful reparations.

16. In the area of prevention, a group of Member States highlighted their practice of promoting positive narratives about civil society actors. One State mentioned the training of its judicial personnel, such as judges and public prosecutors, on international human rights norms, standards and mechanisms to deepen their knowledge and understanding of the legitimacy and legality of cooperation with those mechanisms. Another stated that as part of its "human rights diplomacy", it stressed the key role played by human rights defenders in preventing and documenting violations, upholding the rule of law, and preventing conflicts during sessions of the Human Rights Council.

[14] See the 2026 report of the Secretary-General on women and peace and security (forthcoming).
[15] ECE/MP.PP/2025/19, paras. 56–58.
[16] ECE/MP.PP/2025/20, paras. 76 and 77.

Advance edited version

17. In the area of supporting participation in international forums, especially cooperation with and advocacy at the United Nations, several Member States stressed that they provided funds for civil society actors' engagement in United Nations human rights spaces supporting risk mitigation, safe access, and follow-up, including for Indigenous Peoples and persons with disabilities.

18. On 3 October 2025, a group consisting of 70 Member States and the European Union delivered a cross-regional statement on reprisals, at the Third Committee of the General Assembly. They underlined that the participation of civil society and human rights defenders in the work of the United Nations was essential for the Organization's credibility and effectiveness. They regretted that the current environment had created a climate of fear and self-censorship, where fewer reported allegations of reprisals should, in some contexts, not be seen as a positive sign. They expressed concern at the use of online and offline surveillance and at the apparent increase in transnational repression. They noted the deterrent effect that the targeting of independent mandate holders had on individuals and groups seeking to cooperate with them.[17]

19. At their June 2026 meeting, the Chairs of the treaty bodies considered a draft protocol on reprisals during country visits as one of the steps to further implement the Guidelines against Intimidation or Reprisal. The protocol would apply to those treaty bodies with visiting mandates, as well as to other treaty bodies that can undertake inquiry visits in order to conduct research and investigate the human rights situation, as mandated in the relevant instruments.[18]

20. UN-Women, in collaboration with United Nations experts and civil society, developed a Quick Reference Guide for Security Council members on mitigating reprisals against women civil society briefers in public Security Council meetings. The guide provides practical recommendations for risk-informed engagement before, during and after briefings.[19]

21. The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs offered advice on communication and protection considerations for 187 participants (80 men and 107 women) in the third dialogue on peacebuilding between civil society organizations and the United Nations, held in December 2025 in Geneva, with the aim of preventing intimidation or reprisals for cooperation with the United Nations.

22. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) facilitated the Structured Dialogue[20] as one component of the political road map launched on 21 August 2025. UNSMIL prepared guidelines outlining good practices to support safe and inclusive participation and mitigate acts of intimidation or reprisal against individuals and groups engaging in the Dialogue. These guidelines applied to all stages of the engagement – formal or informal – including participant identification, invitations, dialogue participation and follow-up after the dialogue.

23. In the annual induction workshop of the Security Council Affairs Division for newly elected members and in its regular consultations with incoming Security Council presidencies, the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and OHCHR draw attention to issues related to civil society participation in Security Council meetings, including risks of intimidation and reprisal due to this participation. The Security Council Affairs Division engages regularly with presiding Security Council delegations, jointly with OHCHR, to promote good practices for safe civil society engagement with the Council.

[17] See https://www.ireland.ie/en/un/newyork/news-and-speeches/speeches-archive/general-debate-of-the-third-committee-cross-regional-joint-statement-on-reprisals-for-cooperation-with-the-un/.

[18] HRI/MC/2026/2, annex I.

[19] See https://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2026/03/security-council-member-states-quick-reference-guide-mitigating-reprisal-risks-for-women-civil-society-briefers-in-public-security-council-meetings.

[20] Security Council resolution 2796 (2025). See also https://unsmil.unmissions.org/en/structured-dialogue.

Advance edited version

IV. Ensuring access to the United Nations, its representatives and mechanisms in the field of human rights

24. Obstacles facing individuals and organizations who addressed United Nations forums have been addressed in previous reports. Alleged attempts by representatives of Member States to block or delay the accreditation of civil society representatives continued to be reported during the period. Attempts by representatives of States to prevent, interrupt or discredit civil society's interventions at United Nations meetings were also documented.

25. Incidents of intimidation and harassment on United Nations premises, including at Headquarters, continued to be documented, particularly affecting Indigenous Peoples. Civil society representatives reported being followed and photographed or recorded without their consent, as well as receiving intimidating remarks by government representatives before, during or after their participation in United Nations forums.

26. The rapporteur on reprisals of the Committee against Torture noted that some States Parties' delegations had made remarks or openly criticized civil society representatives for engaging with the Committee. Although such behaviour did not meet the Convention's criteria or the Committee's guidelines on reprisals, she underlined that it could create an atmosphere of pressure and a chilling effect on cooperation with civil society, undermining the safe and enabling environment the Committee sought to ensure.[21]

27. During the reporting period, the targeting of independent experts of the United Nations human rights mechanisms linked to the discharge of their official mandates continued, and even intensified. Several United Nations bodies and mechanisms addressed the issue,[22] noting that attacks included repressive activities against mandate holders and could affect their personal security and integrity. They underlined the deterrent effect of such attacks on the ability and willingness of individuals and groups cooperating or seeking to cooperate with the United Nations.[23]

28. Some United Nations peace operations[24] reported that individuals and communities seeking to access and engage with them, including to share information, faced challenges and obstacles. Other peace operations reported persistent movement restrictions and denials of access that in turn prevented affected civilians and communities from engaging with them, including victims of intimidation or reprisal. The Security Council has continued to urge States and all parties to ensure full and unhindered access and freedom of movement for peace operations, associated personnel and expert mechanisms.[25]

29. At its 2025 resumed session, the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations, of the Economic and Social Council, received 614 applications for consultative status, including 356 applications deferred from earlier sessions. The Committee recommended 170 of these for consultative status and deferred 381 for further consideration.[26] At its 2026 regular session, the Committee received 618 applications for consultative status, including 381 applications deferred from earlier sessions. The Committee recommended 214 of these for consultative status and deferred 361 for further consideration.[27]

30. Ahead of the April 2026 elections for the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations, special procedure mandate holders raised concerns about reported abuse of the accreditation process by States Members of the Committee. They noted that accreditation

[21] HRI/MC/2026/2, para. 20.

[22] A/HRC/61/66, para. 55; https://hrcportal.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2026-07/Bureau-meeting-minutes-of-18-June-2025_0.docx, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/statements/20251209-stm-sps-en.pdf; and https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/02/special-procedures-coordination-committee-condemns-attacks-against-francesca.

[23] Human Rights Council resolution 60/23.

[24] The term peace operations in this context is used to refer both to peacekeeping operations and to special political missions.

[25] Security Council resolutions 2800 (2025) (Central African Republic), 2808 (2025) (Democratic Republic of the Congo), 2818 (2026) (Afghanistan) and 2820 (2026) (South Sudan).

[26] See E/2025/32 (Part II).

[27] See E/2026/32 (Part I).

Advance edited version

delays and blocks in recent years had disproportionately affected human rights organizations, and warned that this practice could obstruct civil society engagement with the United Nations and effectively mute certain nongovernmental organizations (NGO) in United Nations spaces.[28]

31. The Secretary-General has repeatedly called for greater access to and participation of civil society in the work of the United Nations, which is critical for its effective functioning. He reiterates his previous calls on the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations to ensure that the criteria applied for assessing organizations are fair and transparent.[29]

V. Information received on cases of intimidation and reprisal for cooperating with the United Nations, its representatives and mechanisms in the field of human rights

A. General remarks

32. The present report includes cases based on information gathered between 1 May 2025 and 30 April 2026, in accordance with Human Rights Council resolutions 12/2 and 24/24, and contains information on acts of intimidation or reprisal against individuals and groups, as established by the Council in its resolution 12/2.

33. The information received has been verified and corroborated by primary and other sources, to the extent possible. Reference is made to United Nations publications or documents if the cases mentioned have been made public. Responses provided by Governments concerned are summarized, including positive actions taken.[30]

34. The present report and its annexes do not contain an exhaustive list of cases. The principle of do no harm and the consent of alleged victims to being named were strictly adhered to. As a result, cases were anonymized or omitted when the security risk to the individuals or their family members was deemed to be high. Furthermore, a number of cases brought to the attention of the Secretary-General were addressed confidentially.

35. As with previous reports on the subject, owing to the word limit, annex I contains additional information about new cases or situations presented during the reporting period that are summarized in the main report, with replies received from Governments to the relevant notes verbales. Annex II contains information on developments during the reporting period on ongoing cases or situations included in previous reports that are listed in the main report, with replies received from Governments. References are made to communications of special procedure mandate holders and the replies thereto from Governments, which may be found on the website for the communications of special procedures.[31]

B. Summary of cases

Afghanistan

36. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan documented three incidents of reprisal against at least seven individuals for their cooperation with the United Nations, which included arbitrary detention by the de facto authorities. Names and details of those concerned are withheld due to risks of further reprisals.

[28] See https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/04/states-champion-human-rights-defenders-must-consider-candidacy-ecosoc-ngo; and A/HRC/60/59, para. 132.

[29] A/HRC/48/28, para. 35; A/HRC/51/57, para. 28; A/HRC/54/61, para. 35; A/HRC/57/60, para. 35; and A/HRC/60/62, para. 30.

[30] Only government replies received within the deadline have been included in the annexes.

[31] See https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/Tmsearch/TMDocuments.

Advance edited version

37. The de facto authorities prohibited Afghan women from entering United Nations premises across the country.[32] Special procedure mandate holders expressed[33] alarm at the ban and at the presence of armed soldiers policing the gates of United Nations compounds to prevent women from entering.

38. The Human Rights Council called on the de facto authorities and all actors to cease reprisals and surveillance of those cooperating with the United Nations, including those based outside Afghanistan, and urged States to take measures against transnational repression targeting Afghans abroad.[34]

Algeria

39. Annex II contains information on developments in the situation of Ms. Jamila Loukil, Mr. Kaddour Chouicha and Mr. Mustapha Bendjamaa.

40. The Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection with the present report.

Bahrain

41. Annex II contains information on developments in the situation of Mr. Abdulhadi al-Khawaja, Mr. Abduljalil al-Singace and Mr. Hassan Mushaima.

42. The Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection with the present report.

Belarus

43. Special procedure mandate holders documented an increase in transnational persecution of individuals in exile that allegedly discouraged families from engaging with United Nations mandate holders, likely due to fear of reprisals.[35] They addressed the designation of the Belarusian Association of Human Rights Lawyers and of six lawyers linked to it as "extremist" as possible reprisals for their engagement with the United Nations. Those concerned were Mr. Dzmitry Lepretar, Ms. Natallia Matskevich, Ms. Tatsiana Lishankova, Mr. Uladzimir Pylchanka and Ms. Maryia Kolesava-Hudzilina, all in exile, and Mr. Dmitri Laevski, who remained in Belarus.[36]

44. OHCHR received information about the designation of the Human Rights House Foundation social media accounts as "extremist materials", reportedly due to the organization's engagement with the United Nations.

45. The Human Rights Council called on the Belarusian authorities to refrain from any form of intimidation and reprisals against persons and associations for their cooperation with United Nations human rights mechanisms.[37]

46. Annex II contains information on developments in the situation of Mr. Maksim Pazniakou and Mr. Aliaksandr Yarashuk, affiliated with the Belarusian Congress of Democratic Trade Unions, and of Mr. Ales Bialiatski and the Human Rights Centre Viasna.

47. The Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection with the present report.

Advance edited version

[32] See https://unama.unmissions.org/en/press-releases/un-in-afghanistan-calls-for-lifting-of-restrictions-on-female-staff-accessing.
[33] See https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/03/afghanistan-un-experts-demand-immediate-end-taliban-restrictions-women-un.
[34] Human Rights Council resolution 60/2.
[35] A/HRC/59/59, paras. 3, 45, and 88 (a).
[36] See BLR 9/2025.
[37] Human Rights Council resolution 61/26.

Burundi

48. Annex II contains information on developments in the situation of Mr. Armel Niyongere, Mr. Dieudonné Bashirahishize, Mr. Vital Nshimirimana and Mr. Lambert Nigarura.

Cameroon

49. Annex II contains information on developments in the situation of Ms. Maximilienne Ngo Mbe, as well as the situation of the civil society organization Organic Farming for Gorillas Cameroon, and of Mr. Jan Joris Cappelle.

China

50. The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention concluded that the detention in 2022 of human rights lawyer Mr. Xie Yang may amount to an act of reprisal for having been the subject of an opinion of the Working Group in 2017.[38]

51. Special procedure mandate holders addressed the forced return from the Lao People's Democratic Republic to China and the disappearance in 2023 of human rights lawyer Mr. Lu Siwei.[39] OHCHR received information that Mr. Lu had been compelled to flee China to the Lao People's Democratic Republic due to harassment linked to his human rights work, including his cooperation with the United Nations.

52. Annex II contains information on developments in the situations of Ms. Anna Kwok, Ms. Carmen Lau, Mr. Jimmy Lai, Ms. Chow Hang Tung, Ms. Li Qiaochu, Ms. Xu Yan, Mr. Yu Wensheng, Ms. Chen Jianfang, Ms. Wang Yu, Ms. Li Wenzu, , Ms. Wang Qiaoling, Mr. Li Heping and Mr. Jiang Tianyong.

53. The Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection with the present report.

Costa Rica

54. The Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers addressed public statements from a senior government official and social media messages discrediting Ms. Adriana Orocú Chavarría, head of the Costa Rican Association of the Judiciary. The statements included elements that could constitute reprisals for having engaged with the mandate of the Special Rapporteur.[40]

55. The Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection with the present report.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

56. The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) documented eight incidents of reprisal affecting eight individuals, including death threats, abductions, attempted murders, looting and destruction of property, reportedly for cooperation with MONUSCO. Names and details have been withheld due to fear of further reprisals.

Egypt

57. Annex II contains information on developments in the situation of Mr. Mohamed el-Baqer and Ms. Basma Mostafa.

[38] A/HRC/WGAD/2025/73, para. 59.
[39] See CHN 9/2025, CHN 10/2025, LAO 2/2025 and OTH 84/2025.
[40] See CRI 3/2025.

Advance edited version

Equatorial Guinea

58. OHCHR received information about intimidation and monitoring of Ms. María José Bikene Obiang, a human rights lawyer and head of the Equatorial Guinean Commission of Jurists, in connection with her engagement with the United Nations.

France

59. Special procedure mandate holders addressed allegations of intimidation, harassment and possible transnational repression on French territory against Mr. Joseph Akaravong, a Lao human rights defender living in France with refugee status.[41]

Germany

60. Special procedure mandate holders addressed the situation of a human rights defender registered as an asylum-seeker in Germany at risk of transnational repression, including for their cooperation with the United Nations, if transferred to a third country. The name and details are withheld for fear of further retaliation.[42]

61. OHCHR received information about continued acts of transnational repression on German territory against Ms. Basma Mostafa in connection with her engagement with the United Nations and her efforts to address the transnational nature of the threats, to seek protection and to ensure accountability.[43]

62. The Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection with the present report.

Guatemala

63. Annex II contains information on developments in the situation of Ms. Thelma Aldana, Mr. Juan Francisco Sandoval, Ms. Eva Siomara Sosa Pérez, Ms. Amy Mayra Lissette Girón Rodas, Mr. Stuardo Ernesto Campo Aguilar, Ms. Virginia Laparra Rivas, Ms. Samari Gómez Díaz, Mr. Carlos Ruano Pineda, Ms. Érika Aifán Dávila, Ms. Yassmín Barrios Aguilar, Mr. Pablo Xitumul de Paz, Ms. Claudia González Orellana, Ms. Leily Santizo and Ms. Claudia Maselli.

64. The Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection with the present report.

Guinea-Bissau

65. Special procedure mandate holders and the Human Rights Committee addressed allegations of abduction and severe beating of Mr. Luís Cordeiro Vaz Martins, a lawyer and human rights defender, allegedly in connection with his participation in the pre-session of the universal periodic review and also for his engagement with the Committee.[44]

66. The Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection with the present report.

India

67. Annex II contains information on developments in the situation of the Centre for Social Development and its staff, including Mr. Nobokishore Urikhimbam.

Iran (Islamic Republic of)

68. Annex II contains information on developments in the situation of family members of journalists of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Persian Service for the journalists' statement at the Human Rights Council.

[41] See FRA 11/2025.
[42] See DEU 1/2026.
[43] See EGY 6/2024.
[44] See GNB 1/2026.

Advance edited version

Israel

69. The United Nations documented persistent self-censorship and choices not to cooperate with the Organization or to do so under conditions of anonymity, due to fear of reprisals by Israeli authorities in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Names and details of those concerned are withheld for fear of further reprisals.

70. The adoption on 29 December 2025 of amendments to the Law to Cease United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) Operations [45] reportedly contributed to an operational environment of intimidation and reprisals against witnesses, victims and beneficiaries, as well as service providers and international NGOs, for engaging or cooperating with UNRWA.

71. On 27 March 2026, the Human Rights Council expressed concern about acts of intimidation, threats, sanctions, reprisals or other coercive measures, including against those who cooperate with United Nations mandate holders, and called upon Israel to revoke all unsubstantiated designations of Palestinian human rights and humanitarian organizations as terrorist or unlawful organizations.[46]

72. Annex II contains information on developments in the case of the designation by Israeli authorities as terrorist organizations of six Palestinian NGOs and on the sanctions subsequently imposed by the Office of Foreign Assets Control, of the United States Department of the Treasury, on the operations of two of them.

Lao People's Democratic Republic

73. Special procedure mandate holders addressed allegations of transnational reprisals against Mr. Joseph Akaravong, a Lao human rights defender living in France with refugee status, for his cooperation with the United Nations. They noted that he had reportedly been attacked under circumstances that raised concern regarding possible links to State agents of the Lao People's Democratic Republic or individuals acting with the acquiescence or support of State authorities of the Lao People's Democratic Republic.[47]

74. The Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights expressed concern at an alleged systematic pattern of transnational repression against individuals and groups critical of the authorities.[48]

75. Mandate holders addressed the forced return from the Lao People's Democratic Republic to China and disappearance in 2023 of Mr. Lu Siwei.[49] During the reporting period, OHCHR received information that Mr. Lu had been compelled to flee China to the Lao People's Democratic Republic due to harassment, including for his cooperation with the United Nations.

Libya

76. UNSMIL continued to document a restrictive civic space and a climate of fear, self-censorship and decreased cooperation with the United Nations. Civil society actors and individuals faced threats, harassment, arbitrary arrest and detention, and administrative restrictions, due to their cooperation with the United Nations. Following the launch of the United Nations-facilitated Structured Dialogue[50] on 14 December 2025, women participants reported fear of reprisals as well as security incidents involving State and non-State actors and declined to formally report incidents. Names and additional details are withheld due to fear of further reprisals.

[45] See A/79/684-S/2024/892; ISR 3/2025; https://www.un.org/unispal/document/secretary-general-statement-31dec25/ and https://www.un.org/unispal/document/unrwa-commissioner-general-on-new-anti%e2%80%91unrwa-legislation-passed-by-the-israeli-parliament/.

[46] Human Rights Council resolution 61/4, paras. 11 and 12.

[47] See LAO 3/2025.

[48] A/HRC/61/49/Add.1, para. 36.

[49] See LAO 1/2023; LAO 2/2025; and https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/08/lao-must-immediately-release-chinese-lawyer-lu-siwei-and-prevent-his.

[50] See https://unsmil.unmissions.org/en/structured-dialogue.

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77. UNSMIL received reports of individuals, including national staff of international civil society and other organizations, who had been detained after being accused of "intelligence activity". Concerns were reported about the potential misuse of national security arguments to penalize or discourage engagement with international organizations, including the United Nations.

Nicaragua

78. The Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua documented the use of extensive transnational repression against and a climate of fear among Nicaraguans in exile that had led to self-censorship and isolation.[51] OHCHR documented that several individuals had declined to cooperate with OHCHR for fear of potential reprisals against them or their families.[52] Names and details of those concerned are withheld for fear of reprisals.

79. OHCHR received information that the "Puentes para el Desarrollo" foundation and its members had been the subject of acts of transnational repression in exile, including for their cooperation with the United Nations. It further documented incidents affecting at least 10 individuals or groups of undue pressure by national authorities not to cooperate with international organizations and the United Nations.

80. The Human Rights Council condemned all acts of intimidation, harassment and reprisal, both online and offline, by State and non-State actors against individuals and groups that seek to cooperate or have cooperated with the United Nations.[53]

81. Annex II contains information on developments in the situations of Mr. Brooklyn Rivera and Mr. Guillermo Gonzalo Carrión Maradiaga – members of an NGO, the "Nicaragua Nunca Más" Human Rights Collective – and of Mr. Félix Alejandro Maradiaga.

Pakistan

82. Annex II contains information on developments in the situation of leaders and members of the Baloch Yakjehti Committee as well as their family members and lawyers, including Ms. Mahrang Baloch, Ms. Beebow Baloch, Ms. Gulzadi Baloch, Mr. Sibghatullah Shahjee, Mr. Bebarg Baloch and Mr. Israr Baloch.

Russian Federation

83. Special procedure mandate holders addressed allegations of arbitrary arrest, detention and criminal prosecution under counter-terrorism legislation of Indigenous human rights defender Ms. Daria Egereva, reportedly for her cooperation with the United Nations.[54] They also addressed the designation of the Batani International Indigenous Fund for Development and Solidarity as an "undesirable organization", reportedly linked to its participation in international forums, including at the United Nations.[55]

84. OHCHR received information about the designation of Ms. Violetta Fitsner, board member of the NGO Memorial Human Rights Defence Centre and an advocacy officer at OVD-Info, as a "foreign agent" in connection with her cooperation with United Nations.

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[51] A/HRC/61/56, paras. 22–53 and 99. See https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/03/nicaragua-un-experts-uncover-corrupt-financing-repression-and-spy-network, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/10/nicaragua-un-group-experts-urges-international-community-hold-government, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/09/nicaragua-un-experts-warn-escalating-repression-reaching-beyond-borders and https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/06/nicaragua-un-group-experts-condemns-murder-prominent-political-opponent.

[52] A/HRC/60/92, para. 3.

[53] Human Rights Council resolution 58/18.

[54] See RUS 3/2026.

[55] A/HRC/60/59, para. 133.

85. The Human Rights Council expressed concern about the use of laws against civil society in the Russian Federation and against Indigenous Peoples to criminalize cooperation with United Nations human rights mechanisms. It also condemned transnational repression of civil society actors, including attacks on relatives and the use of extraterritorial legislation.[56]

86. The Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection with the present report.

Saudi Arabia

87. Annex II contains information on developments in the situation of Ms. Loujain Al-Hathloul.

88. The Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection with the present report.

Sri Lanka

89. OHCHR documented harassment and intimidation by State security officials against seven human rights defenders and families of the disappeared who had engaged with the United Nations or other international actors. Three other human rights defenders were summoned and questioned about their alleged participation in Human Rights Council sessions in Geneva.[57]

90. The Committee on Enforced Disappearances received an allegation of threats from State authorities to a person who had participated in its review and dialogue with Sri Lanka in September 2025 and who had provided inputs to the Committee on several occasions.[58]

South Sudan

91. During the reporting period, United Nations entities documented the further erosion of civic space, including increased restrictions on civil society actors, obstacles to cooperation with the United Nations in an environment of fear and impunity, and access restrictions affecting United Nations personnel.

Thailand

92. Annex II contains information on developments in the situation of Mr. Y Quynh Bdap, Mr. Nguyen Van An and Ms. Angkhana Neelapaijit.

Turkmenistan

93. Annex II contains information on developments in the situation of Mr. Nurgeldi Halykov.

Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

94. The fact-finding mission documented that a climate of fear on the part of sources of cooperating with the mission, including sources based abroad, had led to serious limitations and obstacles to its work, including engaging with sources and verifying information obtained.[59]

[56] Human Rights Council resolution 60/21.
[57] A/HRC/60/21, para. 26.
[58] HRI/MC/2026/2, para. 27.
[59] See the conference room paper of the independent international fact-finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, available on the web page of the Human Rights Council at https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/regular-sessions/session60/list-reports, paras. 533, 551, 556 and 558.

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95. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and special procedure mandate holders variously addressed allegations of arbitrary detention and short-term enforced disappearance of Ms. Martha Lía Grajales, also arising in connection with her participation in a peaceful vigil in front of the United Nations building in Caracas.[60]

96. Annex II contains information on developments in the situation of Mr. Yendri Velásquez.

Viet Nam

97. The Human Rights Committee noted allegations of reprisals against human rights defenders for their engagement with the United Nations.[61] Special procedure mandate holders addressed a reported pattern of arbitrary arrests, detention, ill-treatment and intimidation of Khmer Krom individuals, human rights defenders and Theravada Buddhist monks, in some cases amounting to intimidation and reprisal, for perceived cooperation with the United Nations. Those concerned were Mr. Thach Chanh Da Ra, Mr. Duong Khai, Mr. Thach Nga, Mr. Thach Xuan Dong, Mr. Hoang Chuong, Mr. Thach Cuong, Mr. Danh Minh Quang and Mr. Lam Vong.[62]

98. Mandate holders also addressed the situation of Ms. Trịnh Thị Thảo and Ms. Đỗ Thị Thu in regard to allegations of intimidation, surveillance and questioning in connection to their role communicating information on the arbitrary detention of their relatives to international mechanisms, including the United Nations.[63]

99. Annex II contains information on developments in the situation of Mr. Y Quynh Bdap, the NGO Boat People SOS, and Mr. Thang Dinh Nguyen.

100. The Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection with the present report.

Yemen

101. During the reporting period, according to information received by OHCHR, the Houthis, as well as actors in government-controlled areas, sustained practices of intimidation and reprisal against individuals for their cooperation with the United Nations. OHCHR received information that the Youth Organization for Development and Democracy had faced a coordinated digital smear campaign in connection with the implementation of a United Nations project.

102. Annex II contains information on developments in the situations of the NGO Mwatana Organization for Human Rights and its staff.

State of Palestine

103. Annex II contains information on the cases of several detainees in the custody of Palestinian authorities who reported fearing or having faced reprisals after participating in interviews with OHCHR, as well as of several Palestinian and international women's organizations and human rights defenders.

VI. Conclusions and recommendations

104. **The number of reported acts of intimidation and reprisal by State and non-State actors against those seeking to cooperate or having cooperated with the United Nations remained high. Incidents were reported across all regions and involved 31 Member States and one non-member observer State, similar to last year. Verified cases concerning four Member States were not included in the present report because of serious risks to the victims.**

[60] See https://x.com/UNHumanRights/status/1954927581905715466; and VEN 4/2025.
[61] CCPR/C/VNM/CO/4, paras. 46 and 47 (c).
[62] See VNM 5/2025 and A/HRC/WGAD/2025/30.
[63] See VNM 8/2025.

Advance edited version

105. **The civic space necessary to engage with the United Nations continues to be under growing pressure, in particular the rights to participation in public affairs, freedom of expression, and peaceful assembly and association. Civil society actors across regions increasingly faced undue restrictions, administrative hurdles, criminalization, threats and attacks, and considerable funding cuts. The decline in civic space heightened obstacles and contributed to an environment of fear and self-censorship when engaging with the United Nations.**

106. **As in previous reports, the cases and situations included do not reflect the actual breadth and scope of the issue. Some cases had to be reported anonymously due to protection concerns. Others had to be excluded, as anonymity was not considered to provide adequate protection or due to serious risks of further reprisals. Therefore, the decrease – or even absence – of reported allegations in certain contexts should be interpreted with caution and may not be indicative of wider trends.**

107. **In this context, United Nations entities continued to document global trends similar to previous years, with deeper concerns emerging during the reporting period. Allegations of transnational repression across borders[64] seemed to be on the rise, with examples from all regions, some enabled by the misuse of digital technologies. The documented acts of transnational repression during the reporting period have affected at least 43 individuals and four organizations based in third States. Those concerned were allegedly targeted by State and non-State actors affiliated with their countries of origin or with the countries that were the focus of their work, as a result of their engagement with the United Nations. Such incidents were documented in nearly half (15 out of 32) of the States included in the present report. Of those 15 States, 13 were reportedly responsible for the incidents, whereas the two other States were the location where the transnational repression occurred, but the States themselves were reportedly not involved in the incidents.**

108. **Acts of transnational repression documented comprised arbitrary detention, criminal charges, in-absentia trials, online and offline surveillance, physical attacks, intimidation, digital harassment, confiscation of property and passports, and movement restrictions. They also included instrumentalization of the legal frameworks for combating transnational crime, terrorism and cybercrime, as well as the use of mechanisms of criminal justice cooperation – such as extraditions – without appropriate safeguards. These acts were targeted at those directly engaging with the United Nations, with their organizations and, in some instances, with their family members and associates in their countries of origin.**

109. **Self-censorship and the choice not to cooperate with the United Nations or to do so under conditions of anonymity due to fear of reprisals continued to prevail. Self-censorship was documented in different contexts, some marked by conflicts and crises, others by authoritarian and repressive policies, human rights violations, and fear of criminal liability for cooperating with the United Nations. In such contexts, those seeking to engage with the United Nations often faced heightened risks and reduced access to protections, which further constrained cooperation, data collection and reporting. Individuals and organizations continued to request anonymous reporting and the numbers remained significant, with half of the cases in annex I anonymized, which is comparable to earlier reporting periods. The choice not to cooperate due to risks remains a challenge and is likely underreported.**

110. **OHCHR and other United Nations entities, including peace operations, continued to document a decline in engagement by individuals citing fear of reprisals. They also reported the occupation and destruction of their premises as well as bans on accessing their premises. Persistent restrictions and denials of access to United Nations personnel in the context of peace operations continued during the reporting period and prevented the engagement of individuals and groups with the Organization.**

[64] See https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/transnational-repression-1-en.pdf.

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111. **Online and offline surveillance of those who cooperate or attempt to cooperate with the United Nations remains a concern. Surveillance was reported in almost one out of two of the States included in the present report, compared to one third in the previous year. The reporting period highlighted the growing role of digital technologies in enabling intimidation and reprisals, including through online surveillance, harassment, coordinated disinformation campaigns and the targeting of individuals across borders. These trends underscore the need for stronger safeguards to protect those engaging with the United Nations in digital spaces.**

112. **Continued misuse of civil society, counterterrorism, cybercrime and national security laws and regulations resulted in the deterring or hindering of cooperation with the United Nations. As in the previous reporting period, more than half of the States mentioned in the present report applied, amended or enacted laws that criminalized or further restricted civil society activities and created additional obstacles to engagement with the United Nations.**

113. **Youth, women defenders, peacebuilders and Indigenous Peoples continued to be exposed to heightened risks when engaging with the United Nations, compounded by multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination. Victims and witnesses of violations and abuses, human rights activists, lawyers, environmental defenders, journalists and trade unionists continued to bear the brunt of intimidation and reprisals, as in previous periods.**

114. **As noted in past reports, some cases and situations in annex II are more than isolated incidents. Recurring allegations of repeated incidents of reprisal may signal patterns. They also signal that intimidation and reprisal for cooperation with the United Nations may be part of broader attempts to control civic space and to deter engagement with United Nations entities and human rights mechanisms. The Secretary-General is concerned that some cases in annex II have remained unresolved for years and urges the Member States concerned to take measures to address them.**

115. **Awareness, prevention and risk mitigation are the best safeguards against intimidation and reprisals, and they should be at the centre of United Nations efforts. An enhanced system-wide response is also based on documentation and reporting, as well as sustained political will, increased accountability, and close collaboration with Member States and affected individuals and groups.**

116. **The right of everyone, individually and in association with others, to unhindered access to and communication with international bodies, in particular the United Nations, its representatives and mechanisms in the field of human rights, as consistently reaffirmed in Human Rights Council resolutions,[65] must be respected and protected. It is the engagement with civil society interlocutors that makes the work of the United Nations possible and meaningful, across all pillars. If they cannot trust that they can cooperate safely with the United Nations, we all lose. States bear the primary responsibility for preventing and addressing intimidation and reprisals for cooperation with the United Nations. The Secretary-General urges relevant States to refrain from such acts, to protect those at risk and to ensure accountability.**

117. **The Secretary-General remains committed to continuing to advance the implementation of good practices across the United Nations system, in cooperation with Member States and civil society. Effective action requires coordinated efforts and commitment by Member States, the United Nations and civil society to ensure that all those who engage with the United Nations can do so safely, freely and without fear.**

[65] Human Rights Council resolutions 24/24, para. 1; 36/21, para. 1; 42/28, para. 1; 48/17, para. 1; 54/24, para. 1; and 60/23, para. 1.

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Annex I

Comprehensive information on alleged cases of reprisals and intimidation for cooperation with the United Nations on human rights

1. Afghanistan

1. During the reporting period, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) recorded at least three instances of reprisals against at least seven individuals, including media workers, for their cooperation or perceived cooperation with the United Nations. All three instances involved arbitrary detentions of individuals by Afghanistan's *de facto* authorities, who accused the individuals of sharing information with the United Nations. Names and details of those concerned are withheld due to risks of further reprisals.

2. Reportedly, a prevailing climate of fear and intimidation has contributed to individuals being compelled to self-censor owing to a fear of repercussions from the *de facto* authorities. Interlocutors often report fear for their safety if they discuss human rights issues with UNAMA and often either request that what they say be kept confidential or decide not to report at all what happened to them. In addition to threats and restrictions imposed by the *de facto* authorities, resources are severely limited due to economic challenges and the withdrawal of donor funding after August 2021. Without adequate civil society capacity to address urgent protection cases, individuals facing reprisals for cooperating with the United Nations are left with few avenues for support.

3. Since 7 September 2025, adding to a plethora of restrictions imposed on women's rights and freedoms since 2021, the *de facto* authorities have prohibited Afghan women from entering United Nations premises across the country.[1] On 31 March 2026, special procedure mandate holders expressed alarm[2] over the continuing ban preventing Afghan women from accessing United Nations premises, including for national staff, contractors, and visitors. Mandate holders stressed that there can be no cultural, religious or administrative justification for this policy and expressed their outrage at the presence of armed soldiers policing the gates of United Nations compounds to prevent women from entering. Mandate holders underscored that the United Nations cannot operate effectively – or in accordance with its values and Charter – when women are deliberately and systematically excluded.

4. On 6 October 2025, the Human Rights Council adopted resolution 60/2 on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan. The Council called upon the de facto authorities and all actors to cease reprisals and threats against and surveillance of those cooperating with United Nations mechanisms, including those based outside Afghanistan, and urged States to take measures against transnational repression targeting Afghans abroad. The Human Rights Council further called upon all relevant actors in Afghanistan to ensure that civil society organizations, human rights defenders, victims, survivors, their families and other individuals have unhindered access to the United Nations bodies and mechanisms without fear of reprisal, intimidation or attack (A/HRC/RES/60/2, OP 19 and 37).

2. Belarus

5. During the reporting period, several United Nations entities reported that relatives of human rights defenders, lawyers, and trade unionists in exile were subjected to pressure and harassment in reprisal for their engagement with the United Nations (see Annex II). They also addressed the designation of human rights organizations and their social media accounts

[1] https://unama.unmissions.org/en/un-afghanistan-calls-lifting-restrictions-female-staff-accessing-un-premises.

[2] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/03/afghanistan-un-experts-demand-immediate-end-taliban-restrictions-women-un.

Advance edited version

as “extremist formations” or “extremist materials” as measures that could constitute reprisals for engagement with the United Nations human rights system.

6. In his report to the Human Rights Council in June 2025, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus reported an increase in transnational persecution of individuals who had to leave the country following the political repression that began in 2020. This included in absentia trials lacking fair trial guarantees and due process and the confiscation of property. He also documented pressure exerted on relatives of exiled individuals and political prisoners, which reportedly discouraged families from engaging with human rights defenders and United Nations mandate holders due to fear of reprisals. The Special Rapporteur recommended that the Government enhance cooperation with special procedures and ensure protection against reprisals for those engaging with them (A/HRC/59/59, paras. 3, 45, and 88(a)).

7. On 15 October and 17 November 2025, special procedures mandate holders addressed the designation of the **Belarusian Association of Human Rights Lawyers (BAHRL)** as an “extremist formation” and of six disbarred lawyers linked to it as “individuals involved in extremist activities,” noting that these measures may constitute reprisals for engagement with the United Nations human rights system. Founded in 2023 by Belarusian lawyers in exile, BAHRL submits complaints to international human rights bodies, including United Nations mechanisms (BLR 9/2025).

8. On 18 August 2025, the State Security Committee of Belarus adopted Decision No. 3/3-1962 designating BAHRL as an “extremist formation.” The decision whose grounds remain undisclosed entered into force on 21 August 2025, and on 22 August the Ministry of Internal Affairs added BAHRL to its public list of entities involved in extremist activities. The lawyers concerned were **Mr. Dzmitry Lepretar, Ms. Natallia Matskevich, Ms. Tatsiana Lishankova, Mr. Uladzimir Pylchanka, and Ms. Maryia Kolesava-Hudzilina**, all in exile, as well as **Mr. Dmitri Laevski,** who remained in Belarus (BLR 9/2025).

9. On 15 December 2025, the Government informed mandate holders that BAHRL was found to be an extremist organization in August 2025 and its activities banned in Belarus. It rejected the view that the listed individuals were being “persecuted” in retaliation for their legitimate legal and human rights work as unfounded and contrary to the facts.

10. According to information received by OHCHR, on 13 March 2026 the Belarusian authorities designated the social media accounts of the **Human Rights House Foundation (HRHF)** – a Norway-based international human rights organization with ECOSOC consultative status – as “extremist materials,” pursuant to a ruling of the Haretski District Court of the Mahiliou Region. This designation is reportedly connected to HRHF’s engagement with the United Nations human rights mechanisms. HRHF does not operate in Belarus. Its work on Belarus is carried out from abroad and focuses on supporting Belarusian civil society in exile, engaging with United Nations human rights mechanisms, and publicly advocating on human rights violations in the country. The designation of HRHF’s social media accounts as “extremist materials” exposes people in Belarus to legal liability for accessing or interacting with its content and may also have broader extraterritorial implications for HRHF’s Belarusian partners in exile.

11. In its 2026 resolution on the situation of human rights in Belarus, the Human Rights Council reiterated its call to the Belarusian authorities to establish full and non-selective engagement with all United Nations human rights mechanisms, including the Group of Independent Experts, and to refrain from all forms of intimidation and reprisals against persons and associations for their cooperation with those mechanisms (A/HRC/RES/61/26, OP10).

12. On 25 June 2026, the Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection with the preparation of the present report. The Government noted that the legislation of Belarus, including in terms of countering extremism and combating terrorism, is fully consistent with the Constitution, generally recognized norms of international law, and is constantly being improved to ensure the rights and freedoms of citizens, as well as the national security interests of Belarus.

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13. Regarding BAHRL, the Government informed that it has been recognized as an extremist organization, and its activities are prohibited in Belarus. According to the Government, the prosecutor's supervision indicated that this decision was made in strict compliance by law enforcement and judicial bodies with the provisions of the Constitution, domestic laws and international obligations of Belarus.

14. Concerning the Human Rights House Foundation, the Government stated that according to a ruling by the Goretsky District Court of the Mogilev Region, its social media accounts "Human Rights House Foundation" were recognized "extremist materials" on the grounds that these accounts had posted and publicly displayed information previously deemed extremist by court decisions.

3. China

15. On 14 November 2025, the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention concluded that the re-arrest and detention in 2022 of **Mr. Xie Yang**, a human rights lawyer, may amount to an act of reprisal for having been the subject of a Working Group's opinion in 2017 (A/HRC/WGAD/73/2025, AEV, para. 59).

16. Mr. Xie Yang was the subject of the Working Group's opinion No. 59/2017 where the Group found that his 2015 detention was arbitrary. In May 2017, Mr. Xie was convicted of "inciting subversion" but was exempted from serving time in prison in exchange for renouncing his allegations of torture. Mr. Xie Yang was re-arrested in January 2022 and has remained in pre-trial detention since then. His situation has been addressed on several occasions by special procedures mandate holders, including during the reporting period (CHN 8/2025, and 10/2025).[3] In its 2025 Opinion, the Working Group considered that Mr. Xie's re-arrest for the exercise of rights that it had previously found to be protected may amount to reprisal against him for having been the subject of its Opinion in 2017.

17. During the reporting period, mandate holders addressed a reported surge in human rights violations of a transnational nature in the Greater Mekong Subregion, including China (see also Annex II). In this context, they addressed the forced return from Lao PDR to China in 2023 and the temporary disappearance of human rights lawyer **Mr. Lu Siwei**. Mr. Lu Siwei was deported under the framework of the mechanism for bilateral cooperation between the two countries (CHN 9/2025, CHN 10/2025, LAO 2/2025 and OTH 84/2025).[4] (See Annex I, section on Lao PDR).[5]

18. The Government of China stated that following Mr. Lu Siwei's deportation, he was released on bail, pending an investigation into the crime of illegally crossing the border. On 15 October 2024, he was re-arrested based on what the Government deemed to be sufficient evidence (CHN 9/2025).

19. According to information received by OHCHR, in July 2023 Mr. Lu Siwei was compelled to flee China to Lao PDR due to harassment and intimidation linked to his human rights work, including his cooperation with the United Nations. Information about Mr. Lu Siwei's cooperation with the United Nations could not be publicly reported before due to fear of further reprisals. In April 2025, after having been returned to China by Lao PDR, Mr. Lu Siwei was reportedly convicted by the Chenghua District People's Court in Sichuan Province for illegally crossing the border. Mr. Lu Siwei's appeal of his conviction was rejected by the Chengdu Intermediate People's Court on 16 July 2025. On 5 August 2025, he was released

[3] CHN 3/2017, CHN 13/2024, and CHN 15/2024. See Government replies at https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=33449 https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=38937 https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=38852 https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=39097 https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=39195.

[4] LAO 1/2023; see also https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/08/lao-must-immediately-release-chinese-lawyer-lu-siwei-and-prevent-his.

[5] The allegations of intimidation and reprisals concerning is Mr. Lu Siwei are connected to and should be read in conjunction with the related allegations concerning the same individual in Annex I, section on Lao PDR.

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after serving an 11-month prison sentence. Since his release, Mr. Lu has reportedly faced police harassment and surveillance.

20. On 10 July 2026, the Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection with the preparation of the present report. It rejected allegations that it retaliates against persons cooperating with UN human rights mechanisms.

21. Regarding the case of Mr. Xie Yang, the Government stated that in January 2022, he was criminally detained on suspicion of inciting subversion of state power; that the case was transferred for prosecution in July 2022; that on 23 March 2026, the Changsha Intermediate People's Court sentenced him to five years' imprisonment and a fine of RMB 100,000 for inciting subversion of state power; that he did not appeal and was currently serving his sentence in prison.

22. Regarding the case of Mr. Lu Siwei, the Government stated that on 18 April 2025, the Chenghua District People's Court of Chengdu sentenced him to 11 months' imprisonment and a fine of RMB 10,000; that he appealed the sentence; that on 16 July 2025 the Chengdu Intermediate People's Court upheld the original judgment; and that he completed his sentence and was released on 5 August 2025.

4. Costa Rica

23. On 22 May 2025, the UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers addressed public statements from the highest level of the Executive and social media messages discrediting **Ms. Adriana Orocú Chavarría,** head of the Costa Rican Association of the Judiciary (ACOJUD). The statements included elements that could constitute reprisals for having engaged with her mandate (CRI 3/2025).

24. In connection with a communication sent by the Special Rapporteur to the Government of Costa Rica in December 2024 (CRI 3/2024), the President of the Republic referred to both the communication and to Ms. Orocú during a press conference on 12 February 2025, making statements that could be seen as undermining her credibility, her work, and her cooperation with the mandate. Following this, Ms. Orocú was reportedly the target of harassment and smearing messages on social media, which included a photograph of her with the Special Rapporteur (CRI 3/2025).

25. The Special Rapporteur deplored the statements from the President of the Republic seeking to discredit an association of judges and Ms. Orocú Echevarria, including for having cooperated with her by sharing information on matters relevant to the mandate. As statements by the highest Executive authority, the Special Rapporteur noted that they carry significant influence over public opinion, increasing the seriousness of the alleged reprisals (CRI 3/2025).

26. On 23 July 2025, the Government responded[6] to the communication by the Special Rapporteur noting that Costa Rica has ratified international treaties which reinforce the State's obligation to protect those who report human rights violations or cooperate with international mechanisms. The Government stated that the existing legal framework is consistent with Costa Rica's commitment to protecting those who cooperate with international human rights mechanisms, including public officials who, in the exercise of their duties or as whistleblowers, may be subject to retaliation, intimidation, or arbitrary acts. It further noted that the possibility of filing an *amparo* remedy without excessive formalities ensures real and effective access to justice.

5. Democratic Republic of the Congo

27. During the reporting period, the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO) of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) documented **eight incidents of reprisals affecting eight individuals** perpetrated by armed forces and groups against human rights defenders for cooperating with

[6] https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=39109.

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the Mission in the conflict affected provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri. Five incidents were attributed to the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23), two to the Convention pour la Révolution Populaire (CRP) and one to the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC).

28. The previously reported hostilities of the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) towards human rights defenders and journalists whom they accused of reporting on the Movement's activities[7] continued and expanded as they gained and consolidated control over new territories in North and South Kivu. As a result, three of the four victims of reprisals who were under MONUSCO protection in 2024 remained in hiding during the reporting period and one of them received new threats. In Ituri, the Convention pour la Révolution Populaire intensified threats against UNJHRO civil society partners to force them to stop cooperating with or to deter them from cooperating with the Mission in territories where the group is active. The reported threats included texts and voice messages informing defenders that they and their families had been located and that they would be killed; surveillance and movement tracking; visits to their homes, with pressures on family members to disclose the human rights defenders' whereabouts. Reported acts of reprisals against defenders also included physical attacks against them, looting and destruction of their property; as well as abductions and attempted murders.

29. According to UNJHRO, since February 2025, a woman human rights defender member of a women's rights organization promoting women's rights and accountability for sexual violence against women and girls in Ituri had been receiving thinly veiled threat messages through her phone. The text messages sent from masked numbers included questions about the women defender's whereabouts and about whether she was "gossiping" on them or "lying" about them to "her human rights people". On 12 May 2025, neighbours informed her that a group of elements of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) had visited her home several times during her absence looking for her. She went to meet the local FARDC commander to enquire about the reasons for the visits. The commander interrogated her about her movements and activities asking where she had been; whether she had taken her reports to UNJHRO, and what she had said again. One of the soldiers present during and participating in the interrogation threatened to kill her if she did not stop denouncing FARDC actions "to the foreigners". The woman defender continued to receive threats through texts and calls that she attributed to FARDC as the tone of those messages was reminiscent of the one used by the FARDC commander mentioned above. The text messages stated that they (FARDC) were keeping an eye on her; asked her what she was gaining from her "lies"; and warned her to prepare to "follow those foreigners when they leave Ituri". She finally left her home in October 2025 for her security.

30. A male journalist who had narrowly escaped an attempted murder in an armed attack on his house in the evening on 7 July 2025 in Bukavu, South Kivu fled to North Kivu and contacted UNJHRO shortly thereafter. Credible independent sources from the area where he lived confirmed the incident to the Mission and attributed it to M23 de facto authorities who sought to silence the journalist because of his findings on their illegal mining activities and related human rights violations. Besides, the journalist met with members of the OHCHR Fact-Finding Mission on the situation in North and South Kivu Provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC-FFM) during its visit to the country in 2025. Following the meeting with the DRC-FFM in September and October 2025, M23 elements started sending him text messages on his phone warning that they knew that he "denounced them to foreigners from human rights organisations" in a veiled reference to the DRC-FFM and that "they would get him anytime". In February 2026, the journalist relocated farther away from the area to escape M23 reach.

31. In the morning of 16 August 2025, a male human rights defender member of a civil society organization advocating for the rights of vulnerable people in his community in the southern part of the South Kivu province received an anonymous phone call. The caller told him that the M23 had identified him as part of persons who used to report M23 activities to the UNJHRO, and that "they would deal with him" if he continued to "gossip" about them. In the afternoon of the same day, the human rights defender received another call from the

[7] A/HRC/60/62, para. 34.

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M23-appointed deputy de facto governor of South Kivu. He asked the defender where he was staying and warned him to stop smearing the M23 image to the UNJHRO. Fearing for his life, the defender left his hometown.

32. Between June and September 2025, a human rights defender and chairperson of a local civil society organization in hiding due to threats from the M23 in the North Kivu province kept receiving insisting calls from unknown numbers. He ignored them fearing that they may be originating from M23. On 16 November 2025, he received threatening text messages from a former police officer, who had joined the M23. The text messages read that they knew where he was and were aware of his "fake reports" against them to UNJHRO; that UN soldiers would not stop them (M23) when they came after him ; that he had better come negotiate with them; and that, if he did not, they had located his family and would soon bring him the heads of his family members, "one after the other". The defender feared for the safety of his family and requested that their situation be closely monitored.

33. On 3 December 2025, suspected CRP armed elements attacked the home of a human rights defender who had been a long time-partner of UNJHRO in Ituri. Failing to find him, they looted his house and burnt part of his property. Two days later, CRP combatants bragged that they would not miss him the second time if he continued lying about them to UNJHRO. The defender relocated away from his area of residence. Three weeks later, CRP stated that they knew the whereabouts of "traitors" and would track them even in other provinces. Since then, the defender had remained in hiding owing to concerns that CRP elements were tracking him.

34. On 7 December 2025, as M23 was expanding its control towards the southern parts of South Kivu province, a human rights defender and coordinator of a network of several civil society organizations that had been supported by UNJHRO received threatening calls from M23 officers asking him about his whereabouts. He said he was outside the DRC, to which the caller replied asking whether the defender had fled to his "bosses from human rights organisations", and threatening that they (M23)) would find him either at the office or at home, and would see how his "reporting bosses" saved him from their hands. Due to protection concerns, the human rights defender fled into exile.

35. On 21 February 2026, approximately ten unidentified armed individuals stormed the house of a human rights defender in Ituri province. They shouted enjoining him to come out, that his "UNJHRO friends" need his report, but they needed to "see it first". The defender being absent, the assailants intimidated his spouse and children demanding they disclose where he was hiding. They left vowing that they would locate him and "seal his loud mouth". Neighbours who witnessed the incident identified the armed men as CRP elements based on their knowledge of armed groups operating in the area. They called the defender and warned him to stay away, which he temporarily did. Since then, the defender kept changing homes to escape the threats.

36. On 25 March 2026, M23 combatants abducted the focal point of a human rights defenders' network and partner to UNJHRO in the northern part of North Kivu and detained him at one of their intelligence headquarters. Witnesses to the abduction asserted that M23 had been accusing the defender of sharing information on human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law attributed to the group with several international organizations including UNJHRO. According to some witnesses, prior to the abduction, M23 elements had visited the locality where the defender lived several times before, asking about his whereabouts and telling some residents to warn him to stop his "lies to the UN" about M23's activities. The defender was released 10 days after his abduction following an advocacy campaign by UNJHRO in collaboration with other United Nations entities and civil society organizations. He left his usual residence for fear of further threats.

37. During the reporting period several senior United Nations officials and human rights mechanisms also addressed repressions of Civil society actors – especially human rights defenders, women activists, lawyers, journalists, and media workers – by the same armed groups, particularly in North and South Kivu provinces as well as State officials. Such concerns were voiced by the United Nations High Commissioner and Deputy High

Advance edited version

Commissioner for Human Rights;[8] the OHCHR Fact-Finding Mission on the situation in North and South Kivu Provinces of the DRC;[9] special procedures mandate holders[10], and MONUSCO.[11]

6. Equatorial Guinea

38. According to information received by OHCHR, **Ms. Maria José Bikene Obiang**, a human rights lawyer and head of the NGO Comisión Equatoguineana de Juristas, faced intimidation, monitoring, and harassment by high-level Government officials in connection with her engagement with UN human rights bodies and mechanisms. Due to protection concerns linked to the events described below, Ms. Bikene temporarily relocated abroad.

39. Ms. Bikene was part of a group of civil society representatives affected by an incident in 2019 during the review of Equatorial Guinea by the Human Rights Committee. The Human Rights Committee addressed allegations of the broadcast of unauthorized footage and stigmatization of civil society representatives by a State-owned television channel. The case was included anonymously in the 2020 report of the Secretary-General[12] due to protection concerns and fear of further reprisals at the time.

40. On 25 March 2025, Ms. Bikene took the floor during the adoption of the outcome of the fourth cycle of Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of Equatorial Guinea at the 58th regular session of the Human Rights Council.[13] On 7 April 2025, during a programme by the national public radio broadcaster of Equatorial Guinea[14], the host and a high-ranking Government official discussed the outcome of the UPR. The host referred to Ms. Bikene by name and to her intervention in Geneva. In his response, the high-level Government representative stated that civil society actors who questioned the country's position on the death penalty during the UPR review could be considered "enemies of the State".

41. Following Ms. Bikene's return to Equatorial Guinea, on 29 and 30 of September, a Toyota Avensis car with a masked license plate was reportedly seen in front of her house several times. On 30 September and 3 October 2025, a high-ranking Government official from the Ministry of National Security reportedly called Ms. Bikene from an undisclosed number and asked her to "stop creating so much headache". He allegedly mentioned that he knew her family and asked her personal questions. On 6 October, the same Government official reportedly followed Ms. Bikene in a car while she was visiting a colleague. As she left the colleague's office, he rolled down his window and waved at her.

42. On 16, 17 and 20 October 2025, another high-ranking Government official also linked to the Ministry of National Security reportedly paid an unannounced visit to Ms. Bikene's office accompanied by two men in plain clothes carrying guns openly. The visit was reportedly to request her legal assistance in a case but was perceived as an excuse to enter the office. In the conversation, the representative allegedly indicated that Ms. Bikene must have known him since she "defended clients that accused him of torture".

43. On 26 October, Ms. Bikene reportedly received another call from the Government official who had called before. When she confronted him about his intentions and explained her anxiety to receive calls from a person linked to the security apparatus, he allegedly said that he could be her "guardian angel" and that he does not have any negative intentions

[8] https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2025/06/hc-turk-updates-council-situation-north-and-south-kivu-provinces; https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2025/09/hc-turk-democratic-republic-congo-genuine-ceasefire-needed-urgently; https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2026/03/deputy-high-commissioner-al-nashif-democratic-republic-congo-peace.

[9] A/HRC/60/80, paras. 39 and 37.

[10] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/09/democratic-republic-congo-un-expert-warns-abuses-against-women-human-rights; COD 2/2026; COD 3/2026.

[11] S/2025/779, para. 33; https://reliefweb.int/attachments/ea030c33-7761-4f0a-bd86-015725fd8e2d/BCNUDH%20-%20Communiqu%C3%A9%20de%20Presse-%20Note%20Mensuelle-%20Janvier%20%202026.pdf; https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/03/1167204.

[12] A/HRC/45/36, Annex I para. 53.

[13] https://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k1i/k1il3gyk71.

[14] https://www.youtube.com/clip/UgkxaLok3_6S8CfJIztRQkIPiYNSEG9BYhdp.

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towards her. On 12 April 2026, the same Government official reportedly contacted Ms. Bikene again from a different number that she did not recognize. When Ms. Bikene answered and after some questions, he allegedly asked if she was in Malabo. Ms. Bikene reportedly refused to disclose any information.

7. France

44. On 8 September 2025, special procedures mandate holders addressed allegations of intimidation, harassment, and possible transnational repression on French territory against **Mr. Joseph Akaravong,** a Lao human rights defender living in France with refugee status (see Annex I section on Lao PDR).[15] Mandate holders expressed concern that these may constitute acts of reprisal for Mr. Akaravong's cooperation with the United Nations and its mechanisms in the field of human rights. They recalled France's positive obligations to prevent threats to life and to conduct ex officio, impartial and prompt investigations into any potential or actual violation (FRA 11/2025).

45. Mr. Akaravong conducted part of his environmental human rights activism in Lao PDR on social media. In 2018, the Ministry of Public Security issued an arrest warrant against him, prompting Mr. Akaravong to flee Lao PDR and seek refuge in Thailand. However, due to an increased climate of fear amongst the Lao refugee community in Thailand, he relocated to France in 2022, where he received asylum (FRA 11/2025).

46. In October 2024, Mr. Akaravong travelled to Geneva in connection with the review of Lao PDR by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women.[16] In November 2024, he also provided information to the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights ahead of her visit to Lao PDR. On 14 June 2025, Mr. Akaravong was stabbed by an unknown man in the streets of Pau (France). On 17 June 2025, four people were arrested and placed in custody in connection with the attack. Pau's Public Prosecutor confirmed the arrests and informed that two of the suspects were released from custody and one was in pre-trial detention (FRA 11/2025).

47. Expressing concerns at reports that the Lao PDR is engaged in a systematic pattern of transnational repression against those critical of the authorities, mandate holders stated that the circumstances of the attack against Mr. Akaravong raised concern regarding possible links to Lao PDR State agents or individuals acting with the acquiescence or support of Lao PDR State authorities (FRA 11/2025).

48. On 26 January 2026, the Government of France responded[17] to mandate holders stating that the Prosecutor General at the Court of Appeal of Pau had informed the Ministry of Justice on 16 June 2025 about an attack suffered by a Laotian national on 14 June 2025, in the municipality of Pau. The Government noted that Mr. Akaravong was immediately taken care of and benefited from security measures during his stay at the Pau hospital center.

49. The Government informed that investigations were ongoing and that all scenarios were being considered, including that of a commissioned act linked to the profile of the victim and to his activism. The Government noted that the intelligence services had no information at that stage that could refute or confirm the possibility of a transnational act of repression connected to Mr. Akaravong's activism as a human rights defender.

50. According to information received by OHCHR, on 16 September 2025, Mr. Akaravong received an official judicial notice to formally constitute himself as a civil party, and in January 2026 he received summons for a first hearing before an investigating judge in February 2026. Information available on the progress of the investigation remained limited due to the confidentiality of the judicial proceedings.

[15] The allegations of reprisals concerning Mr. Akaravong are connected to and should be read in conjunction with the related allegations concerning the same individual in Annex I, section on Lao PDR.

[16] CEDAW/C/LAO/CO/10 (CEDAW 2024).

[17] https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=39561.

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8. Germany

51. On 27 March 2026, special procedures mandate holders addressed the situation of **an individual human rights defender** registered as asylum seeker in Germany at risk of transnational repression and reprisals, including for cooperation with the United Nations, if transferred to a third country (DEU 1/2026). Name and details of the individual concerned are withheld due to risks of reprisals.

52. Mandate holders expressed concern that the transfer of the human rights defender to a third country would force them to hide their identity and human rights work, causing profound social isolation and increasing their exposure to surveillance and intimidation by actors linked to the authorities of the individual's country of origin. They noted that these adverse actions appeared to be attempts, *inter alia*, to deter or punish their cooperation with the United Nations in the field of human rights.

53. Mandate holders expressed concerns that the relatives of the human rights defender had already faced targeted questioning in the country of origin, where they noted that they had documented repeated cases of intimidation and reprisals for cooperation with the United Nations. They requested information on the steps in place in Germany to assess the risks of transnational repression against the individual human rights defender, including due to their cooperation with the United Nations (DEU 1/2026).

54. On 19 May 2026, the Government responded[18] to mandate holders indicating that it had been closely following the situation of the individual human rights defender. According to the Government, there was no indication of non-compliance with the principle of *non-refoulement* in the third country. The Government stated that an appeal against the transfer order from Germany based on the Dublin Regulation[19] had been lodged.

55. The case of **Ms. Basma Mostafa** was included in the 2025 report of the Secretary-General[20] on allegations of surveillance, threats of arrest and acts of transnational repression on German territory and in other countries in connection with her engagement with the United Nations in the field of human rights. Ms. Mostafa is an Egyptian investigative journalist in exile in Germany and the alleged target of transnational repression related to acts by Egyptian State agents or agents reportedly acting on behalf, or with the acquiescence, of Egyptian State authorities in Germany, Kenya, Lebanon, and Switzerland since 2020 (EGY 6/2024) (See Annex II, section on Egypt). [21]

56. On 16 April 2025, the Federal Government Commissioner for Human Rights Policy and Humanitarian Aid publicly[22] expressed concern at the allegations raised by special procedures mandate holders of transnational repression of Ms. Mostafa in Germany. The Commissioner noted that Germany offers protection to foreign human rights defenders, journalists and opposition leaders who are persecuted in their home countries.

57. According to information received by OHCHR, during the reporting period, the harassment and threats against Ms. Mostafa intensified in connection with her efforts to address the cross-border nature of the threats, seek protection, and ensure accountability. In August 2025, Ms. Mostafa was reportedly the target of a coordinated online campaign, consistent with the pattern of prior harassment documented by mandate holders (EGY 6/2024). The campaign reportedly included posts labelling her a 'spy,' 'agent,' 'terrorist,' and 'fugitive' and she was subject to harassment across different online platforms. On 17 September 2025, Ms. Mostafa reportedly received a direct message on her German phone threatening her with physical assault, including the line 'wait for your punishment.'

[18] https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=39714.

[19] The EU Dublin III Regulation establishes the criteria and mechanisms for determining which EU member state is responsible for examining an application for international protection, with the aim of ensuring that each application is assessed by a single member state, see EU asylum policy: EU Member State responsible for examining applications | EUR-Lex.

[20] A/HRC/60/62, Annex I paras. 48–51.

[21] The allegations of intimidation and reprisals concerning Ms. Basma Mostafa are connected to and should be read in conjunction with the related allegation concerning the same individual in Annex II, section on Egypt.

[22] https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/newsroom/2714528-2714528.

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The sender was allegedly the same individual who incited rape against her in 2022 (EGY 6/2024). On 26 September 2025, the special rapporteur on human rights defenders issued [23] a public statement expressing concern that Ms. Mostafa continued to face threats by supporters of an Egyptian state agent who attacked her in Berlin and urged the German authorities to ensure her protection.

58. On 28 September 2025, Ms. Mostafa reportedly experienced an incident of intimidation in Berlin. While seated in a café, an unknown man allegedly sat beside her and made a phone call in Egyptian Arabic within earshot. He reportedly said that a senior national security officer had asked him to 'send a car tomorrow.' The use of a title and coded language associated in Egyptian security jargon with abduction operations was reportedly aimed at creating an intimidating effect given Ms. Mostafa's prior history. She reported the incident to the Berlin police immediately. The police allegedly treated the incident as an isolated event and, during the interaction, some officers questioned her psychological state. It is reported that despite concerns, evidence, and information formally shared with the German authorities since 2022, Ms. Basma has not received preventive, protective, or accountability measures.

59. On 25 June 2026, the Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection with the preparation of the present report. Regarding the case of the human rights defender registered as asylum seeker in Germany at risk of transnational repression and reprisals, including for their cooperation with the United Nations, if transferred to a third country, the Federal Government indicated that it is closely following the situation and to its knowledge there is no indication of non-compliance with the principle of *non-refoulement* by the respective third Member State. It also stated that there is no indication of a heightened risk of transnational repression as compared to Germany. The Federal Government further noted that an appeal against the transfer order from Germany to the respective third Member State has been lodged based on the Dublin Regulation. At the time of writing, the decision was pending. With due respect to the independence of the judiciary in Germany in general and of the court hearing of this case in particular, the Federal Government asked for understanding that no further assessment of the case will be made. Should the court decide to reject the appeal and the human rights defender be transferred, the Federal Government will inform the respective authorities of the third Member State so that an evaluation of the threat situation and potential need for protective measures can be made.

60. Concerning the case of Ms. Basma Mostafa the Federal Government informed that Ms. Mostafa first met the Berlin State Criminal Police Office in 2023, where her security situation has been regularly analyzed and assessed. According to the Federal Government, several security consultations have taken place during which Ms. Mostafa's personal risk profile has been discussed, and risk-mitigating measures addressed. In addition, measures under the law on the prevention of danger ("Gefahrenabwehrrecht") were reviewed and – where appropriate – implemented in accordance with the individual threat assessment. For reasons related to the law on the prevention of danger, no further details regarding these matters can be disclosed. The Federal Government also noted that upon becoming aware of facts relevant under criminal law, corresponding criminal proceedings were initiated and forwarded to the public prosecutor's office upon completion of the investigation. Furthermore, the Federal Government indicated that it has taken foreign policy measures relating to Ms. Mostafa's case, including a public statement. The Federal Government noted that is closely following the situation of Ms. Mostafa and will take further preventive and protective measures, if necessary.

9. Guinea Bissau

61. On 2 April 2026, special procedures mandate holders addressed allegations of abduction and severe beating of **Mr. Luís Cordeiro Vaz Martins,** a lawyer and human rights defender, allegedly in connection with his participation in the pre-session of the UPR and his engagement with the UN Human Rights Committee (GNB 1/2026).

62. On 10 October 2025, Mr. Vaz Martins was reportedly abducted and severely beaten in Bissau by four unidentified armed men who allegedly forced him into a vehicle, took him

[23] https://x.com/MaryLawlorhrds/status/1971593465675862373.

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to the outskirts of Bissau, and severely beat him until he lost consciousness causing injuries to his head and body. The assailants reportedly filmed parts of the attack and told Mr. Vaz Martins that the beating was "punishment" for criticizing the President. Mandate holders noted reports that the perpetrators may be linked to the Republican Guard Corps, under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior and the Presidency (GNB 1/2026).

63. Mandate holders noted that Mr. Vaz Martins' cooperation with United Nations human rights mechanisms was among the motives for the abduction and beating. He had taken part in the NGO-led pre-session of the UPR of Guinea Bissau in February 2025 and participated in the informal session with the UN Human Rights Committee linked to the review of Guinea Bissau in June 2025. Following the February 2025 UPR pre-session, civil society organizations reported an increase in intimidation, targeting individuals involved in reporting human rights violations to international bodies, including to the United Nations (GNB 1/2026).

64. On 29 April 2026, the Human Rights Committee's Rapporteur for Reprisals addressed the above-mentioned allegations regarding the abduction and severe beating of Mr. Luis Vaz Martins, allegedly linked to his cooperation with the Committee during Guinea-Bissau's initial periodic review in June 2025. Referring to the 2015 San José Guidelines against intimidation or reprisals, the Committee's Rapporteur requested information on protective measures and investigations.

65. On 26 June 2026, the Government responded to the note verbal sent in connection with the preparation of the present report. The Government noted that on 10 October 2025 it became aware, through media outlets, of the abduction of Dr. Luís Cordeiro Vaz Martins, lawyer and former President of the Guinean League of Human Rights, allegedly by a group of four masked and armed individuals. The Government stated that given the seriousness of the facts, the competent authorities immediately opened a criminal investigation, which, at the time of writing was underway in the Section for Crimes against Persons of the Judicial Police. Additionally, the Government informed that the Public Prosecutor's Office, following the complaint filed by the Guinean League of Human Rights, opened an investigation that at the time of writing was underway before the Public Prosecutor attached to the Criminal Chamber of the Bissau Regional Court. It further noted that the reported facts may constitute the offences of abduction and torture. The Government of Guinea-Bissau reaffirmed its commitment to follow this process, expressing hope that the investigation will be successful and will make it possible to identify and bring to justice both the direct perpetrators and the intellectual authors of the alleged crimes.

10. Israel

66. As part of its human rights monitoring during the reporting period, the United Nations documented that self-censorship and the choice not to cooperate with the United Nations or to do so under conditions of anonymity due to fear of reprisals by Israeli authorities continued in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT). This was documented including in the context of escalated settler violence in the occupied West Bank, which increasingly occurred with the support and participation of the State amidst widespread impunity.[24] Names and details of those concerned are withheld for fear of further reprisals.

67. In Gaza, some victims and their family members voiced fears that if identified for having shared information with the United Nations, they may face retaliation, including at least two who expressed fears that it could result in their arbitrary denial of crossing or detention by Israeli military at official crossings out of Gaza. In an instance , two international activists providing protective presence interviewed by the UN after witnessing a settler attack refused to provide their identity and gave testimonies anonymously, fearing reprisals in the form of future visa denials from Israeli authorities, as well as reprisals by settlers.

[24] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/03/israels-settlement-expansion-drives-mass-displacement-west-bank-un-report; https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/03/state-backed-terror-squads-forefront-israels-ethnic-cleansing-and-annexation; https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/official-statements/unrwa-commissioner-general-west-bank-violence-israeli-settlers-continues-unabated.

Advance edited version

68. The entry into force on 30 January 2025 of two laws passed by the Knesset of Israel in October 2024[25] and amended in December 2025[26] reportedly contributed to creating an operational environment of intimidation and reprisals for engaging or cooperating with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA). While the explicit scope of the laws is limited to cooperation between the Israeli authorities and UNRWA, intimidation and reprisal reportedly affected witnesses, victims, and beneficiaries as well as commercial service providers and international NGOs who engage with UNRWA. During the reporting period, fear of reprisals by the Israeli authorities reportedly had a deterrent effect on witnesses' engagement in legal processes related to UNRWA. Israeli authorities allegedly pressured third parties such as contractors and operational partners referencing the above-mentioned domestic legislation. A sustained campaign of disinformation targeting UNRWA reportedly contributed to an environment in which those cooperating with the Agency or seeking its assistance risked facing intimidation, stigmatization, or other security-related concerns.

69. The Human Rights Council raised concerns about acts of intimidation, threats, sanctions, reprisals or other coercive measures, including against those who cooperate with United Nations mandate holders; and called upon Israel to revoke all unsubstantiated designations of Palestinian human rights and humanitarian organizations as terrorist or unlawful organizations.[27]

11. Lao People's Democratic Republic

70. The Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights visited Lao PDR from 19 to 29 November 2024. She identified the need to cease reprisals against human rights defenders, including those in exile, as one of three areas where steps by the Government were urgently needed. The Special Rapporteur stated that individuals had faced reprisals for sharing information with United Nations human rights mechanisms. Referring to the case of Mr. Joseph Akaravong (see below), the Special Rapporteur noted concerns about what appeared to be a case of transnational repression. She further expressed concern at an alleged systematic pattern of transnational repression against individuals and groups critical of the authorities, which involved acts such as enforced disappearance, surveillance, intimidation and coerced repatriation (A/HRC/61/49/Add.1, para. 36).

71. On 8 September 2025, special procedures mandate holders addressed allegations of reprisals in the form of intimidation, harassment, and possible transnational repression against **Mr. Joseph Akaravong,** a Lao human rights defender living in France with refugee status, for his cooperation with the UN in the field of human rights (LAO 3/2025) (see Annex I, section on France)**.** [28]

72. Mr. Akaravong conducted part of his environmental activism in Lao PDR on social media, where he posted on different issues concerning the situation in the country. In 2018, the Lao PDR Ministry of Public Security issued an arrest warrant against him, prompting Mr. Akaravong to flee the country in 2019 and seek refuge in Thailand, where he continued his activism using his social media accounts (LAO 3/2025).

73. Reportedly from 2019, an increased climate of fear grew within the Lao refugee community in Thailand due to reported surveillance and enforced disappearances of activists. In March 2019, Mr. Akaravong met with the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights in Bangkok. In 2022, he relocated and received asylum in France, where he continued his social media activism about the human rights situation in the Lao PDR. In

[25] Law for the Cessation of UNRWA Activities, 5784-2024 and the Law for the Cessation of UNRWA Activities in the Territory of the State, 5784-2024, both adopted on 28 October 2024. See: A/79/684-S/2024/892 and ISR 3/2025.

[26] https://www.un.org/unispal/document/secretary-general-statement-31dec25/; https://www.un.org/unispal/document/unrwa-commissioner-general-on-new-anti%e2%80%91unrwa-legislation-passed-by-the-israeli-parliament/.

[27] Resolution 61/4, paras. 11 and 12.

[28] The allegations of reprisals concerning Mr. Akaravong are connected to and should be read in conjunction with the related allegations concerning the same individual in Annex I, section on France.

Advance edited version

October 2024, Mr. Akaravong travelled to Geneva in connection with the CEDAW review of Lao PDR.[29] He also provided information to the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights ahead of her visit to Lao PDR (LAO 3/2025).

74. On 14 June 2025, Mr. Akaravong was reportedly stabbed by an unknown man in the streets of Pau (France). On 17 June 2025, four people were arrested and placed in custody in connection with the attack. Pau's Public Prosecutor confirmed the arrests in connection with the stabbing (LAO 3/2025).

75. On 25 June 2025, the social media account of Mr. Akaravong was suspended, limiting an important way with which he could advocate to the public. Similar to a prior suspension of his social media account in 2022, the account was reinstated after one week Mandate holders stated that these suspensions could have taken place as a result of requests made by authorities of Lao PDR. Expressing concern at reports that the Lao PDR is engaged in a systematic pattern of transnational repression against individuals and groups critical of the authorities, mandate holders stated that the circumstances of the attack against Mr. Akaravong raised concern regarding possible links to Lao PDR State agents or individuals acting with the acquiescence or support of Lao PDR State authorities (LAO 3/2025).

76. During the reporting period, mandate holders addressed a reported surge in human rights violations of a transnational nature in the Greater Mekong Subregion, including Lao PDR. They addressed the forced return from Lao PDR to China in 2023 and disappearance of human rights lawyer **Mr. Lu Siwei**. Mr. Lu Siwei was deported under the framework of the mechanism for bilateral cooperation between the two countries (CHN 9/2025, CHN 10/2025[30], LAO 2/2025 and OTH 84/2025).[31] (See Annex I, section on China).[32] According to information received by OHCHR, in July 2023 Mr. Lu Siwei was compelled to flee to Lao PDR from China due to harassment and intimidation linked to his human rights work, including his cooperation with the United Nations. Information about Mr. Lu Siwei's cooperation with the United Nations could not be publicly reported before due to fear of further reprisals.

12. Libya

77. During the reporting period, UNSMIL continued to document a restrictive civic space in Libya, particularly in the southern and eastern regions, and a climate of fear, self-censorship, and decreased cooperation with the United Nations. Human rights defenders, civil society actors, and individuals cooperating or seeking to cooperate with the United Nations faced acts of intimidation and reprisals due to this cooperation. These included threats, harassment, arbitrary arrest and detention, and administrative restrictions, such as restrictions on access to bank accounts. Office raids, interrogations, and harassment by the Criminal Investigation Department of the Ministry of Interior were also documented, including accusations of espionage linked to cooperation with United Nations agencies.

78. Following the launch of the United Nations-facilitated Structured Dialogue[33] on 14 December 2025, women participants raised concerns with UNSMIL about threats, intimidation, and risks of reprisals linked to their participation. Several women participants in the Dialogue informally reported security incidents involving different State and non-State actors, while others expressed fear of reprisals and declined to formally report incidents. Names and additional details are withheld due to fear of further reprisals.

[29] CEDAW/C/LAO/CO/10 (CEDAW 2024).
[30] https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=39195.
[31] LAO 1/2023; see also https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/08/lao-must-immediately-release-chinese-lawyer-lu-siwei-and-prevent-his.
[32] The allegations of intimidation and reprisals concerning is Mr. Lu Siwei are connected to and should be read in conjunction with the related allegations concerning the same individual in Annex I, section on China.
[33] https://unsmil.unmissions.org/en/structured-dialogue.

Advance edited version

79. UNSMIL also received reports of individuals, including national staff of international civil society and other organizations, who were arbitrarily detained after being accused of "intelligence activity." Concerns were reported about the potential misuse of national security arguments to penalize or discourage engagement with International Organizations, including the United Nations.

13. Nicaragua

80. In their 2026 report to the Human Rights Council, the Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua documented and reported[34] on the use of extensive transnational repression, including surveillance and intelligence architecture to monitor, intimidate and attack Nicaraguans in exile. The main transnational repression patterns identified by the Group of Experts included the use of digital surveillance and harassment, as well as hacking and doxing against critics based abroad. Experts also noted that the use of physical violence against exiled Nicaraguans had increased in recent years, particularly in Costa Rica and Honduras. Exiled Nicaraguans were also reportedly physically followed, photographed, harassed and threatened by alleged undercover officials or informants. The Group of Experts noted that transnational acts had fostered a general climate of fear and suspicion among exiled Nicaraguans and had led to widespread self-censorship and social isolation (A/HRC/61/56, paras. 22–53 and 99, see also Anex II).

81. According to information received by OHCHR, the **Foundation "Puentes para el Desarrollo"** and its members have been subject to acts of transnational surveillance and physical security threats in exile due to their human rights work, including their cooperation with the United Nations in the field of human rights. The Foundation is a non-profit organization working on the impact of governmental policies on the enjoyment of economic, social, cultural and environmental rights (ESCER) in Nicaragua and Central America. It promotes and advocates for ESCER through systematic engagement with OHCHR and other international human rights mechanisms, including by submitting information on ESCER and statelessness in Nicaragua and participating in side events at the margins of Human Rights Council sessions.

82. During the reporting period, the Foundation was allegedly subject to intensified and repeated acts of physical and digital surveillance of a transnational nature, that reportedly started in 2023 and were allegedly attributable to intelligence structures linked to the Government of Nicaragua. It is alleged that the intensification of such actions during the period further exposed members of the organization to increased physical security risks compromising their ability to work on economic and social rights from exile. In 2023, while in exile in Costa Rica, members of the organization reportedly faced acts of transnational persecution, including the arbitrary closure in 2023 of their bank accounts with a Nicaraguan banking institution operating in Costa Rica. Furthermore, it is reported that members of the Foundation's leadership were arbitrarily stripped of their nationality and subsequently subjected to undue restrictions on the exercise of their rights.

83. In its 2025 report to the Human Rights Council, OHCHR noted a continued deterioration of human rights and the rule of law, marked by fear of reprisals among victims and witnesses. Driven by regressive legal reforms and impunity for violations, this had a chilling effect on civic space. During the reporting period, several individuals declined to cooperate with the Office for fear of reprisals against themselves or their families. This was compounded by Nicaragua's decision to cease participating in the Human Rights Council and its mechanisms, signalling deeper isolation and non-cooperation with the United Nations human rights system (A/HRC/60/92, para. 3). During the reporting period, OHCHR received allegations of incidents affecting at least ten individuals or groups of undue pressure by

[34] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/03/nicaragua-un-experts-uncover-corrupt-financing-repression-and-spy-network; https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/10/nicaragua-un-group-experts-urges-international-community-hold-government; https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/09/nicaragua-un-experts-warn-escalating-repression-reaching-beyond-borders; https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/06/nicaragua-un-group-experts-condemns-murder-prominent-political-opponent.

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national authorities not to cooperate with international and United Nations human rights mechanisms.

84. In its 2025 resolution 58/18, the Human Rights Council condemned all acts of intimidation, harassment and reprisals, both online and offline, by State and non-State actors against individuals and groups that seek to cooperate or have cooperated inter alia with the United Nations, its representatives and mechanisms in the field of human rights.

14. Russian Federation

85. During the reporting period, various United Nations actors addressed a reported pattern of misuse of national security provisions and the continued arbitrary application of laws on "foreign agents" or "undesirable organizations", as well as reported use of transnational repression against civil society actors. They addressed new allegations of reprisals for cooperation with the United Nations and noted that such legislation reportedly led to self-censorship and discouraged civil society actors from engaging with the Unitd Nations and other organizations.

86. On 16 March 2026, special procedures mandate holders addressed allegations of arbitrary arrest, detention and criminal prosecution under counter-terrorism legislation of **Ms. Daria Egereva** reportedly for her cooperation with the United Nations, including the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform (LCIPP), the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (EMRIP), and the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) (RUS 3/2026).

87. Ms. Daria Egereva is a Selkup Indigenous human rights defender and an Indigenous leader who has played a central role in representing Indigenous Peoples in multilateral processes, particularly in the United Nations system. She has served as Co-Chair of the International Indigenous Peoples' Forum on Climate Change (IIPFCC), the official Indigenous Peoples' constituency to the UNFCCC. In this capacity, she participated in COP28 in Dubai, COP29 in Baku, and COP30 in Belém (RUS 3/2026).

88. Between 10 and 21 November 2025, Ms. Egereva attended COP30 in Belém as Co-Chair of the IIPFCC. She returned to the Russian Federation on 13 December. On 17 December, authorities reportedly carried out coordinated operations across several regions, detaining at least 17 Indigenous activists. Most were released the same day, but Ms. Egereva and one other person were transferred to Moscow and charged under article 205.5(2) of the Criminal Code for participation in a terrorist organisation, an offence punishable by 10–20 years' imprisonment. The charges stemmed from her alleged involvement in Aborigen Forum, an informal association of Indigenous experts from the North, Siberia and the Far East that was listed in 2024 as part of the Free Nations of PostRussia Forum and later declared a "terrorist organisation" (RUS 3/2026).

89. On 18 December, the Basmanny District Court of Moscow ordered Ms. Egereva's pre-trial detention until 17 February 2026. The decision was upheld on appeal on 11 February 2026 before the Moscow City Court. On 12 February 2026, the District Court extended her detention until 15 March 2026 to allow further investigative actions; the Moscow City Court upheld this decision on 11 March. On 12 March, the District Court further extended Ms. Egereva's detention until 15 June 2026 on the same grounds. At the time of writing Ms. Egereva was held in facility SIZO No. 7 of the Federal Penitentiary Service in Moscow (СИЗО № 7 УФСИН по г. Москве), where she was reportedly being subjected to restrictive conditions of detention, incuding the denial of regular calls and in-person visist of close relatives. (RUS 3/2026).

90. Mandate holders noted the chilling effect of this prosecution on Indigenous advocacy, international cooperation and engagement with the United Nations. They further noted that the case appeared to reflect a broader pattern in the Russian Federation of misusing national security provisions to silence Indigenous activists, human rights defenders, civil society representatives and others who engage with the United Nations. They asked the Government of the Russian Federation to indicate the steps taken to protect Indigenous defenders and all individuals cooperating with the United Nations, and safeguards in place to prevent

Advance edited version

intimidation, surveillance, criminalization or reprisals linked to such engagement (RUS 3/2026).

91. References to the impact of the arbitrary application of restrictive legislation,[35] in particular laws on "foreign agents" or "undesirable organizations", on the ability and willingness of civil society actors to engage with international bodies, including with the United Nations, have been included in previous reports of the Secretary-General.[36] On 9 April 2026, special procedures mandate holders called for an end to the abuse of counterterrorism and extremism laws to dismantle Russian civil society. They noted that authorities were using mass "undesirable" and "foreign agent" designations and national security legislation to target lawyers, journalists, anti-war activists and human rights defenders. Special procedures mandate holders reported that by that date, over 343 organisations had been labelled "undesirable", more than 1,173 entities and individuals "foreign agents", and 830 organisations and 20,813 individuals were placed on "terrorists and extremists" list.[37]

92. The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Russian Federation noted that on 14 May 2025 the Office of the Prosecutor General designated the **International Indigenous Fund for Development and Solidarity Batani** an "undesirable organization", reportedly citing its participation in international forums, including at the United Nations. In her view, authorities accused Batani of promoting "anti-Russian narratives" under the guise of Indigenous rights work as a reprisal for engaging with United Nations mechanisms (A/HRC/60/59, para. 133).

93. According to information received by OHCHR, **Ms. Violetta Fitsner** was designated a "foreign agent" in direct connection with her cooperation with United Nations in the field of human rights. Ms. Fitsner is a human rights lawyer, a board member of the NGO Memorial Human Rights Defense Center and an advocacy officer at OVD-Info. Based outside the Russian Federation, since 2022 she had focused on international advocacy regularly engaging with the United Nations on the human rights situation in the Russian Federation.

94. On 6 June 2025, Russia's Ministry of Justice designated Ms. Fitsner a "foreign agent"[38] stating that she spread false information about Russian authorities, helped prepare foreign agent materials, and supported the anti-Russian activities of international organizations, among other actions. In August 2025, Ms. Fitsner challenged her "foreign agent" designation before the Zamoskvoretsky District Court of Moscow. On 1 November 2025, the Ministry of Justice filed written objections to the challenge where it detailed the grounds for her designation. On 7 November 2025, the Zamoskvoretsky District Court of Moscow ruled that Ms Fitsner's designation as a "foreign agent" was lawful and did not violate her rights.

95. The arguments in the court's decision listed several engagements that Ms. Fitsner had with the United Nations in the field of human rights. It referred to her statement in March 2024 during the adoption of the outcome of the UPR of the Russian Federation at the 55th session of the Human Rights Council[39], to Memorial's submission in August 2024 to the Committee on the Rights of the Child on General Comment No. 27 on children's access to

[35] These included the N 121-FZ Foreign Agent Law for Non-Commercial Organizations, adopted in July 2012 and amended in June 2016 (N 147-FZ and N 179-FZ) and several pieces of federal legislation signed into effect on 30 December 2020 as well as Federal Law No. 538-FC, which introduced a five-year prison sentence for libel, and Federal Law No. 525-FZ which introduced criminal liability for malicious violation of the duties of a "foreign agent" with a penalty of up to five years in prison. In April 2021, Bills No.1052327-7 and 105895-7 were adopted and published introducing amendments and penalties for non-compliance with the norms mentioned above.

[36] A/HRC/60/62, Annex II, para. 108; A/HRC/57/60, Annex II, paras. 154–155; A/HRC/54/61, Annex II, paras. 130–131; A/HRC/51/47, Annex II, paras. 126–127; A/HRC/48/28 Annex II, paras. 111–114; A/HRC/45/36, Annex II, paras. 105–107; A/HRC/42/30, Annex II, para. 88; A/HRC/30/29, Annex II para. 3; A/HRC/27/38, para. 43; A/HRC/24/29, paras. 29–31.

[37] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/04/strategy-blatant-abuse-counter-terrorism-and-extremism-laws-destroy-russian; A/HRC/60/59, paras. 20–22, and https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/12/russias-repression-policy-dismantle-civil-society-exposes-fear.

[38] О реестре иностранных агентов: Министерство юстиции Российской Федерации (*About the Register of Foreign Agents: Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation*; unofficial translation).

[39] https://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k1p/k1pye10ger.

Advance edited version

justice and cited her speech at the 2025 UN World Congress on Enforced Disappearances. On 5 December 2025, Ms Fitsner appealed the decision of the Zamoskvoretsky District Court of Moscow.

96. On 10 November 2025, Department of the Ministry of Justice for the Kaliningrad Region initiated an administrative case against Ms. Fitsner at the Central District Court of Kaliningrad for failure to comply with the reporting obligations under the law on "foreign agents".[40] Ms Fitsner challenged this decision at the Kaliningrad Regional Court which upheld the decision of the lower court and she received a fine. On 9 April 2026, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation designated the NGO "International Public Movement Memorial" as "extremist organization".[41]

97. In her September 2025 report to the Human Rights Council, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Russian Federation addressed the systematic blocking of Russian organizations from obtaining **ECOSOC accreditation** through the misuse of procedural rules by the Russian Federation and other members on the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations. She noted that in 2024 no Russian organization received ECOSOC accreditation, and organizations deprived of domestic registration could not apply, effectively excluding them from participating in United Nations deliberations (A/HRC/60/59, para. 132).

98. In October 2025, the Human Rights Council adopted resolution 60/21 on the situation of human rights in the Russian Federation and expressed concern about the use of legislative measures against Russian civil society, human rights defenders and Indigenous Peoples to criminalize cooperation with international organizations, including as intimidation and reprisal for cooperating with the United Nations human rights mechanisms. The Council noted that the enforcement of such legislation was reportedly leading to self-censorship and dissuading civil society actors from publicly engaging with the United Nations and other organizations. The Council condenmed the use by the Russian Federation of transnational repression against civil society actors, including the targeting of their relatives and the use of extraterritorial legislation. The Council called upon the Russian authorities to fully engage with all United Nations human rights mechanisms and refrain from all forms of intimidation and reprisal against persons and associations for their cooperation with these bodies.

99. On 30 June 2026, the Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection with the preparation of the present report. The Government stressed that the Russian Federation has an active civil society and that there are no prohibitions on interaction and cooperation by non-governmental organizations at international forums. It further noted that many organizations representing Indigenous Peoples operate in the country and that some have ECOSOC consultative status and regularly participate in UN forums.

100. Regarding the case of Ms. Daria Egereva, the Government noted that on 22 November 2024 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation issued a decision recognizing the Post-Russia Free Nations Forum and 172 of its structural subdivisions as terrorist organizations. According to the Government, Ms. Egereva participated in international events on behalf of organizations that are structural subdivisions of the Forum and that a preliminary investigation concerning her is ongoing.

101. The Government confirmed the designation of the International Indigenous Fund for Development and Solidarity "Batani" as undesirable in the Russian Federation. It also confirmed that Ms. Violetta Fitsner was included in the register of foreign agents on 6 June 2025.

102. The Government rejected allegations that the Russian Federation improperly used procedural rules of the United Nations NGO Committee to block consultative status applications by Russian NGOs. It stated that Russia has not been a member of the Committee since 2023 and therefore could not influence its decisions.

[40] Part 2 of Article 19.34 of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Russia Federation.

[41] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/04/comment-un-human-rights-chief-volker-turk-russian-designation-memorial.

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15. Sri Lanka

103. In his 2025 report to the Human Rights Council, the High Commissioner for Human Rights noted[42] that despite an increasingly open civic space, there are ongoing, persistent patterns of intimidation and harassment by security agencies of human rights defenders, victims' groups and independent journalists. During the reporting period, OHCHR and the Committee on Enforced Disappearances addressed cases of intimidation and reprisals in Sri Lanka related to cooperation with the United Nations on an anonymous basis. The names of those concerned and details of the cases were withheld due to fear of further reprisals.

104. In its September 2025 report, OHCHR noted that it had received reports of harassment and intimidation by State security officials against seven human rights defenders and families of the disappeared in north and east Sri Lanka who had engaged with the United Nations or other international actors. Three other human rights defenders were summoned by the Terrorism Investigation Division and questioned about their alleged participation in events, including at sessions of the Human Rights Council in Geneva (A/HRC/60/21, para. 26).

105. In January 2026, the Committee on Enforced Disappearances received an allegation of direct threats from State authorities to a person who had participated in its review and dialogue with Sri Lanka on 26 September 2025 and who had provided inputs to the Committee on several occasions. The Committee expressed concern that the person's contributions to its work, and efforts to search for a loved one and investigate the disappearance, may have contributed to the alleged intimidation and reprisals (HRI/MC/2026/2, para. 27).

16. South Sudan

106. During the reporting period, United Nations entities addressed the further erosion of civic space, and documented increased restrictions on civil society actors, obstacles to cooperation with the UN in an environment of fear and impunity, and access restrictions affecting UN personnel.

107. According to the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), persistent restrictions and denials of access affecting United Nations personnel, especially Human Rights officers conducting patrols and monitoring missions, significantly constrained their ability to reach affected civilians and communities. These access limitations impeded efforts to identify, document, and verify possible cases of intimidation or reprisals linked to cooperation or perceived cooperation with the United Nations. In addition, the continued lack of accountability for perpetrators targeting individuals perceived to be associated with or cooperating with the United Nations contributes to an environment of impunity that is likely to have a deterrent effect on victims and witnesses, discouraging them from reporting incidents or coming forward with testimonies due to fear of further harm.

108. The High Commissioner for Human Rights stressed that his Office had documented increased threats to civic space. He noted that the National Security Service censored the media, monitored civil society activities, intimidated journalists and political activists, and targeted human rights defenders and activists who speak out.[43] The Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan referred to a "prevailing context of repression of civic space" in the country. [44]

109. UNMISS documented the arbitrary arrests and detentions, intimidation of civil society actors for exercising the rights to freedom of expression and association and the use of State institutions to suppress dissent. [45] On 25 November 2025, the Transitional National Legislative Assembly passed the cybersecurity and misuse of computers bill. Civil society

[42] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/08/sri-lanka-has-opportunity-break-past-turk.

[43] https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2026/02/south-sudan-forgotten-crisis-demands-worlds-attention-turk.

[44] A/HRC/61/25, para. 98; https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/02/un-inquiry-finds-south-sudans-political-and-military-leaders-are-driving.

[45] S/2025/706, para. 65, S/2026/58, paras. 20 and 67, and S/2026/316, para. 66.

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organizations have raised concerns that the cybersecurity bill could be misused to restrict civic and political space.[46] On 18 February 2026, the President of South Sudan signed the Cybercrime and Computer Misuse Act, 2026 into law.

110. The Human Rights Council expressed concern at further restrictions to democratic and civic space in South Sudan, including repeated reports of harassment, intimidation, arbitrary arrest and enforced disappearance of and other attacks, committed with impunity, against civil society actors as well as undue restrictions on the rights to freedom of opinion and expression, online and offline.[47]

17. Venezuela

111. During the reporting period, the High Commissioner for Human Rights[48], special procedures mandate holders and the International Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela addressed an alleged climate of fear and repression against human rights defenders, journalists and others, including against those based abroad (See Annex II).

112. The Fact-Finding Mission reported that this climate had led to serious limitations and obstacles to its work due to the fear of sources to cooperate with the Mission. This prevented it from engaging with some sources, including in person, and from verifying certain elements of information obtained. The Mission noted the cumulative psychosocial effects of self-censorship that had led some interlocutors to keep a lower profile, reduce activities and relocate abroad. The Mission further noted that the inability to leave the country due to the cancellation of passports had severely hampered the work of human rights organisations with an international presence, including their ability to report in person to the Human Rights Council (A/HCR/60/CRP.4, paras. 533, 551, 556, 558).

113. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights[49] and special procedures mandate holders addressed allegations of arbitrary detention and short-term enforced disappearance of **Ms. Martha Lía Grajales** in connection with her participation in a peaceful vigil in front of the United Nations building in Caracas. Ms. Grajales is a woman human rights defender and member of the Committee of Mothers in Defense of the Truth, which brings together relatives of people allegedly arbitrarily detained following the Presidential elections of July 2024 (VEN 4/2025).

114. On 5 August 2025, Ms. Grajales had joined a vigil outside the Supreme Court of Justice with mothers from the Committee. During the vigil, several armed, hooded men reportedly attacked the group and took their identity documents and mobile phones, including Ms. Grajales's. They tried to file complaints with the Public Prosecutor's Office and the Branch of Scientific, Penal and Criminal Investigations, but both institutions allegedly refused to receive them. On 7 August, two police patrols were reportedly stationed near her residence (VEN 4/2025).

115. On 8 August 2025, Ms. Grajales delivered a letter to the United Nations Resident Coordinator's Office and OHCHR in Caracas and read a statement in front of the United Nations building denouncing State repression and calling for the detainees' release. As she was leaving, the National Police detained her and reportedly took her in an unmarked vehicle to an unknown location. Her whereabouts remained unknown for three days. On 9 August 2025, the Criminal Judicial Circuit of the Metropolitan Area of Caracas reportedly refused to receive a *habeas corpus* request filed by her relatives. On 11 August 2025, she was charged with incitement to hatred, conspiracy with a foreign government and criminal association, and her family was informed of her whereabouts that day (VEN 4/2025).

[46] S/2026/58, para. 20.
[47] Resolution 61/2, para. 11.
[48] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-briefing-notes/2025/05/venezuela-continuing-crackdown-government-critics-venezuela.
[49] https://x.com/UNHumanRights/status/1954927581905715466.

Advance edited version

116. The Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of association and peaceful assembly[50] and the High Commissioner for Human Rights[51], respectively, made public calls for her release. OHCHR in Venezuela, jointly with the Resident Coordinator, engaged with the authorities on Ms. Grajales' situation. She was released under precautionary measures on 12 August 2025. According to information received, Ms. Grajales benefitted from the Amnesty Law on 22 February 2026. On 10 April 2026, she went to the Office of the Attorney General to recover her telephone and passport, but was reportedly told that they could not be returned due to an ongoing investigation.

18. Viet Nam

117. During the period, United Nations special procedures mandate holders and treaty body experts addressed the reported escalation of repression in the country and across borders, including against human rights defenders and civil society actors for their engagement with the United Nations or with the aim of preventing the flow of information to reach the international community, including the United Nations (see also Annex II).

118. The Human Rights Committee observed that broadly framed provisions of the Criminal Code, in particular articles 109, 116, 117, and 331, had been used to prosecute human rights defenders, journalists, political dissidents, and members of ethnic and religious minorities. It expressed concern over reported reprisals against human rights defenders and civil society actors for their engagement with the United Nations and its human rights mechanisms. The Committee urged Viet Nam to take measures to ensure that civil society actors, particularly those cooperating with the United Nations, can carry out their activities safely and without fear of intimidation, harassment, or reprisals against themselves or their family members (CCPR/C/VNM/CO/4, paras. 46 and 47(c)).

119. Special procedures mandate holders raised concerns over a reported pattern of arbitrary arrests, detention, ill-treatment, and intimidation of Khmer Krom individuals, human rights defenders and Theravada Buddhist monks, in some cases raising concerns of intimidation and reprisals for perceived cooperation with UN human rights mechanisms. Mandate holders addressed the cases of **Venerable Thach Chanh Da Ra and Venerable Duong Khai, Messrs. Thach Nga, Thach Xuan Dong, Hoang Chuong and Thach Cuong, and Messrs. Danh Minh Quang and Lam Vong**. They were reportedly arbitrarily arrested, questioned, charged and convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for activities promoting international human rights norms, including the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Mandate holders viewed these incidents as part of a broader strategy to deter religious and minority groups from peaceful activities and engagement with United Nations human rights mechanisms (VNM 5/2025; A/HRC/WGAD/2025/30, AEV). [52]

120. On 7 October 2025, the Government responded to the communication from mandate holders[53] stating that no individual or organization in Viet Nam had faced threats, attacks or reprisals for engaging with United Nations agencies or international human rights organizations. It said such engagement is permitted if it complies with Vietnamese law, respects the rights and interests of others, and aligns with national interests and security. The Government also noted that 15 United Nations entities and more than 400 foreign NGOs are registered and operating in Viet Nam with domestic partners to promote and protect human rights.

121. On 29 December 2025, mandate holders addressed the situation of **Ms. Trịnh Thị Thảo** and **Ms. Đỗ Thị Thu** on allegations of sustained intimidation, surveillance, questioning and harassment by security authorities in connection to their role communicating information on the arbitrary detention of their relatives – **Ms. Cấn Thị Thêu and her sons Mr. Trịnh Bá Tư and Mr. Trịnh Phương** – to international mechanisms, including the United Nations. Mandate holders noted that the reported actions appeared aimed at deterring them from

[50] https://x.com/Ginitastar/status/1954169914693939311.
[51] https://x.com/UNHumanRights/status/1954927581905715466.
[52] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/08/viet-nam-un-experts-alarmed-ongoing-repression-khmer-krom-indigenous-peoples.
[53] https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=39277.

Advance edited version

disseminating information, engaging with international mechanisms, or advocating on behalf of their detained family members (VNM 8/2025).

122. On 4 May 2026, the Government responded to mandate holders and categorically rejected the allegations contained in the communication as false. Regarding the case of Ms. Đỗ Thị Thu, the Government informed that pursuant to Article 37 of the Law on Exit and Entry and the relevant regulation, the competent authorities issued a decision on temporary exit suspension. According to the Government, this decision complied with legal requirements, was based on sufficient grounds and fell within the competence of the relevant authorities. Regrading Ms. Trịnh Thị Thảo, the Government rejected the allegations as unfounded.[54]

123. On 25 June 2026, the Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection with the preparation of the present report. It expressed concern that some allegations in the draft report appeared to rely on insufficiently verified or contextualized information from organizations and individuals with hostile or politically motivated views against Viet Nam. It provided an annex with detailed information on the allegations and cases and requested their exclusion from the final report of the Secretary-General.

124. With regard to specific cases mentioned in Annex I, the Government rejected allegations that Thach Chanh Da Ra, Duong Khai, Thach Nga, Thach Xuan Dong, To Hoang Chuong, Thach Cuong, Danh Minh Quang and Lam Vong had been subjected to reprisals. The Government also rejected allegations that Trinh Thi Thao and Do Thi Thu were threatened, placed under surveillance, questioned or harassed for providing information to international mechanisms concerning the situation of their detained relatives.

19. Yemen

125. According to information received by OHCHR, human rights defenders and civil society actors across Yemen continued to operate in an increasingly restrictive and high-risk environment. During the reporting period, the Houthis (who call themselves Ansar Allah) in their controlled areas and actors operating in the Government-controlled areas sustained the practice of intimidation and reprisals against individuals for their cooperation with the United Nations. In Houthis-controlled areas those engaging with the United Nations reportedly faced heightened risks of arbitrary arrest, incommunicado detention, surveillance, and prosecution on broadly defined national security charges due to such cooperation.

126. During the reporting period, arrests and detentions of United Nations staff remained deeply concerning in Houthis-controlled areas.[55] Houthis forces raided United Nations offices, residential compounds and staff homes in Sana'a and other governorates. At the time of writing, the offices of the World Food Programme and United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) in Houthis-controlled areas remained occupied. These actions reportedly hindered access to the United Nations on the ground and deterred individuals and groups from cooperating with the Organization.

127. In 2025, the **Youth Organization for Development and Democracy (YODD),** a national non-governmental organization (NGO) working in Ta'izz city, received a micro-grant from the United Nations to implement a human rights project in schools in the second half of 2025. An introductory workshop for participating teachers and schools was held on 21 September 2025. Shortly thereafter, a coordinated digital smear campaign against YODD allegedly started in Ta'izz, led by religious figures, including a Member of Parliament and several other mosque preachers. The campaign alleged that the project promoted foreign cultural values contrary to local customs; introduced foreign religious beliefs and spread immorality. The smear campaign included threats of physical violence, online harassment and threats via social media, as well as calls to obstruct the project activities. As a direct consequence of this smear campaign, YODD had to suspend its activities, closed its office in Ta'izz city, relocated staff and shifted to remote work modalities.

[54] https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=39693.

[55] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/03/turk-calls-immediate-release-un-humanitarian-staff-detained-yemen.

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Annex II

Information on alleged cases included in follow-up to previous reports

1. Algeria

1. The cases of **Ms. Jamila Loukil and Mr. Kaddour Chouicha**, both members of La Ligue Algérienne pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme (LADDH), were included in reports of the Secretary-General since 2023[1] on allegations of obstacles to and a ban on travelling abroad that prevented their in-person participation in the fourth cycle of Algeria's Universal Periodic Review in August 2022 (DZA 2/2023). According to information received by OHCHR, on 19 June 2025, the Conseil d'Etat dismissed the appeal that Mr. Chouicha had filed on 22 April 2025 to challenge the dissolution of LADDH. The Conseil d'Etat ruled that the complaint was inadmissible because it did not include any of the legal grounds provided for by law. Following this rejection, on 30 October 2025 Chouicha reportedly addressed an individual complaint with the UN Human Rights Committee.

2. The case of **Mr. Mustapha Bendjamaa** was included in the 2024 and 2025 reports of the Secretary-General[2] on allegations of arbitrary detention and criminal charges brought against him in connection with his cooperation with OHCHR. Mr. Bendjamaa is the chief editor of the Algerian regional newspaper "Le Provincial", and a representative of La Ligue Algérienne des Droits de l'Homme (LADH).

3. According to information received by OHCHR, on 12 October 2025, the Annaba Court convicted and sentenced Mr. Bendjama to a one-year suspended prison sentence and a fine of 100,000 dinars for "exposing to public view publications likely to harm the national interest" and "deliberately disseminating and promoting biased news and information among the public via social media, likely to undermine public security and public order". Mr. Bendjama appealed this judgement. On 4 March 2026, the Annaba Court of Appeal upheld the conviction handed down against Mr. Bendjama on 12 October 2025. and enhanced the sentenced to one year in prison and a fine of 200,000 dinars.

4, On 10 February 2026, Mr. Bendjama appeared again before the Annaba Criminal Court in connection with a new case and was prosecuted for "'exposing to the public publications likely to harm the national interest"' and "disseminating false or biased information likely to undermine public security or public order ". On 17 February 2026, the Annaba Criminal Court convicted and sentenced Mr. Bendjama to six months in prison, a fine of 200,000 dinars, and the payment of 100,000 dinars to the public treasury.

5. On 17 July 2026, the Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection with the preparation of the present report.

6. Regarding the other cases against Mr. Bendjama, the Government clarified that on 12 October 2025, the Annaba Court sentenced him to one year of imprisonment, not a one-year suspended prison sentence as initially reported, as well as a fine of 100,000 dinars for "deliberately publishing and disseminating false information likely to undermine public safety and public order", and for "publicly displaying publications likely to harm the national interest". The court also ordered the lifting of the ban on leaving the country imposed on Mr. Bendjama. On the civil action, the court ordered Mr. Bendjama to pay the Treasury's Judicial Officer the sum of 100,000 dinars as damages. In a ruling dated 4 March 2026, the Annaba Court of Appeals upheld the judgment. On 9 March 2026, Mr. Bendjama filed an appeal to the Court of Cassation against this ruling.

[1] A/HRC/54/61, Annex I paras. 7–11; A/HRC/57/60, Annex II paras. 1–5; A/HRC/60/62, Annex II, paras. 1–5.

[2] A/HRC/57/60, Annex I, paras. 9–12 and A/HRC/60/62, Annex II, paras. 10–13.

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7. The Government also clarified that on 17 February 2026, the Annaba court sentenced Mr. Bendjama to six months in prison and a fine of 50,000 dinars for "disseminating false information likely to undermine public order".

2. Bahrain

8. The situation of **Mr. Abdulhadi Al-Khawaja**, **Mr. Abduljalil Al-Singace** and **Mr. Hassan Mushaima** was included in previous reports of the Secretary-General, on allegations of arbitrary arrest, torture and lengthy sentences on terrorism charges following their engagement with the United Nations. Specifically, their situation was included in the 2011 and 2012 reports of the Secretary-General as well as in the 2021, 2023, 2024 and 2025 reports concerning Mr. Mushaima, and since 2021 regarding Mr. Al-Khawaya and Mr. Al-Singace.[3]

9. On 26 November 2025, the Committee against torture adopted its Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Bahrain and stressed that it was particularly concerned about the situation of several human rights defenders, including Abdulhadi al-Khawaja, whose detention was declared arbitrary by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, and Hasan Mushaima and Abduljalil al-Singace, especially with regard to their access to medical care.[4] The Committee recommended that the State Party should release human rights defenders who have allegedly been detained and imprisoned in retaliation for their work, including Abdulhadi al-Khawaja, Abduljalil al-Singace and Hassan Mushaima.[5]

10. On 30 June 2026, the Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection with the preparation of the present report. The Government asserted that Mr. Abdulhadi Al Khawaja, Mr. Abduljalil Al Singace, and Mr. Hassan Mushaima had been convicted pursuant to final and binding judgments issued by the competent national courts in criminal cases concerning acts that constitute offences under national legislation and that affect security and public order. The Government added that they were afforded all legal rights and procedural safeguards prescribed by law, including the right to legal representation and defense, and the assistance of counsel throughout all stages of the investigation and trial. They were also able to exercise their right to appeal the judgments before the competent judicial authorities at the various levels of litigation. Regarding concerns related to their access to medical care, the Government said that they remained under continuous medical supervision and monitoring by the competent health authorities. It added that they were provided with all necessary medical, therapeutic, and preventive healthcare services in accordance with their medical condition, on an equal basis with all other beneficiaries of healthcare services in the Kingdom of Bahrain, without discrimination on any ground.

3. Belarus

11. The case of **Mr. Maksim Pazniakou**, acting Chairperson of the outlawed Belarusian Congress of Democratic Trade Unions (BKDP) then in exile, was included in the 2025 report of the Secretary-General on allegations that the legal proceedings against him (under article 361 of the Criminal Code) and the harassment of his relatives in Belarus appeared to be directly linked to his cooperation with the International Labour Organization (ILO) (GB.353/NSP/PV, para. 223). On 18 March 2026, the Governing Body acting under article 33 of the ILO Constitution on Belarus noted allegations of continued criminal prosecution of Mr. Pazniakou. Close relatives had reportedly been summoned for questioning, and in December 2025, the police had again searched the apartments of some of them (GB.356/INS/12(Rev.2), para. 14).

[3] A/HRC/18/19, paras. 15–24; A/HRC/21/18, paras. 53–54; A/HRC/48/28 Annex II paras. 5–8; A/HRC/51/47, Annex II paras. 5–6 and 9 and 14; A/HRC/54/61, Annex II, paras. 8–9; A/HRC/57/60, Annex II, paras. 9–13, 17–18; A/HRC/60/62, Annex II, paras. 14–22.

[4] CAT/C/BHR/CO/4, para. 39.

[5] CAT/C/BHR/CO/4, para. 40.

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12. The case of **Mr. Aliaksandr Yarashuk** has been included in reports of the Secretary-General[6] since 2023 on allegations of arbitrary detention, charges and sentencing to 4 years in prison under articles 342 and 361 of the Criminal Code, including for his submission of information to the International Labour Organization (ILO). Mr. Yarashuk was a head of the outlawed Belarusian Congress of Democratic Trade Unions (BKDP) and a member of the ILO Governing Body. The ILO Governing Body and Special Procedures mandate holders addressed his situation on several occasions, to which the Government has responded.[7] On 11 September 2025, Mr Yarashuk was released and deported to Lithuania as part of a group of 52 individuals, most of them Belarusian citizens, many of whom had their identity documents confiscated. Mr. Yarashuk had served almost three and a half years of prison following a conviction for "group actions violating public order" (Article 342) and for "calls for the imposition of sanctions" (Article 361). On 27 November 2026, the Governing Body under article 33 of the ILO Constitution on Belarus noted the release of Mr. Yarashuk and urged the Government, without further delay, to return his passport and restore the payment of his pension (GB.355/INS/8(Rev.1)/Decision, para. (c)). [8]

13. The case of the **NGO Human Rights Centre Viasna**, a human rights organization providing legal aid in Belarus, has been included in the reports of the Secretary-General[9] since 2021 on allegations of raids of the NGO's office, and arbitrary arrest, criminal charges and long prison sentencing of its Chair and staff in connection with their cooperation with the United Nations. Special procedures mandate holders addressed the situation of the staff of the NGO Viasna and the persecution of the NGO Viasna on several occasions,[10] to which the Government responded.[11]

14. On 27 February 2026, the Group of Independent Experts on the Human Rights Situation in Belarus welcomed the release over the previous year of Viasna Chairperson **Mr. Ales Bialiatski** and other staff from Viasna, as part of a group of political prisoners and human rights defenders (A/HRC/61/57, para. 55). They warned that their subsequent expulsion from Belarus and the confiscation and cancellation of their passports amounts to a fundamental violation of human rights.[12] According to information received by OHCHR, Viasna staff and volunteers who remained in detention had faced severe restrictions in their communications with the outside world. During the reporting period, relatives of convicted or exiled Viasna members were visited by security officers enquiring about their whereabouts, and their property has been seized and later actioned to enforce court sentences. Since the designation of Viasna as an "extremist organization" in August 2023, any interaction with it may create criminal liability, including prison.[13]

[6] A/HRC/54/61, Annex I paras. 16–21

[7] BLR 5/2024; GB.353/NSP/PV, paras. 15, 223; GB.349/INS/13(Rev.1), para. 7; GB.350/INS/10 (Rev.1), paras. 6 and 51; GB.346/PV), paras. 467–468; and BLR 6/2022.

[8] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/12/belarus-un-experts-denounce-expulsion-citizens-warn-about-risk-statelessness.

[9] A/HRC/60/62, Annex II paras. 29–31; A/HRC/57/60, Annex II paras. 37–38, A/HRC/54/61, Annex II paras. 20–22.A/HRC/51/47, Annex II paras. 23–24; A/HRC/48/28, Annex I, para. 2.

[10] BLR 1/2010; BLR 2/2011; BLR 7/2011; BLR 9/2011; BLR 2/2012; BLR 3/2012; BLR 1/2013; BLR1/2019; BLR 2/2019; BLR 8/2021; BLR 3/2023.

[11] See Government replies at: https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=31683; https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=31386;https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=31263;https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=32592;https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=34577;https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=34679; https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=36641.

[12] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/02/belarus-un-experts-welcome-prisoner-releases-warn-forced-expulsion-and; https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/04/belarus-un-experts-condemn-government-move-invalidate-passports-exiled?sub-site=HRC.

[13] A/HRC/61/57, paras. 87–93.

Advance edited version

4. Burundi

15. The cases of four Burundian lawyers, namely Mr. Armel Niyongere, Mr. Dieudonné Bashirahishize, Mr. Vital Nshimirimana, and Mr. Lambert Nigarura, were included in the reports of the Secretary-General between 2017 and 2024[14] on allegations of reprisals, including disbarment, suspension and seizure of real estate property and other assets, following their cooperation with the Committee against Torture during the consideration of a special report on Burundi in July 2016.[15] In a decision adopted on 21 November 2025 following a complaint filed by the four lawyers against Burundi, pursuant to article 22 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Committee against Torture concluded that the State Party had failed to fulfil its responsibility under article 13 of the Convention against Torture to refrain from reprisals against individuals who have cooperated with the Committee. It urged the State Party: (a) to restore the complainants' law licenses, reverse any bans imposed and restore their property rights; (b) to provide the complainants with appropriate redress, including compensation for material and non-material damages, restitution, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition; and (c) to ensure that no similar violations occur in the future.[16]

16. In its concluding observations on the combined eleventh to nineteenth periodic reports of Burundi adopted on 2 December 2025, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination expressed concerns about acts of violence, intimidation, harassment, threats and reprisals, including against human rights defenders and members of civil society organizations.[17] It recommended that the State Party address those acts, including by guaranteeing these individuals the freedom to carry out their activities, including cooperation with the United Nations and international and regional human rights mechanisms, without fear of harassment, intimidation or reprisals.[18] During the reporting period, the UN Committee against Torture, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and special procedures mandate holders[19], including the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Burundi, addressed the shrinking civic space, including attacks against civil society in the country, and reprisals for cooperation with the United Nations.

5. Cameroon

17. The cases of **Ms. Maximilienne Ngo Mbe and Ms. Alice Nkom** of Central Africa Human Rights Defenders Network (REDHAC) were included in the 2018, 2019 and 2025 reports of the Secretary-General.[20] These individuals suffered physical attacks, intimidation and harassment reportedly in connection to their cooperation with the Human Rights Committee during the review of Cameroon in October 2017.

18. According to information received by OHCHR, on 6 April 2026, the Douala-Bonanjo Court of First Instance held the eighth hearing in the case against Ms. Maximilienne Ngo Mbe. This was in relation to the case opened in January 2025 against Ms. Ngo Mbe and Ms. Nkom in relation to the charges of "breaking of seals" and "rebellion" for failure to

[14] A/HRC/36/31, Annex I, paras. 11–15; A/HRC/39/41, Annex II, paras. 12–13; A/HRC/42/30, Annex II, paras. 13–14; A/HRC/45/36, Annex II, para. 10; A/HRC/48/28, Annex II, para. 13; A/HRC/51/47, Annex II paras. 26–27; A/HRC/54/61, Annex II paras. 23–25; A/HRC/57/60, Annex II, paras. 43–47.

[15] AT/C/BDI/CO/2/Add.1, paras. 33 and 34. See also INT_CAT_RLE_BDI_24877_F and INT_CAT_RLE_BDI_24878_F.

[16] CAT/C/83/D/1141/2022, paras. 8.7 and 11. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/12/burundi-disbarring-lawyers-and-appropriating-property-were-reprisals-un.

[17] CERD/C/BDI/CO/11-19, para. 25.

[18] CERD/C/BDI/CO/11-19, para. 26(b) and (c).

[19] A/HRC/60/60, paras. 44, 50, 51, 58–61, 62 – 72, 95 (b), (c), (d), (f), (g). See also: https://hrcmeetings.ohchr.org/HRCSessions/HRCDocuments/88/OTH/88_18842365_aac0eb63-9693-4af6-ae3e-3e9d10b6caa5.docx; https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/09/burundi-un-experts-alarmed-increase-serious-human-rights-violations-during.

[20] A/HRC/39/41, Annex I, paras. –8; A/HRC/42/30, Annex II, paras.15–16; A/HRC/60/62, Annex II, paras. 33–37.

Advance edited version

comply with summons from the Senior Divisional Officer of Wouri in December 2024.[21] For the first time since the trial began on 7 April 2025, a representative of the State of Cameroon in the person of the Divisional Officer of Douala 1, the plaintiff in the case, appeared in Court and requested the reopening of the proceedings to submit additional evidence. The Court granted the request and adjourned the case to 4 May 2026, even though this was supposed to be the final hearing of the trial. During the hearing on 4 May 2026, the prosecutor examined the Divisional Officer, followed by cross-examination from the defence. The case was adjourned to 1 June, then to 6 July 2026 at the request of the Public Prosecutor for continuation of witness examination and further proceedings, including the presentation of final submissions.

19. The case of the civil society organization **Organic Farming for Gorillas Cameroon (OFFGO)** has been included since 2020 in the Secretary-General's reports[22] on allegations of reprisals following a communication by special procedure mandate holders (CMR 3/2019).

20. According to information received by OHCHR, during the reporting period the High Court of Mezam held several hearings between May 2025 and February 2026 in the court case involving Mr. Capelle as a civil party and 15 defendants, 11 of whom were high rank senior police and administrative officials, former high-raking officials from the Directorate-General for External Research (DGRE).

21. On 6 December 2025, Mr. Cappelle reportedly received death threats messages on his mobile phone. The person said, amongst other things, that he would "activate search for [Jan Cappelle]" if he "[tries] going back to Cameroon again". He added that Jan Cappelle "will meet barrister Kemende (…)"[23].[24]

22. In a ruling on 19 February 2026, the Examining Magistrate of the High Court of Mezam concluded that the rogatory commission before him since 10 July 2024 in relation with Mr. Capelle's case had "protracted for an exceptionally long period of time", and ordered that the rogatory commission be closed and the inquiry file be sent back to the Examining Magistrate of the Momo High Court (Mbengwi) for further necessary action.

23. On 23 February 2026, Mr. Cappelle was reportedly arrested in the streets of Bamenda and held at the DGRE headquarters in Bamenda by three officials from the DGRE who allegedly intimidated and threatened him in an attempt to force him to disclose what he said before the Examining Magistrate of the High Court of Mezam. Mr. Cappelle refused to disclose the information. Allegedly, the three officers also made death threats against Mr. Cappelle saying that unexpected events such as a car accident could easily take place. He was reportedly released minutes later following the intervention of his lawyer.

6. China

24. The cases of **Ms. Anna Kwok and Ms. Carmen Lau,** from the Hong Kong Democracy Council in self-exile, were included in the 2025 report of the Secretary-General[25] on allegations that arrest warrants[26] against them and their passport revocation were linked to their past and ongoing cooperation with the United Nations. On 30 April 2025 Ms. Kwok's father and brother were arrested for allegedly attempting to obtain funds from a life and personal accident insurance policy that belonged to her. Ms. Kwok's brother was released on bail pending investigation. On 2 May 2025. Ms Kwok's father was charged under section 90

[21] A/HRC/60/62, Annex II, para. 37.
[22] A/HRC/45/36, Annex I paras. 21–23; A/HRC/48/28, Annex II paras. 14–16; A/HRC/51/47, Annex II paras. 28 and 29; A/HRC/54/61, Annex II paras. 26–27; A/HRC/57/60, Annex II paras. 48–53; A/HRC/60/62, Annex II, paras. 38–40.
[23] Barrister Kemende was one of Mr. Cappelle's lawyers and was assassinated on 11 January 2022 in the streets of Bamenda (See: CMR 4/2022).
[24] CMR 4/2022.
[25] A/HRC/60/62, Annex I, paras. 19–23.
[26] Under the Hong Kong National Security Law and the 2024 Safeguarding National Security Ordinance.

Advance edited version

of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance that prohibits to deal with funds belonging to an "absconder."

25. On 24 July 2025, mandate holders raised concerns about a reported surge in human rights violations of a transnational nature against activists, human rights defenders and ethnic and religious minorities from China in self-exile. They addressed the case of Ms. Lau and requested clarification regarding the extraterritorial application of national security charges against Ms. Kwok, Ms. Lau and others, as well as to members of their families (CHN 9/2025). According to information received by OHCHR, on 11 February 2026, Ms. Kwok's father was tried and convicted of the above crime, and on 26 February 2026 he received a sentence of 8 months in prison. Ms. Kwok's father was reportedly the first family member of a self-exiled wanted activist to be charged and convicted of a national security offence. In November 2025, the former neighbours of Ms. Lau in the United Kingdom received letters purported to be from Ms. Lau with fake, sexualized images of her.

26. The case of two members of the international legal team supporting **Jimmy Lai and his son Sebastian Lai** was included in the 2023, 2024 and 2025 reports of the Secretary-General[27] on allegations that their statements at the Human Rights Council were considered by the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) as likely constituting a criminal offence. During the reporting period, special procedures mandate holders[28] and the High Commissioner for Human Rights[29] deplored the 20-year prison conviction and sentence of Jimmy Lai under the HKSAR national security legislation and called for his immediate release on humanitarian grounds. The UN Human Rights Office had previously noted that the broad scope of "collusion with external forces" under the National Security risks capturing legitimate activities of civil society organizations and journalists, including engagement with international human rights mechanisms. Specifically, it raised concerns that the judgment also treated engagement by others with the United Nations and UN human rights mechanisms as relevant context in reaching its conclusion of guilt.

27. The case of **Ms. Chow Hang Tung** was included in the 2024 and 2025 reports of the Secretary-General[30] on allegations that he had faced reprisals following the decision of the **Working Group on Arbitrary Detention**[31] on his case. The Working Group also raised concerns that the submission from the source on his detention could potentially give rise to criminal liability, as suggested in the reply of the Government of HKSAR.[32] On 7 January 2026, special procedures mandate holders addressed the arrest, charges and pre-trial detention of Ms. Chow HangTung under the HKSAR National Security Law (CHN 23/2025). Ms. Chow Hang Tung was reportedly representing herself. On 3 November 2025, the High Court rejected Ms. Chow Hang Tung's application to terminate the prosecution. Following several postponements, the trial started in January 2026, and it is alleged that Ms. Chow Hang Tung was not provided with the means to prepare for her defence. On 23 March 2026, the Government responded[33] to the communication by mandate holder. According to the Government, as early as July 2022, the Correctional Services Department approved Ms. Chow's use of a computer within the facility to read the electronic trial documents provided by the prosecution for pretrial preparation. As for the electronic trial arrangements in court, the Department also approved Ms. Chow's request, filed in November 2024, to borrow a laptop computer for use in court until the conclusion of the trial. During the public hearing on 27 January 2026, Ms. Chow expressly told the court that the Department had indeed approved and arranged for her to use a computer during the trial.

[27] A/HRC/60/62, Annex I, paras. 41–43, A/HRC/57/60, Annex II, para. 54; A/HRC/54/61, Annex I paras. 26–32.
[28] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/12/hong-kong-sar-un-experts-dismayed-jimmy-lai-conviction.
[29] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/02/hong-kong-sar-turk-urges-release-jimmy-lai-following-imposition-20-year.
[30] A/HRC/57/60, Annex I para. 32, and A/HRC/60/62, Annex II, paras. 44–45.
[31] A/HRC/WGAD/2023/30 and A/HRC/WGAD/2023/30/Corr.1.
[32] A/HRC/57/44, para. 30.
[33] https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=39644.

Advance edited version

28. The case of **Ms. Xu Yan** was included in previous reports of the Secretary-General[34] in relation to her reported targeting for engaging with United Nations human rights mechanisms on the release her husband, **Mr. Yu Wensheng** whose detention was considered arbitrary by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. Following their trial in closed proceedings and their conviction and sentencing in 2024, Ms. Xu Yan was released in January 2025 and placed under 24-hour police surveillance. During the reporting period, the Spokesperson for the UN Human Rights Office[35] noted the release of Mr. Yu Wensheng after he completed a 36-month sentence following a conviction for "inciting subversion of State power". The Spokesperson stated that it was crucial that his release be unconditional, that any related restrictions on him and his wife, be lifted, and that they be free from surveillance. According to information received by OHCHR, Ms. Xu Yan continued to be subjected to police surveillance. There were reportedly several cameras in the vicinity of her building, one of them pointed directly to her window, and there were reasons to believe that her electronic devices are being monitored to track her movements.

29. The case of **Ms. Li Qiaochu**, a human rights defender working on gender-based violence and labour rights, has been included in previous reports of the Secretary-General[36] on allegations that her detention had been in reprisal for meeting online with experts from the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances.[37] In August 2024, Ms. Li Qiaochu was released from prison after having served an eight-months sentence for inciting subversion of State power. According to information received by OHCHR, Ms. Li's telecommunications, online activity, and physical movements were under constant police surveillance since her release. She was required to report to local police in advance if she planned to leave the district where she lived. Reportedly, Ms. Li received police queries about her online activities shortly after sending text messages or making an online purchase.

30. The case of **Ms. Chen Jianfang**, a human rights defender, has been included in the previous reports of the Secretary-General[38] on allegations of arbitrary detention and reprisals for her campaign for civil society participation in the UPR of China, including a tribute to Ms. Cao Shunli [39] on the fifth anniversary of her death. Ms. Chen Jiangfan was released on 21 October 2023 after serving the full term of her sentence. According to information received by OHCHR, Ms. Chen Jiangfang remained under house arrest and continued to be subjected to strict movement restrictions. In May 2025, she allegedly developed a skin condition but was not allowed to seek medical treatment. Ms. Chen Jiangfang continues to be prevented from attending weekly services at her church or visiting family or friends during holiday periods.

31. The case of **Ms. Wang Yu** and of **Mr. Bao Longjun**, human rights lawyers, have been included in previous reports of the Secretary-General[40] on allegations of arrest and charges [41] including in connection with Ms. Wang Yu's role in the case of **Ms. Cao Shunli**, who had attempted to cooperate with the United Nations. According to information received by OHCHR, Ms. Wang Yu and Mr. Bao Longjun continued to be prevented from obtaining passports. They could not access medical treatment or provide legal services due reportedly

[34] A/HRC/42/30, para. 45 and Annex I, paras. 13, 17, A/HRC/45/36, Annex II, para. 16; A/HRC/48/28, para. 59, Annex II, para. 19; A/HRC/51/47, Annex II, para. 40; A/HRC/54/61, Annex II, para. 32; A/HRC/57/60 Annex II, para. 57; A/HRC/60/62, Annex II, paras. 47–48.

[35] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/04/china-cases-artist-gao-zhen-and-lawyer-yu-wensheng.

[36] A/HRC/48/28, para. 58, Annex I, para. 26; A/HRC/51/47, Annex II, paras. 36–38; A/HRC/54/61, Annex II para. 30. 58, Annex I, para. 26; A/HRC/51/47, Annex II, paras. 36–38; A/HRC/54/61, Annex II para. 30; A/HRC/57/60, Annex II, para. 55; A/HRC/60/62, Annex II para. 46.

[37] See also CHN 4/2021.

[38] A/HRC/27/38, para. 17, A/HRC/42/30, Annex II, para. 18; A/HRC/45/36, Annex II, para. 19–20, A/HRC/48/28, para. 59, Annex II, para. 20, A/HRC/51/47, Annex II, para. 41; A/HRC/51/47, Annex II, para. 41; A/HRC/54/61, Annex II, para. 33; A/HRC/57/60, Annex II, para. 59; A/HRC/60/62, Annex II para. 49.

[39] A/HRC/27/38, paras. 17–19, A/HRC/45/36, paras. 19, 21 and 34.

[40] A/HRC/39/41, Annex I, para. 10–12; A/HRC/42/30, Annex II, para. 19; A/HRC/45/36, Annex II, para. 21, A/HRC/48/28, para. 59, Annex II, para. 21; A/HRC/51/47, Annex II, para. 42; A/HRC/54/61, Annex II, para. 34; A/HRC/60/62, Annex II, para. 50.

[41] https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=32826.

Advance edited version

to obstruction and harassment by the authorities. On 10 December 2025, Ms. Wang Yu was briefly detained in Beijing after an arbitrary inspection of her belongings. On 27 March 2026, Xicheng District Branch of the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau requested Mr. Bao Longjun to report to the station. When he arrived, he was taken into custody and then released later the same day. On the same day, a dozen police officers detained Ms. Wang Yu while she was having tea with another human rights lawyer. She was also released later the same day.

32. The cases of **Ms. Li Wenzu, Ms. Wang Qiaoling and her husband, Mr. Li Heping, and of Mr. Jiang Tianyong** were included in previous reports of the Secretary-General[42] on allegations of arbitrary arrest and detention following their cooperation with the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights during his visit to China in August 2016. According to information received by OHCHR, all of the aforementioned individuals have continued to face police surveillance, harassment and intimidation during the reporting period, which has also reportedly affected their close relatives. These individuals also reportedly continued to face movement restrictions.

33. On 10 July 2026, the Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection with the preparation of the present report. It rejected allegations that it retaliates against persons cooperating with UN human rights mechanisms.

34. Regarding the cases of Ms. Anna Kwok and Ms. Carmen Lau, the Government stated that the arrest warrants against them and the cancellation of their passports were unrelated to "any cooperation with UN bodies". The Government added that both individuals continued to advocate "Hong Kong independence" overseas and called on foreign countries to impose sanctions on the HKSAR, thereby endangering national security. The authorities therefore considered it necessary to take measures to bring them to justice. Regarding the case of Ms Kwok's father, the Government stated that there was no "guilt by association" or "collective punishment," and that the proceedings against him were unrelated to his relationship with a fugitive (her daughter).

35. Regarding the case of Mr. Jimmy Lai, the Government stated that his conviction was not based on "normal communication with UN bodies" but rather on conduct involving requests for foreign sanctions against China and the HKSAR; that the court neither ruled nor suggested that contact with UN bodies constituted a criminal offense; and that the Court found him guilty of "conspiracy to collude with foreign or external forces to endanger national security."

36. Regarding the case of Ms. Chow Hang Tung, the Government stated that judicial proceedings in her case were still ongoing and that comments on the merits of the case would be inappropriate due to the principle of avoiding interference with pending judicial matters.

37. Regarding the case of Mr. Yu Wensheng, the Government stated that he completed the sentence and was released on 13 April 2026.

38. The Government added that there was no updated information regarding the cases involving Ms. Xu Yan, Mr. Bao Longjun, Ms. Li Qiaochu, Ms. Chen Jianfang, Ms. Li Wenzu, Mr. Li Heping, and Ms. Wang Qiaoling.

7. Egypt

39. The case of **Ms. Basma Mostafa** was included in the 2025 report of the Secretary-General[43] in the section on Egypt on allegations of harassment in the form of surveillance, threats of arrest and acts of transnational repression for her participation in an

[42] A/HRC/42/30, Annex II, para. 22, A/HRC/45/36, Annex II, para. 242; A/HRC/48/28, para. 59, Annex II, para. 24, A/HRC/51/47, Annex II, paras. 44–45; A/HRC/54/61, Annex II, para. 35; A/HRC/57/60, Annex II, para. 61; A/HRC/60/62, Annex II, para. 51-3.

[43] A/HRC/60/62, Annex I paras. 48–51.

Advance edited version

international human rights advocacy programme and her meetings with United Nations human rights mechanisms and OHCHR. (See Annex II, section on Egypt). [44]

40 Ms. Mostafa is an Egyptian investigative journalist and human rights defender in exile since November 2020, and the co-founder and Director of Programs of the Berlin-based Law and Democracy Support Foundation (LDSF). The alleged transnational repression related to acts by Egyptian State agents or agents reportedly acting on behalf, or with the acquiescence, of Egyptian State authorities in Germany, Kenya, Lebanon, and Switzerland since 2020 (EGY 6/2024).

41. According to information received by OHCHR, during the reporting period, the harassment and threats against Ms. Mostafa intensified in connection with her efforts to address the recurrent cross-border nature of the threats, seek protection, and ensure accountability. On 25 July 2025, Ms. Mostafa submitted a formal report to the United Kingdom Home Office concerning the individual who physically assaulted her in Berlin in 2022, and whose name was mentioned by mandate holders in their communication (EGY 6/2024). On 25 August 2025, the individual was arrested in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for activities targeting Egyptian activists in exile; he was subsequently released.

42. In August 2025, Ms. Mostafa reportedly became the target of a coordinated online campaign, consistent with the pattern of prior harassment documented by mandate holders (EGY 6/2024). The campaign reportedly included posts labelling her a 'spy,' 'agent,' 'terrorist,' and 'fugitive'. She was subject to harassment across different online platforms; including doxxing-style attacks using her name and photographs as well as posts delegitimizing her work and vilifying her for taking legal steps against those targeting her. On 17 September 2025, Ms. Mostafa reportedly received a direct message on her German phone threatening her with further physical assault, including the line 'wait for your punishment.' The sender was allegedly same individual who incited rape against her in 2022 (EGY 6/2024).

43. On 26 September 2025, special rapporteur on human rights defenders publicly expressed concern that Ms. Mostafa 'continued to be subjected to threats by supporters of an Egyptian state agent who attacked her in Berlin and who was recently arrested in London for his threatening behaviour,' and urged the German authorities to ensure her protection. [45]

44. On 28 September 2025, Ms. Mostafa reportedly faced another intimidation incident in Berlin. While seated in a café, an unknown man sat beside her and made a phone call in Egyptian Arabic within earshot, saying that a senior 'National Security' officer had asked him to 'send a car tomorrow.' The use of a plausible title and coded language associated in Egyptian security jargon with abduction operations was reportedly aimed at creating a targeted intimidating effect given Ms. Mostafa's prior history.

45. The case of **Mr. Mohamed el-Baqer**, a human rights lawyer from the Adalah Center for Rights and Freedoms, was included in the reports of the Secretary-General from 2020 to 2024[46] on allegations of arrest, ill-treatment and terrorism charges following the engagement of the Adalah Center in Egypt's 2019 UPR concerning the human rights situation of the Nubians (EGY 11/2019). In 2021, Mr. el-Baqer was convicted and sentenced for "joining a terrorist organization" and "participating in a criminal agreement with the intention of committing a terrorist crime" and was included in an official terrorist list. Mr. El-Baqer was released from prison in July 2023 following a Presidential pardon.

46. On 31 December 2025, special procedures mandate holders addressed alleged restrictions and precautionary measures against released human rights defenders, including the renewed inclusion on the terrorism watchlist of Mr. Mohamed El-Baqer. They noted that

[44] The allegations of intimidation and reprisals concerning Ms. Basma Mostafa are connected to and should be read in conjunction with the related allegation concerning the same individual in Annex I, section on Germany.

[45] https://x.com/MaryLawlorhrds/status/1971593465675862373

[46] A/HRC/45/36, Annex I, paras. 45–46; A/HRC/48/28, Annex II, paras. 46–47; A/HRC/51/47, Annex II, paras. 66–69; A/HRC/54/61, Annex II, paras. 52–53; A/HRC/57/60, Annex II, paras. 83–84.

Advance edited version

on 18 November 2025, the First Circuit of the Cairo Criminal Court renewed the inclusion of Mr. El-Baqer on the terrorist watchlist for a second period of five years in response to a request by the Public Prosecutor's Office. They stressed that no new evidence was provided, and the renewal came one day before the end of the first five-year period and that Mr. El-Baqer planned to appeal his re-listing before the Court of Cassation within 60 days of the ruling (EGY 10/2025).[47] They reiterated these concerns publicly on 14 January 2026.[48] On 2 March 2026, the Government responded to mandate holders that "the allegation contained in the communication is untrue". According to information received by OHCHR, Mr. El-Baqer appealed against his re-listing and a court hearing was scheduled to take place on 13 June 2026.

8. Guatemala

47. Alleged acts of reprisals against **judges, lawyers and prosecutors** who had worked for or investigated cases with the technical assistance of the **International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG)** have been included in the reports of the Secretary-General since 2019[49], and have been addressed by multiple United Nations actors. During the reporting period, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights[50] and special procedures mandate holders (see below) raised concerns that private actors, with support from the Public Prosecution Office and members of the judiciary, were misusing the criminal justice system against human rights defenders, former justice officials, and civil society representatives.

48. From 12 to 23 May 2025, the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers visited the country and noted that persecution had intensified, with those fighting impunity and corruption, defending human rights, or denouncing abuses of power increasingly facing online harassment, threats, and criminal charges.[51] The Special Rapporteur on the right to adequate housing, who visited the country from 14 to 25 July 2025, noted that this pattern of criminalization had a chilling effect, including on public officials, and pushed many legal professionals into safer work or exile.[52]

49. During the reporting period, OHCHR and special procedures mandate holders addressed the cases of former Attorney General **Ms. Thelma Aldana**, former head of the Special Prosecutor's Office against Impunity (FECI) **Mr. Juan Francisco Sandoval**, as well as former FECI prosecutors Ms. **Eva Siomara Sosa Pérez** and Ms. **Amy Mayra Lissette Girón Rodas**. Allegations included criminalization and the issuance on 30 May 2025 of national and international arrest warrants against them and others who had played a key role in the investigation of the Odebrecht case[53]. They noted a worrying pattern of criminalization against justice operators, particularly prosecutors and former officials who were part of the Special Prosecutor's Office and the now-defunct CICIG (A/HRC/61/18, para. 44 and GTM 8/2025).

[47] https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=39622.

[48] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/01/un-experts-egypt-must-lift-restrictions-released-human-rights-defenders.

[49] A/HRC/42/30, Annex I paras. 40–45 and Annex II para. 52; A/HRC/45/36, Annex II paras. 54–64; A/HRC/48/28, Annex II paras. 53–61; A/HRC/51/47, Annex I paras. 27–30 and Annex II paras. 74–79; A/HRC/54/61, Annex I paras. 50–55 and Annex II paras. 58–73; A/HRC/57/60, Annex I paras. 56–65 and Annex II paras. 90–106; A/HRC/60/62, Annex II, paras. 65–80.

[50] https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2026/02/assistant-secretary-general-brands-kehris-updates-human-right.

[51] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/05/guatemala-must-uphold-integrity-justice-system-end-criminalisation-un-expert.

[52] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/07/guatemala-un-expert-calls-urgent-moratorium-evictions.

[53] The Odebrecht case refers to a major transnational corruption scandal involving the Brazilian construction company Odebrecht, which admitted to paying large bribes to public officials in multiple countries in exchange for government contracts. It became one of the largest corruption cases in the region. In Guatemala investigations found that Odebrecht had paid millions of U.S. dollars in bribes to officials in connection with a highway rehabilitation contract, see GTM 8/2025.

Advance edited version

50. On 10 December 2025, the Government responded[54] to the communication by mandate holders and noted that despite the Government's firm commitment to the protection of human rights, Guatemala is experiencing a critical moment that led to a decision to allow independent oversight of the human rights situation in the country by international protection mechanisms.

51. According to available information, on 27 March 2026, the International Criminal Police Organization INTERPOL informed that it had not accepted the request for international arrest of **Mr. Sandoval**. On 9 April 2026, the Supreme Court of Justice issued injunction 3851-2025, nullifying the 30 May 2025 arrest warrants (see above). It is possible for the Public Prosecutor's Office to file an appeal. In the case of **Ms. Girón**, her family was reportedly subjected to intimidation and surveillance during the second half of 2025. She continues to receive threats through social media, including messages with information from a case under seal.

52. The case of **Mr. Stuardo Ernesto Campo Aguilar**, former anti-corruption prosecutor and former Chief of FECI, was included in the 2024 and 2025 reports of the Secretary-General in relation to his detention on charges related to his work on high-profile cases investigated with the technical assistance of the CICIG. He has remained in pre-trial detention since December 2023. According to information received by OHCHR, in July 2025, the Tenth Criminal Sentencing Court issued an acquittal in his favour in the case known as "Alfa Siete", which resulted in the closure of one of the three criminal cases against him. At the time of writing, Mr. Campo remains deprived of liberty due to ongoing proceedings, particularly the "Zolic" and "Libramiento de Chimaltenango" cases, in which no substantive rulings were issued during the reporting period. Key hearings were repeatedly postponed, including the initial Libramiento hearing, postponed again in March 2026.

53. The case of **Ms. Virginia Laparra Rivas**, former FECI chief in Quetzaltenango, has been included since 2022 in the reports of the Secretary-General on allegations of arrest, arbitrary detention, conviction and sentencing for her work with the FECI in high-profile corruption cases against public officials and organized crime, including many investigated with the technical assistance of the CICIG.[55] The High Commissioner for Human Rights[56] and the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention declared her detention arbitrary and called for her release.[57] In January 2024, Ms. Laparra was released under non-custodial measures. In July 2024, a second conviction was issued against her. Following the sentencing, and amid an ongoing risk of detention, Ms. Laparra left the country.

54. According to information received by OHCHR, the convictions against Ms. Laparra remained in effect and have not been overturned. In view of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, the Public Prosecutor's Office requested the imposition of exorbitant financial reparations for so-called damages to the State, which remain in place.[58] On 5 July 2025, the Fifth Chamber of Appeals for Criminal Matters, Narco-Activity and Environmental Crimes of Quetzaltenango, declared Ms. Laparra in contempt and ruled in favor of the request by the Public Prosecutor's Office to seek an international arrest warrant through the INTERPOL or Red Notice, thereby revoking the alternative measures previously in force. The decision is still pending. On 22 May 2026, the Supreme Court of Justice is scheduled to hear the cassation appeal related to the first conviction.

55. The case of **Ms. Samari Gómez Díaz**, a prosecutor at FECI, was included in the 2023 and 2025 reports of the Secretary-General on allegations of detention and prosecution for allegedly leaking confidential information to the former FECI Chief in connection with a high-profile case investigated with CICIG's technical assistance. On 14 June 2023,

[54] https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=39431.

[55] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/11/guatemala-un-expert-condemns-targeting-prosecutor-and-judge. See also GTM 1/2022 and GTM 6/2022 and government replies at: https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=36970; https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=27705.

[56] https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2024/01/comment-un-high-commissioner-human-rights-volker-turk-continued.

[57] A/HRC/WGAD/2023/24, para. 109.

[58] A/HRC/62/43/Add.1, para. 102.

Advance edited version

Ms. Gómez Díaz was acquitted, but on 10 October 2023 an appeals court ordered a re-trial of the case. In September 2024, three appeals of cassation were filed. According to information received by OHCHR, the case remained in the appeals phase at the cassation level, awaiting a decision from the Court. Ms. Gómez Díaz still faced the possibility of returning to prison should the court find her 'guilty' of the acts for which she has already been tried once. The process has caused serious damage to her professional and family life.

56. During the reporting period, reprisals allegedly continued against former judges **Mr. Carlos Ruano Pineda** and **Ms. Erika Aifán Dávila**, **Ms. Yassmín Barrios Aguilar** and **Mr. Pablo Xitumul de Paz** as well as against lawyers **Ms. Claudia González Orellana and Ms. Leily Santizo**, whose cases were included in previous reports of the Secretary-General.

57. According to information received by OHCHR, **Ms. Barrios Aguilar** remained in the country. She had reportedly been barred from participating in events related to the judiciary. **Mr. Xitumul de Paz** remains suspended from his judicial functions following the lifting of his immunity, in the context of criminal proceedings initiated in 2019 involving National Civil Police officers. The case remained at a preliminary stage, prolonging both legal uncertainty and his inability to resume judicial functions. According to information received by OHCHR, during the reporting period, the security detail of Mr. Xitimul de Paz was reduced.

58. The case of **Ms. González Orellana** was included in the 2024 and 2025 reports of the Secretary-General on allegations of arbitrary detention and prosecution and reprisal for her work with the CICIG during the period 2011-2019, and as a **lawyer of justice officials** who worked for or investigated cases with the technical assistance of the CICIG. Ms. González Orellana was being prosecuted for "abuse of power," reportedly in connection with a high-profile investigation with the technical support of the CICIG.[59] The trial against Ms. González continued behind closed doors. On 16 July 2025, the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers addressed the criminal proceedings against Ms. González Orellana (GTM 6/2025), noting unjustified delays and repeated hearing suspensions, and alleged bias by the Tenth Judge of First Instance in Criminal, Drug-related, and Environmental Crimes. She expressed concern that the proceedings may amount to reprisals for Ms. González Orellana's work with the CICIG. On 2 September 2025, the Government responded[60] providing information on the applicable legal framework as well as on the precautionary measures from the Interamerican Commission for Human Rights in relation to the situation of Ms. González Orellana.

59. According to information received by OHCHR, in January 2026, Ms. González Orellana's defence sought to modify the non-custodial measures to allow her to travel abroad for work. The Public Prosecutor's Office reportedly did not oppose the request, noting that she had previously been authorized to leave the country at least eleven times. On 21 January 2026, the Seventh Criminal Court revoked all substitute measures, leaving only the obligation to attend all hearings. The oral hearing, initially scheduled for 5 May 2026 before the Seventh Criminal Sentencing Court, was postponed to 12 May 2027.

60. According to available information, during the reporting period, there was no significant progress in the situations of former judges **Ms. Aifán and Mr. Ruano** as well as lawyer **Ms. Santizo**. They remained in exile due to the risk of arrest in the event of their return.

61. The case of **Ms. Claudia Maselli**, former Deputy Ombudsperson of the National Human Rights Institution, has been included since 2022 in the reports of the Secretary-General, in connection with alleged attempts to undermine the institution for its support to the work of the CICIG. In 2024, although the charges against Ms. Maselli had been dismissed in 2023, the dismissal was overturned on appeal and the case remanded for trial to the court of first instance. She was subsequently convicted and sentenced to three years of imprisonment and a four-year ban from holding public office. Following her appeal against thew verdict, she was granted alternative measures, including a prohibition to leave

[59] GTM 5/2023.

[60] https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=39204.

Advance edited version

the country, pending a final ruling. According to information received by OHCHR, in August 2025, Ms. Maselli was acquitted by the Third Chamber of the Criminal Court of Appeal (A/HRC/61/18, para. 45). This ruling was not yet final, as the Public Prosecutor's Office and the private complainant reportedly filed cassation appeals, which had not been notified to Ms. Maselli; no information is available regarding their status.

62. On 23 June 2026, the Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection with the preparation of the present report and provided detailed information on the cases included. Regarding Ms. Thelma Aldana, Mr. Juan Francisco Sandoval, Ms. Eva Siomara Sosa Pérez and Ms. Amy Mayra Lissette Girón Rodas, the Government reported that on 13 April 2026 the Constitutional Remedies and Preliminary Proceedings Chamber (Cámara de Amparo y Antejuicio) of the Supreme Court of Justice definitively annulled the arrest warrants against them in the Odebrecht case, finding that the chamber had exceeded its authority. Consequently, the declaration of contempt (rebeldía) imposed on them was also nullified. The Government noted that according to the information available warrants or orders issued by other judicial bodies may remain in effect; and that the individuals concerned remain outside the country.

63. Concerning Ms. Girón Rodas, the Government informed that the circumstances of harassment referred to persist, namely acts of surveillance targeting her family environment and threats disseminated through digital media. The Government noted that no additional updates regarding her personal situation have been received.

64. Concerning the situation of Mr. Stuardo Ernesto Campo Aguilar, the Government informed that in May 2026 the Constitutional Remedies and Preliminary Proceedings Chamber (Cámara de Amparo y Antejuicio) of the Supreme Court of Justice definitively rejected the request to lift the pretrial detention order. Consequently, the order at the time of writing remained in force.

65. Regarding Ms. Virginia Laparra Rivas, the Government informed that the public hearing on the cassation appeal against the first conviction, originally scheduled for September 2026, was brought forward to 22 May 2026. The defense submitted its arguments in writing, and the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice could thereby decide whether to uphold, modify, or set aside the conviction. At the time of writing, that decision had not yet been issued.

66. The Government also noted that the recent period had been characterized by the judicial review of several actions that gave rise to the allegations contained in the report, as well as by the continuation of proceedings that remain pending final resolution. The Government noted that the relevant institutions remain attentive to developments in the cases referred to and reiterated its willingness to convey, through the appropriate official channels, any updates that may arise subsequent to this update.

9. India

67. The situation of the **Centre for Social Development (CSD)** in Manipur and **its staff**, including its secretary **Mr. Nobokishore Urikhimbam and his relatives** have been included since 2018 in the reports of the Secretary-General.[61] Reportedly, staff from the CSD and Mr. Nobokishore Urikhimbam have been subjected to surveillance, freezing of bank accounts under the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act of 2010 (FCRA), and attempted killing and abduction of relatives in connection with their engagement with the United Nations. This engagement has been in relation to uranium mining and cement factories in Meghalaya and to the human rights situation in Manipur.

68. According to information received by OHCHR, on 7 November 2025, the Ministry of Home Affairs, FCRA Division sent a written order stating that CSD's FCRA Registration had been denied again because CSD had violated Section 12(4)(f)(i), 12(4)(f)(ii) of the FCRA

[61] A/HRC/39/41, Annex I paras. 63–65 : A/HRC/42/30, Annex II, para. 57; A/HRC/45/36, para. 76, Annex II. paras. 72–73; A/HRC/48/28, Annex II. paras. 66–68; A/HRC/51/47, para. 61, Annex II. paras. 80–81; A/HRC/57/60, Annex II, paras. 112–115; A/HRC/60/62, Annex II paras. 84–87.

Advance edited version

rules. The order also referred to Section 16 of the FCRA that allows the Central Government to make an inquiry through the central security agency to confirm whether the organization seeking the renewal has fulfilled all conditions specified in Section 12(4) of the FCRA. In this case, the security agency stated that the CSD and some of the persons affiliated with it had been opposing the Uranium mining in Meghalaya and had also raised the issue at various global platforms. The order stated that the activities of CSD and that of the persons affiliated with it were likely to affect the sovereignty and integrity of India.

69. The FCRA Division order further stated that following the decision not to accept the October 2024 revision application, CSD may submit a fresh registration application that meets the Act and Rules. At the time of writing, the denial of FCRA registration and the resulting bank account freeze had halted CSD's peacebuilding project and human rights activities.

10. Iran (Islamic Republic of)

70. The case of **stigmatization and threats against family members of journalists of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Persian service** for the journalists' statement at the Human Rights Council was included in the 2019, 2020 and 2024 reports of the Secretary-General.[62]

71. Special procedures mandate holders addressed the alleged escalation since June 2025 of the targeting and harassment by the Islamic Republic of Iran of BBC News Persian staff outside Iran and their family members inside Iran, in some cases including death threats (IRN 13/2025). On 18 September 2025, the Government responded to mandate holders rejecting the allegations as unfounded and undocumented.[63]

72. On 18 December 2025, the Human Rights Council adopted a resolution calling upon the Islamic Republic of Iran to end reprisals against human rights defenders, wherever they may occur, including against those who cooperate or attempt to cooperate with the United Nations.[64]

73. During the reporting period, transnational repression, including against journalists and human rights defenders, was addressed by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran,[65] the Independent Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran;[66] and the High Commissioner for Human Rights.[67]

11. Israel

74. The cases of six Palestinian human rights and humanitarian organizations, namely the **Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association (Addameer), Al Haq, the Bisan Center for Research and Development (Bisan), Defense for Children International – Palestine, (DCI-P), the Union of Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC), and the Union of Palestinian Women's Committees (UPWC)** have been included in the reports of the Secretary-General since 2022, on allegations that their designations by Israel as "terror[ist] organizations" under the Counter-Terrorism Law 5776 of 2016 were related to their cooperation with the United Nations and their human rights and humanitarian work.[68]

[62] A/HRC/42/30, Annex I paras. 54–55, A/HRC/45/36 paras. 77–79; A/HRC/57/60, para. 19 and Annex II, para. 130.
[63] https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=39247.
[64] A/RES/80/22, para. 17.
[65] A/80/349, paras. 44, 49, 50 (l) and 51 (c) and A/HRC/61/59, para. 50–55.
[66] A/HRC/61/60, paras. 123–131 and 141; https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/03/iranian-civilians-caught-between-ongoing-armed-hostilities-and-repression.
[67] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/04/iran-turk-deplores-crackdown-dissent-says-rights-all-iranians-must-be.
[68] A/HRC/60/62, Annex II, paras. 93 and 94.

Advance edited version

75. During the reporting period, multiple UN actors raised concerns about the negative impact of these designations on the above-mentioned organizations and the subsequent sanctions imposed by the United States Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) on the operations of two of them. On 10 June 2025, OFAC sanctioned the operations of **Addameer,** alleging it had ties with organizations listed as a terrorist in the United States of America and in Israel (Executive Order 13224)[69]. On 4 September 2025, OFAC sanctioned **Al Haq, Al Mezan, and the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR) for their alleged engagement in efforts by the International Criminal Court ICC to investigate, arrest, detain, or prosecute Israeli nationals, without Israel's consent** (Executive Order 14203).[70] The sanctions required third-party service providers to sever ties with the organisations within one month.

76. On 5 September 2025, the High Commissioner for Human Rights called on the U.S. Government to withdraw the sanctions imposed against these four NGOs.[71] In September and December 2025, special procedures mandate holders addressed the impact of the designation and/or sanctions by the U.S. Government against the above-mentioned NGOs (USA 27/2025 and USA 38/2025).[72] During the period, mandate holders also addressed Google LLC, Intuit Inc. and Meta Inc on allegations of disruption of the digital operations of Al-Haq and Al-Mezan following their designation and subsequent imposition of sanctions by OFAC (OTH 151/2025; OTH 153/2025; OTH 152/2025).[73]

77. On 27 March 2026, the Human Rights Council adopted a resolution on the 'Human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the obligation to ensure accountability and justice' in which it said it was concerned by acts of intimidation, threats, sanctions, reprisals or other coercive measures against judges, prosecutors, other officials and staff of the International Criminal Court, United Nations mandate holders and those cooperating with them, as they are incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the obligation of States to respect the independence, objectivity and proper functioning of international judicial and human rights mechanisms, in accordance with their respective mandates, and called upon all States to refrain from and rescind any such measures (A/HRC/RES/61/4, para. 11). The Council further called for an end to all policies of harassment, threats, intimidation and reprisals, detention, expulsion and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions against human rights defenders, journalists, media workers and civil society actors and their families, who peacefully advocate for the rights of the Palestinian people, including by cooperating with United Nations human rights bodies. It called for their protection and underscored the need to investigate all such acts and to ensure accountability and effective remedies (A/HRC/RES/61/4, para. 14).

78. The sanctions imposed by Israel against these organisations as well the ones subsequently adopted by the U.S. Government had a severe impact on their operations and staff. All bank accounts previously held by these organizations were reportedly closed; their staff holding U.S. citizenship were forced to resign; and some donors discontinued funding. A number of social media companies shut down their social media accounts without warning, causing the permanent deletion of reams of content, including documentation of human rights violations and abuses.

79. The sanctions have had rippling effects across Palestinian civil society. Reportedly some organisations working on human rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory had to adapt their advocacy efforts, while others, including Defence for Children International – Palestine (DCI-P) took the decision to cease their operations due to unacceptable risk to staff, beneficiaries and partners.

[69] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0162;
[70] https://www.state.gov/releases/2025/09/sanctioning-foreign-ngos-directly-engaged-in-iccs-illegitimate-targeting-of-israel.
[71] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/09/turk-calls-us-withdraw-sanctions-against-palestinian-rights-groups.
[72] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/09/un-experts-dismayed-us-sanctions-against-palestinian-human-rights.
[73] https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=39575.

Advance edited version

80. On 1 December 2025, Israeli security forces raided the Ramallah and Hebron offices of UAWC amidst an escalating Israeli targeting of Palestinian civil society and human rights defenders.[74] Reportedly, during the raid, Israeli security forces kept the people who were in the premises blindfolded and handcuffed, kneeling down, or with their faces down on the floor for several hours and arbitrarily detained eight men. Six were held for nine days in Israeli detention, while two were held for 25 days before being released.

12. Nicaragua

81. The case of **Mr. Brooklyn Rivera**, Indigenous leader and at the time Deputy of the National Assembly for the YATAMA, was included in the 2024 and 2025 reports of the Secretary-General,[75] on allegations that he was not allowed to return to Nicaragua following his participation in the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII). In September 2023, upon his clandestine return to the country, he was arbitrarily arrested and was since held without charges or contact with his relatives. On 22 August 2025, special procedures mandate holders addressed allegations of the enforced disappearance of Mr. Rivera and requested information from the Government about his fate and whereabouts. Mandate holders also requested information on any judicial proceedings against him, and on the measures to guarantee his rights to health, liberty, and personal integrity (NIC 2/2025). On 1 May 2026, mandate holders publicly expressed[76] consternation over reports indicating that individuals subjected to enforced disappearance in Nicaragua may have died in custody under conditions that could amount to torture. They noted information suggesting that Mr. Rivera may have died while in detention. Mandate holders called for immediate proof of life of Mr. Rivera and, if he has died in detention, for information on the circumstances and causes of his death and the location of his remains.

82. On 27 May 2026, the Interior and Health Ministries released a statement[77] and photographs showing Mr. Rivera in a hospital bed where he had been admitted on 7 March 2026 due to "a deterioration in his respiratory condition". On 31 May 2026, the Interior and Health Ministries announced[78] his death due to physical and neurological deterioration due to a COVID-19 virus bacterium. The Secretary-General, High Commissioner for Human Rights[79] and special procedures mandate holders[80] deplored Mr. Rivera's death in custody, expressed doubts about his treatment while in custody, and called on the authorities to conduct prompt, impartial and transparent investigations into the circumstances of his death.

83. The case of the NGO **Comisión Permanente de Derechos Humanos (CPDH)** and its staff was included in previous reports of the Secretary-General issued[81] on allegations of threats, harassment and intimidation for its regular engagement with the United Nations. According to information received by OHCHR, during the period former staff of CPDH and their relatives in Nicaragua continued to be subjected to surveillance by the National Police. In addition, lawyers and other individuals associated with or who had collaborated with CPDH reportedly faced undue restrictions affecting the exercise of their professional activities and their interactions with the police and judicial authorities. In one case, a former CPDH staff was allegedly subjected to harassment by authorities, which compelled the individual to leave the country. Names and details of those concerned are withheld due to fear of further reprisals.

[74] https://www.un.org/unispal/document/ohchr-press-release-3dec25/.
[75] A/HRC/57/60, Annex I, paras. 78, 81 and 84.
[76] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/05/nicaragua-un-experts-appalled-allegations-death-custody-forcibly-disappeared.
[77] https://www.el19digital.com/articulos/ver/177578-informe-de-salud-de-brooklyn-rivera-bryan-del-ministerio-del-interior-y-ministerio-de-salud.
[78] https://www.minsa.gob.ni/centro-de-medios/noticias/nos-deja-brooklyn.
[79] https://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k1k/k1k622qah2; https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-briefing-notes/2026/06/nicaragua-death-custody.
[80] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/06/nicaragua-un-experts-demand-truth-and-accountability-after-indigenous-leader.
[81] A/HRC/42/30, Annex I, para. 78; A/HRC/45/36, Annex II, paras. 95–96; A/HRC/48/28, Annex II para. 105; A/HRC/51/47, Annex II para. 120; A/HRC/60/62, Annex II para. 104.

Advance edited version

84. The case of **Mr. Guillermo Gonzalo Carrión Maradiaga** was included in previous reports of the Secretary-General[82] concerning allegations of surveillance and persecution in exile linked to his cooperation with OHCHR and the sharing of information on human rights violations with international mechanisms. Mr. Carrion is a lawyer and human rights defender who was legal director of the now dissolved Nicaraguan Center for Human Rights (CENIDH) and subsequently re-located to Costa Rica and co-founded the NGO Human Rights Collective "Nicaragua Nunca Más".

85. According to information received by OHCHR, **Mr. Carrión Maradiaga** faced intensified acts of transnational persecution throughout the reporting period that extended to other members of the Human Rights Collective, including **Mr. Yader Joel Valdivia Martínez** and **Mr. Salvador Lulio Marenco Contreras**. The three defenders also reportedly received credible information that they were at heightened risk of acts of transnational repression in Costa Rica, allegedly attributable to agents or structures with links to the Government of Nicaragua. During the reporting period, the Collective reportedly experienced repeated digital threats, cyberattacks and ongoing physical and digital surveillance. The accumulation of these security incidents and the escalation in risks of transnational violence reportedly compelled the Human Rights Collective to relocate its offices in March 2026 for the fourth time since its establishment in Costa Rica. Between April and May 2026, the Collective was included in an alleged smear campaign against perceived government opponents disseminated through media outlets aligned with the Government. The reported acts of intimidation, surveillance and transnational repression impacted their ability to carry out their work, including their engagement with the United Nations and other human rights mechanisms.

86. The case of **Mr. Félix Alejandro Maradiaga** was included in previous reports of the Secretary-General[83] for his conviction and sentencing to 13 years in prison in connection with his briefing to the Security Council in 2018. Mr. Maradiaga was the executive director of the Institute for Strategic Studies and Public Policy and a pre-candidate for the 2021 Nicaragua presidential elections. The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention found his detention to be arbitrary. Mr. Maradiaga was deported from Nicaragua to the United States in 2023, arbitrarily deprived of his nationality and his records were reportedly erased from the Civil Registry. According to information received by OHCHR, Mr. Madariaga continued to face a vilification campaign by State-aligned media and social media accounts labelling him as traitor, foreign agent or terrorist. During the reporting period, he was reportedly subjected to surveillance, unusual approaches by unknown persons, and suspicious telephone calls in the United States, where he resides. Mr. Maradiaga's relatives in Nicaragua have also reportedly continued to be subject to surveillance, repeated unjustified summoning to police stations, and unannounced visits to their residence by police officials or members of neighbourhood watch network. They have been questioned about Mr. Maradiaga´s whereabouts and activities.

13. Pakistan

87. The detention of **Ms. Mahrang Baloch** and of other leaders of the **Baloch Yakjehti Committee** (BYC) was included in the 2025 report of the Secretary-General[84] on allegations that it may amount to reprisal for their interaction with United Nations mechanisms.[85] On 23 July 2025, the Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection to the Secretary-General's report, stating that the allegation of intimidation and reprisals was unfounded.

[82] A/HRC/42/30, Annex I paras. 78–79; A/HRC/57/60, Annex II paras. 143–144, A/HRC/60/62, Annex II, para. 95.

[83] A/HRC/42/30, Annex I para. 82; A/HRC/51/47, Annex II para. 118; A/HRC/54/61, Annex II para. 114; A/HRC/60/62, Annex II, paras. 100–103.

[84] A/HRC/60/62, Annex I paras. 86–93.

[85] PAK 4/2024 and PAK 1/2025. See also https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/04/un-experts-urge-pakistan-address-human-rights-violations-balochistan. See also: https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=39580.

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88. On 9 May 2025, special procedures mandate holders addressed the arrest, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance and mistreatment of leaders and members of the **Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC)** as well as their family members and lawyers**.** Those concerned included **Ms. Mahrang Baloch, Ms. Beebow Baloch, Ms. Gulzadi Baloch, Mr. Sibghatullah Shahjee, Mr. Bebarg Baloch, and Mr. Israr Baloch** (PAK 6/2025).

89. Between 22 March and 7 April 2025, Ms. Mahrang Baloch, Ms. Beebow Baloch, Ms. Gulzadi Baloch, Mr. Sibghatullah Shahjee, and Mr. Bebarg Baloch were reportedly arrested and detained at Hudda Prison under section 3 of the Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance (MPO). On 23 April 2025, Ms. Beebow Baloch was reportedly removed from the prison by force, during which she, Ms. Mahrang Baloch, and Ms. Gulzadi Baloch were beaten, and later transferred to Pishin Prison. On 25 April 2025, Ms. Mahrang Baloch, Mr. Sibghatullah Shahjee, Mr. Bebarg Baloch, and other detained BYC members began a hunger strike to protest the transfer and prison mistreatment (PAK 6/2025).

90. Mandate holders reported attempts to coerce Ms. Mahrang Baloch into signing a document consenting to house arrest, which she refused. They also noted that, since April 2025, allegedly her bank account had been blocked, her national identity card suspended, and that she may have been placed on the Fourth Schedule under the Anti-Terrorism Act.[86] Her close relatives reportedly faced intimidation for advocating on her behalf. Mandate holders further noted ongoing harassment of Mr. Israr Baloch, a lawyer for detained BYC activists, including a raid of his house by masked individuals in April 2025 (PAK 6/2025).

91. On 11 December 2025, mandate holders addressed allegations of human rights violations linked to mining operations in Chagai District, Balochistan, involving repeated reprisals, arbitrary arrest and detention, enforced disappearances, and inhuman or degrading treatment in custody of human rights defenders, including **Ms. Mahrang Baloch and Ms. Beebarg Baloch** (PAK 11/2025).

92. Mandate holders reported repeated extensions of Ms. Baloch's detention under section 3 of the Maintenance of Public Order (MPO) Ordinance. On 11 October 2025, the Balochistan Government decided to hold hearings of detained BYC leaders in prison premises, citing security concerns. Ms. Mahrang and other BYC members were later transferred from preventive detention under section 3 of the MPO to the Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC), where cases were filed under the Anti-Terrorism Act and the Penal Code. The ATC in Quetta extended their custody repeatedly for nearly two months before rejecting a request for further physical remand and ordering their transfer to judicial custody in September 2025. Those detained in March and April 2025 were at that time eligible for bail (PAK 11/2025).[87]

93. According to information received by OHCHR, at the time of writing, Ms. Mahrang Baloch, Ms. Beebow Baloch, Ms. Gulzadi Baloch, Mr. Sibghatullah Shahjee, Mr. Bebarg Baloch remained in prison. Mr. Israr Baloch, the lawyer, was reportedly placed on the 4th Schedule under the Anti-Terrorism Act.

14. Saudia Arabia

94. The case of Ms. **Loujain Al-Hathloul**, a woman human rights defender, was included in previous reports of the Secretary-General[88] on allegations of disappearance, arbitrary detention and torture following her engagement with the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women in March 2018. In June 2020, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention found her detention arbitrary (A/HRC/WGAD/2020/33). In

[86] The 4th Schedule under the Pakistan Anti-Terrorism Act of 1997 is a preventive administrative measure that allows the state to designate individuals reportedly without procedural safeguards to be proscribed individuals considered a security risk subject to severe limitations on their freedom of movement and access to financial accounts, see PAK 1/2025.

[87] https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=39581.

[88] A/HRC/42/30, Annex I, paras. 91–93; A/HRC/45/36, Annex II, paras. 110–111; A/HRC/48/28, Annex II, paras. 114–116, A/HRC/51/47, Annex II, paras. 128–129; A/HRC/54/61, Annex II, paras. 132–133; A/HRC/57/60, Annex II, paras. 157–159 ; A/HRC/60/62, Annex II, paras. 116–117.

Advance edited version

December 2020, Ms. Al-Hathloul was convicted and sentenced on national security related charges (SAU 3/2021).[89] On 10 February 2021, she was released from prison on probation for three years and subjected to a travel ban.[90]

95. According to information received by OHCHR, Ms. al-Hathloul continued to be subjected to an indefinite travel ban. During the reporting period, Ms. al-Hathloul was prevented from travelling abroad (to Europe) at least three times, in June and September 2025 as well as in January 2026. In the first instance, on 19 June 2025, when Ms. al-Hathloul attempted to travel through Bahrain, she was stopped at the border and informed that she remained subject to a travel ban, without being provided with any end date. On 18 December 2025, Ms al-Hathloul sent two letters to the royal court in relation to the travel ban. It is reported that at the time of writing, she had received no reply.

96. On 20 July 2026, the Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection with the preparation of the present report. It rejected allegations that Ms. Al-Hathloul had been subjected to torture, arbitrary detention, or disappearance. It also rejected allegations that she had been targeted because of her cooperation with United Nations human rights mechanisms. The Government stated that the travel ban against Ms. Al-Hathloul was based on a judicial ruling, adding that she was sentenced under the anti-terrorism financing law to 5 years and 8 months in prison, with 2 years and 10 months of her sentence suspended as well as a travel ban of equal length to the prison term.

15. Thailand

97. During the reporting period, mandate holders addressed a reported surge in human rights violations of a transnational nature in the Greater Mekong Subregion, including in Thailand, such as killings and enforced disappearances of activists and opposition members, refoulements and harassment. They expressed concern about the terrorist designation by Viet Nam of diaspora civil society organizations and raised several cases that were included in previous reports of the Secretary-General on allegations of reprisals for cooperation with the United Nations, its representatives and mechanisms in the field of human rights (THA 8/2025)[91] (See Annex II section on Viet Nam).[92]

98. The case of **Mr. Y Quynh Bdap,** co-founder of **Montagnards Stand for Justice (MSFJ),** was included in the 2025 report of the Secretary-General[93] on allegations that his conviction *in absentia* in Viet Nam and his situation as a refugee in Thailand since 2018 could be linked *inter alia* to his active involvement with MSFJ and its engagement with the United Nations human rights mechanisms, including with the UPR and treaty bodies.[94] On 24 July 2025, mandate holders addressed the trial, conviction and sentencing *in absentia* in Viet Nam of Mr. Bdap and urged Thailand not to extradite or forcibly return Montagnards seeking protection in the country (VNM 3/2025). On 26 November 2025, the Bangkok Court of Appeal upheld the decision to proceed with Mr. Bdap's extradition, and he was returned to Viet Nam on 28 November 2025. In view of mandate holders, this transfer violated the obligation of *non-refoulment*. On 3 December 2025, mandate holders publicly expressed alarm[95], warning that his return exposed him to torture or other ill-treatment, enforced disappearance and other grave human rights violations. At the time of writing, his whereabouts in Viet Nam remained unknown (VNM 3/2025).

[89] https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=36216.
[90] SAU 3/2021.
[91] See also THA 6/2024.
[92] The allegation of intimidation and reprisals concerning the NGO Montagnards Stand for Justice (MSFJ) and its founder Mr. Y Quynh Bdap is connected to and should be read in conjunction with the related allegation concerning the same organization and individual contained in Annex II, section on Viet Nam.
[93] A/HRC/60/62, Annex I, paras. 135–147 and 159–166.
[94] THA 6/2024, an A/HRC/60/62, Annex I, para. 140.
[95] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/12/un-experts-alarmed-y-quynh-bdaps-extradition-thailand-viet-nam.

Advance edited version

99. According to information received by OHCHR, on 29 December 2025, Viet Nam's state television broadcast Mr. Bdap's public admission to having directed the shootings in Da Lak Province in June 2023. On 12 February 2026, the UN special rapporteur on human rights defenders noted[96] news that Mr. Bdap has been made to appear on state TV in Viet Nam giving what were reported to be forced confessions, following his refoulement from Thailand and his conviction and sentencing to 10-year imprisonment.

100. The case of **Mr. Nguyen Van An,** a Catholic from Ke Gai parish, was included in the 2019 report of the Secretary-General[97] under the section on Viet Nam on allegations that the arrest warrant against him was due to his involvement in documenting alleged human right violations and reporting them to the United Nations. Mr. Nguyen Van An and his family left the country in May 20218 and relocated to Thailand. According to information received by OHCHR, on 27 May 2025 Mr. Nguyen was arrested for "illegal residence" by Thai authorities and detained at the Pathum Thani Detention Center before being transferred to Suan Phlu detention centre. During his detention in Thailand, it is reported that Vietnamese embassy officials visited him three times and pressured him to sign a document agreeing to "voluntary repatriation". On 28 August 2025, Vietnamese police from Nghe An Province and local authorities reportedly visited his mother's house to pressure his family to bring Mr. Nguyen home. It is reported that while the Vietnamese police promised a reduced sentence, they also warned that they could intervene to prolong indefinitely Mr. Nguyen's detention in Thailand or force his return if he refused. Following the intervention of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and other United Nations entities in Thailand, Mr. Nguyen was released on bail on 5 January 2026.

101. The case of **Ms. Angkhana Neelapaijit** was included in the reports of the Secretary-General between 2017 and 2021 and again in 2025[98] on allegations of surveillance, harassment, intimidation and online smear campaign against a group of human rights defenders documenting torture and ill-treatment by military in the Southern Border Provinces. Ms. Neelapaijit and other grantees of the United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture were part of the group.[99] On 11 November 2025, mandate holders publicly addressed [100] a widespread smear campaign, harassment and death threats against Ms. Neelapaijit and another human rights defender in Thailand and called on the authorities to ensure their protection and conduct prompt and effective investigations. Some social media posts had reportedly called for Ms. Neelapaijit's enforced disappearance, with disturbing references to the disappearance of her husband, Somchai Neelapaijit, which took place several years ago.

102. According to information received by OHCHR, Ms. Neelapaijit has continued to face threats and intimidation in connection with her human rights work and cooperation with the United Nations.[101] Ms. Neelapaijit reported these incidents to the Royal Thai Police, which provided regular patrols around her home reportedly to ensure her safety during the most intense period of the harassment. On 18 October 2025, Ms. Neelapaijit petitioned the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand (NHRCT) for an investigation into the smear campaign. The NHRCT reportedly declined to take up the case and reaffirmed this decision on 13 February 2026.

[96] https://x.com/MaryLawlorhrds/status/2021878282271052123; https://bsky.app/profile/marylawlorhrds.bsky.social/post/3menojoycxc2n.

[97] A/HRC/42/30, Annex I, paras. 121 and 123.

[98] A/HRC/60/62, Annex II paras. 122–124; A/HRC/48/28, Annex II, para. 131; A/HRC/45/36, Annex II, paras. 119–21, 123–124; A/HRC/42/30, Annex II, para. 101; A/HRC/39/41, Annex II paras. 51–53; A/HRC/36/31, para. 57 and Annex I, paras. 80–81.

[99] THA 6/2017 and THA 7/2024. See Government reply at https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=38524.

[100] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/11/thailand-un-experts-alarmed-renewed-harassment-and-intimidation-human-rights.

[101] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/03/thailand-un-experts-deplore-justice-unfulfilled-22-years-after-somchais.

Advance edited version

16. Turkmenistan

103. The case of **Mr. Nurgeldi Halykov**, an independent journalist, was included in the 2021 and 2022 reports of the Secretary-General[102] on allegations of judicial harassment and a four-year prison sentence following a conviction for fraud. This happened shortly after he had shared information on social media about the visit of a World Health Organization (WHO) delegation to Turkmenistan in July 2020 in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic (TKM 1/2021).[103] Mr. Halykov completed his sentence in June 2024.

104. On 30 May 2025, special procedures mandate holders addressed allegations concerning an apparently arbitrary travel ban imposed on Mr. Halykov, who intended to travel to Dubai for work and held a valid visa. On 12 January 2025, at passport control, Turkmen authorities informed him that he could not leave the country due to a temporary travel restriction, of which he had not been notified in advance. On 17 January 2025, Mr. Halykov submitted a written complaint to the Migration Service regarding the restriction (TKM 2/2025).

105. On 15 May 2025, a court in Ashgabat upheld the travel ban after concluding that Mr. Halykov's complaint challenging the exit ban was unfounded. In court, a representative of the Migration Service reportedly stated that the Service had no objection to his departure and was acting solely on instructions from a "competent authority", without identifying that authority or citing the legal basis for the restriction (TKM 2/2025).

106. According to information received by OHCHR, on 3 July 2025 the Ashgabat City Court overturned the lower court's decision to uphold the travel ban against Mr. Halykov and sent the case back to the Kopetdag District Court for reconsideration, this time before a different judge. The District Court reviewed the matter and instructed the State Migration Service to issue a formal administrative act establishing the legal basis for the travel ban.

107. On 25 December 2025, the State Migration Service sent Ms. Halykov an official administrative act explicitly stating that the travel ban was based on point 10 of part 1 of Article 30 of the Migration Law. This provision restricts departure when it is against national security interests. It is reported that Mr. Halykov challenged the legal justification for the travel restriction before the court and a hearing took place on 2 and 3 February 2026. The court upheld the travel ban after concluding that Mr. Halykov's complaint was unfounded.

17. Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

108. The case of **Mr. Yendri Velásquez**, LGBTIQ+ human rights defender, was included in the 2025 report of the Secretary-General[104] on allegations that he was prevented from travelling to attend the review of Venezuela by the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, which took place in Geneva on 6 and 7 August 2024.[105] On 13 October 2025, two unidentified men approached Mr. Velásquez and another individual in Bogotá (Colombia), where he had relocated and sought asylum, and fired multiple shots against them before fleeing the scene. Mr. Velásquez sustained eight gunshot wounds. While he survived the attack, Mr. Velásquez suffered significant physical and psychological harm. Mandate holders expressed concern that the attack against Mr. Velasquez could be an act of transnational repression and that Venezuelan actors, including authorities, may have supported or ordered the attack. They noted information that Venezuelan human rights defenders have been subjected to threats for their work, including while abroad. In some cases, these threats appear to have originated from Venezuelan authorities or other actors (VEN 5/2025).

[102] A/HRC/48/28 Annex I, paras. 107–109; A/HRC/51/47, Annex II paras. 147–148.
[103] https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=36065.
[104] A/HRC/60/62, Annex I paras. 152–154.
[105] CERD/C/SR.3081, paras. 7, 26 and 70; CERD/C/SR.3082, paras. 20 and 63; VEN 12/2024.

Advance edited version

18. Viet Nam

109. On 15 July 2025, the UN Human Rights Committee noted with concern allegations of enforced disappearances and extraterritorial enforced disappearances and other forms of repression by Vietnamese officials (see Annex II section on Thailand).[106] The Committee referred to allegations on the misuse of International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) Red Notices against human rights defenders and the use of politically motivated extradition processes (CCPR/C/VNM/CO/4, para. 24).

110. The listing of **Montagnards Stand for Justice (MSFJ)** as a terrorist organization and the trial, conviction and sentencing *in absentia* of its co-founder, **Mr. Y Quynh Bdap** was included in the 2025 report of the Secretary-General[107]. Mandate holders referred specifically to MSFJ's engagement with the United Nations, including with the UPR and treaty bodies. They also warned that its designation as a terrorist organization effectively criminalized any Vietnamese citizen – inside and outside the country – who engages with MSFJ's human rights work and advocacy, including at the United Nations (VNM 4/2024).[108]

111. On 24 July 2025, mandate holders addressed a reported surge in human rights violations of a transnational nature in the Greater Mekong Subregion, including in Viet Nam. In this context, they addressed the case of **Mr. Y Quynh Bdap** and urged Thailand to refuse his extradition (VNM 3/2025). On 26 November 2025, the Bangkok Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Criminal Court to extradite Mr. Bdap, who was returned to Viet Nam on 28 November 2025. Mandate holders publicly expressed[109] dismay at the refoulement and warned that his return exposed Mr. Bdap to a serious risk of grave human rights violations. Mr. Bdap whereabouts in Viet Nam at the time remained unknown.

112. On 19 November 2025, the Government of Viet Nam responded[110] to mandate holders stating that the authorities possessed sufficient evidence of Mr. Bdap's direct implication in the 11 June 2023 terrorist attack on Dak Lak Province. The Government noted that it had transmitted the evidence to the Thai Criminal Court to support the extradition. Viet Nam committed to ensure Mr. Bdap's rights upon extradition.

113. The designation of the **NGO Boat People SOS (BPSOS),** based in the United States and Thailand, of "terrorism" was included in the 2025 report of the Secretary-General[111] on allegations that it was connected to BPSOS active and visible engagement with the United Nations. On 23 July 2025, mandate holders addressed the designation of BPSOS under counter-terrorism legislation and raised concerns about reprisals and intimidation against Indigenous Peoples and ethnic and religious minorities, including **Mr. Thang Dinh Nguyen**, other Montagnard defenders in Thailand, and members of MSFJ and BPSOS. They stated that restrictions on Montagnard diaspora organizations were designed to discourage cooperation with the United Nations and prevent individuals from seeking access to or providing information to its mechanisms, including Special Procedures (VNM 3/2025).

114. On 19 November 2025, the Government responded[112] to mandate holders stating that the inclusion of BPSOS and Mr. Thang on the list of organizations and individuals related to terrorism – not designated as terrorist organizations/individuals, as alleged – fully complied with Vietnamese and international law. It further noted that Viet Nam had sufficient grounds to prove that BPSOS and Mr. Thang are linked to the terrorist organization "Montagnards for Justice – MSFJ".

[106] The allegation of intimidation and reprisals concerning the NGO Montagnards Stand for Justice (MSFJ) and its founder Mr. Y Quynh Bdap is connected to and should be read in conjunction with the related allegations concerning the same organization and individual in Annex II, section on Thailand.
[107] A/HRC/60/62, Annex I, paras. 159–166 and 135–147.
[108] https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=38749.
[109] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/12/un-experts-alarmed-y-quynh-bdaps-extradition-thailand-viet-nam.
[110] https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=39351.
[111] A/HRC/60/62, Annex I, paras. 167–169 and 172.
[112] https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=39351.

Advance edited version

115. According to information received by OHCHR, on 30 January 2026 the Ministry of Public Security of Viet Nam issued an arrest warrant against **Mr. Thang** for the crime of "terrorism". On the same day, an official television channel broadcast a statement by Mr. Bdap's declaring that he acted under the direction of Mr. Thang.[113] On 28 April 2026, the websites of Government and of the Ministry of Public Security[114] informed that the Trial Panel of the People's Court of Dak Lak Province had convicted and sentenced *in absentia* Dr. Thang to 11 years in prison for the crime of "terrorism" in connection with the 11 June 2023 terrorist attack in Dak Lak.

116. On 25 June 2026, the Government responded to the note verbale sent in connection with the preparation of the present report.

117. Regarding the cases mentioned in Annex II, particularly the listing of Montagnards Stand for Justice (MSFJ) as a terrorist organization and the trial, conviction and sentencing *in absentia* of its co-founder, Mr. Y Quynh Bdap, the Government objected to the use of the term "Montagnard" to refer to any ethnic communities in Viet Nam. It stated that this term was historically used during the colonial period, including alongside derogatory and racially discriminatory language to refer to all ethnic minorities residing in the Central Highlands. The Government stated that it had sufficient and credible evidence establishing the terrorist nature of MSFJ and the role of Y Quynh Bdap in organizing the violent attack of 11 June 2023 in Dak Lak Province. It added that his extradition from Thailand to Vietnam was conducted in accordance with the laws of both Viet Nam and Thailand, the international treaties to which both countries are parties, and other relevant international rules and standards. Regarding Y Quynh Bdap's whereabouts, the Government mentioned that he was serving his sentence at Gia Trung Prison.

118. Regarding concerns about reprisals and intimidation against Indigenous Peoples and ethnic and religious minorities, including Mr. Thang Dinh Nguyen, other Montagnard defenders in Thailand, and members of MSFJ and the NGO Boat People SOS (BPSOS), the Government stated that it had sufficient grounds to establish links between BPSOS, Nguyen Dinh Thang and MSFJ, the organization involved in the terrorist attack of 11 June 2023 in Dak Lak Province.

19. Yemen

119. The case of the **Mwatana Organization for Human Rights**, civil society organization and members of its staff, has been included in previous reports of the Secretary-General[115] on allegations of detention and prevention of travel following engagement with the Security Council and United Nations human rights mechanisms.[116]

120. On 27 November 2025, the Government of Yemen's Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (MoSAL) issued a directive, prohibiting local councils, social affairs offices, and civil society from engaging with Mwatana in the areas under the control of Government of Yemen. In the directive, the authorities judged Mwatana as an unofficial and unregistered organization and accused it of dealing with the Houthis militias. The directive has reportedly created additional obstacles for the organization and its staff as well as increased the level of potential risks they face in areas under Government-controlled areas.

121. According to information received, Mwatana faced at least 15 alleged incidents of threats of arrest, harassment, arbitrary detention, restrictions on freedom of movement against its staff and affiliates in connection with their human rights work and their engagement with international human rights mechanisms. During the reporting period, incidents included threats against researchers in Amran governorate leading to cessation of

[113] https://x.com/MaryLawlorhrds/status/2021878282271052123.

[114] https://baochinhphu.vn/tuyen-phat-tu-doi-tuong-nguyen-dinh-thang-ve-toi-khung-bo-tai-dak-lak-102260428135857702.htm; https://baovephapluat.vn/phap-dinh/toa-tuyen-an/tuyen-an-doi-tuong-khung-bo-nguyen-dinh-thang-197932.html.

[115] A/HRC/42/30, Annex I para. 94; A/HRC/48/28, Annex II, paras. 160–161; A/HRC/54/61, Annex II, para. 143, A/HRC/60/62, Annex II paras. 144–146.

[116] SAU 8/2018; YEM 4/2018.

Advance edited version

their work; and threats of arrest against a legal representative in Taiz governorate, reportedly resulting in resignation. On 27 October 2025, the Security and Intelligence Service affiliated with the *de facto* Houthis authorities in Al Hudaydah governorate detained Mwatana's field researcher. The researcher remained arbitrarily detained until 11 February 2026 and was placed in solitary confinement for 50 days.

20. State of Palestine

122. During the reporting period, the OHCHR continued to document cases of **several detainees in the custody of Palestinian authorities who reported fearing or having faced reprisals after participating in interviews with OHCHR** in the context of detention visits carried out in the reporting period to the detention centres managed by the Palestinian security forces (joint security committee, police). OHCHR made unannounced visits to Palestinian detention centres and, since December 2025, the Office documented widespread torture and ill-treatment of Palestinians in detention facilities. In follow up visits, some victims reported being tortured and ill-treated for sharing information with OHCHR in previous detention visits, others refused to give information for fear of being tortured and ill-treated for doing so, and in another case, a cell mate of an interviewee feared reprisals for all those in the cell as a result of the interviewee volunteering his testimony to OHCHR.

123. Since 2020, the reports of the Secretary-General[117] have included the situation of **several Palestinian and international women's organizations and women human rights defenders** who were reportedly subject to smearing, intimidation and threats for their support for the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and their actual or perceived engagement with the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, which reviewed the State of Palestine in July 2018. During the reporting period, a social media page entitled "Mass Movement against CEDAW", continued to issue statements, employing violent language, and threatening and stigmatizing Palestinian women human rights defenders and Palestinian civil society organizations working on gender justice, particularly those actually or perceived as cooperating with the CEDAW Committee and certain UN entities in the field of women's rights. Several civil society organisations who work on the rights of women, and their staff members, have been targeted in online posts by the anti-CEDAW campaign during the reporting period. Names and details of those concerned are withheld due to risks of further reprisals.

[117] A/HRC/45/36, Annex I, paras. 159–161; A/HRC/48/28, Annex II, paras. 162–165; A/HRC/51/47, Annex II, paras. 160–161; A/HRC/54/61, Annex II, paras. 144–147; A/HRC.57/60, Annex II 182–185; A/HRC/60/62, Annex II, paras. 147–151.

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