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Annex II to A/HRC/61/52

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1. This Annex further explains the issues and recommendations in A/HRC/61/52 and should be read as an integral part of that report.

I. Mental element of terrorism: Purpose, aim, objective, cause or motive

2. The most common purpose elements in national terrorism laws are political, ideological and religious. In A/HRC/61/52, the Special Rapporteur recommends including only political and ideological purpose elements, the scope of which are discussed below, both to promote legal certainty in the interpretation and application of these terms, and to explain further why it is unnecessary to additionally include religious and racial motives in the definition of terrorism. Legislatures and courts have refrained from exhaustively defining purpose elements, and limited jurisprudence is available, but their core content is reasonably well understood.

A. "Political"

3. A "political" purpose should not be narrowly interpreted as aiming to overthrow and replace a government or system of government, or foment revolution, rebellion or civil war, and including separatist and national liberation struggles. Older extradition law took this restrictive approach,[1] which was the context in which terrorism was first addressed as a transnational legal problem from the nineteenth century onwards. Rather, the ordinary meaning of "political" also extends to attempts to (violently) change a State's laws, policies and behaviour, or to alter or undermine its processes or institutions (such as by attacking elections, political parties or courts).[2] Such an approach is found in some later extradition jurisprudence.[3]

4. A political purpose is most commonly regarded as directed against the State/Government and their institutions and personnel. A less State-centric conception could cover attempts to change sub-State social or economic behaviour, relations or structures, such as by targeting corporations, trade unions, non-governmental organisations or the practices of particular groups or communities. Where such aims reflect a systematic world-view, they would likely be already captured as "ideological" purposes, but there may still exist "single issue" sub-State political violence that would not necessarily also be ideological.

[1] E.g. *In re Castioni* [1891] 1 QB 149 at 166.
[2] Whether done indirectly by intimidating the population, or directly by compelling the Government, which are the other cumulative elements of definition in A/HRC/61/52.
[3] E.g. *Schtraks v Israel* [1964] AC 556 at 584.

B. "Ideological"

5. "Ideology" refers to a system of beliefs explaining how society (including politics, the economy, and social relations) is or ought to be, which is intended to be shared with or influence others.[4] It is deeper than ad hoc positions on individual political, social, cultural or economic issues. It significantly overlaps with the term "philosophical" in South Africa's terrorism law, rendering such alternative unnecessary. It also intersects with "political" violence, as with communist or fascist violence. Ideology is wide enough to capture many beliefs animating terrorist threats, including white supremacy, neo-Nazism, fascism, ultra-nationalism and other extreme right-wing actors; violent far-left movements; "incel" violence against women; anti-government and citizen militias; and nihilism or anarchism.

C. "Religious"

6. The scope and meaning of "religion" is broadly understood, despite inevitable uncertainties at the margins. In principle its inclusion signals the right of populations and States to protect against extreme religiously-inspired violence, as necessary and proportionate restrictions on the right to freedom of religion, including to protect public safety and the rights of others.[5] A religious purpose element does not target religious beliefs, but unlawful violence inspired by such beliefs. Some communities of victims of religious-inspired terrorism support its inclusion, to properly recognise the harm done to them.

7. In practice, however, the costs of including it have tended to outweigh the benefits, and some official reviewers of terrorism laws, religious communities and civil society actors support removing it. The focus on religion has led to law enforcement profiling of and discrimination against certain communities (but not others, even when they also engage in terrorism), particularly Muslims, fuelling wider media and public stigmatisation as terrorists. Even absent actual bias, it has stimulated a perception of bias among such communities, counter-productively undermining cooperation with law enforcement. Law enforcement training and oversight may not be sufficient to prevent such risks. Including religion can also paradoxically legitimise religious terrorists as representing a faith, with "martyr" effects that fuel radicalisation, recruitment and terrorist support.

8. To the extent that religion is assimilable to an ideology,[6] it is unnecessary to separately include it. Some religious violence may also qualify as "political" terrorism, such as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant seeking to overthrow States and establish a "caliphate", or where violence seeks to change particular laws or policies to conform with religious beliefs. Channelling religious aims through ideological or political purposes cannot eliminate the actual or perceived targeting of religion. Evidence of religious views would still be investigated and admitted as evidence in court to prove ideological or political aims, and the media will still report it. This approach nonetheless blunts a direct focus on religion and reduces risks of discrimination and stigmatisation, in a real-world of Islamophobia, while preserving a focus on the instrumental nature of terrorism. Religious hatred laws would also be available and sufficient to address much of religious-inspired violence.

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[4] See e.g. Michal Nesbitt, Leah West and Amarnath Amarasingam, "The Elusive Motive Requirement in Canada's Terrorism Offences: Defining and Distinguishing Ideology, Religion and Politics" (2023) 60(3) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 549.

[5] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), art. 18(3).

[6] A/57/273, Annex, para. 13. Some religious groups do not believe religion is reducible to ideology in this context.

D. "Racial"

9. At least one national terrorism definition includes a "racial" purpose, in addition to political, ideological and religious ones,[7] and another includes a "sectarian" purpose.[8] Yet another refers to "reasons of xenophobia, discrimination or prejudice based on race, colour, ethnicity or religion",[9] which focuses on the racial attributes of the victim rather than the racist purpose of the perpetrator, though the two can coincide. Terroristic racial violence would be covered by a political and/or ideological purpose, as recommended by the Special Rapporteur's revised model definition, rendering separate mention unnecessary. Further, other legal frameworks directly address racial (and religious) hatred and violence, including human rights law[10] and international criminal law (including genocide and the crimes against humanity of persecution and apartheid).

10. There may be contexts where including a racial purpose would add value by specifically naming, targeting, denouncing and deterring racist terrorism. An example is where there is a threat of widespread sectarian, communal, ethno-nationalist violence or anti-immigrant violence, including majoritarian pressures to capture State institutions or redefine national identity in exclusionary terms. Ordinary racial or religious vilification laws alone may then be insufficient to protect minority rights.

E. Mixed motives

11. A final issue is how the purpose element should address mixed motives.[11] Some definitions require politics, ideology or religion to be "the" purpose or aim. Such approach risks excluding acts with multiple motives, as where a person acts partly for a proscribed reason but also due to private motives or psychosocial disabilities. Some national laws accordingly clarify that an act must be wholly or *partly* committed for a terrorist purpose, or for a purpose that *includes* a terrorist purpose.[12] These approaches are too lax, since they could treat conduct as terrorist even where the terrorist purpose is a minor element and outweighed by predominantly private motives. The preferable middle road is to require the terrorist purpose to be the dominant, or at least a substantial, purpose.

II. State terrorism

12. There is much conceptual confusion about notions of "State terrorism" in debates about the definition of terrorism. This section clarifies the different strands of the State terrorism discourse, further to the summary in A/HRC/51/62, in particular concerning: (a) the prima facie criminal liability of State officials for terrorism, subject to principled exceptions and the functional and personal immunities of State officials; (b) the separate question of State responsibility for terrorism under treaties and other international law; (c) related attempts to lift the civil immunity of States before foreign courts, which are generally inconsistent with international law; and (d) the designation of foreign States for terrorism, State terrorism, or State sponsorship of terrorism in order to variously impose sanctions (some of which may violate international law unless they are comply with the stringent rules on counter-measures), lift civil immunity, or trigger criminal offences (while preserving the immunities of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction).

[7] Terrorism Act 2000 (UK).
[8] Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 (Pakistan).
[9] Law No. 13.260/2016 (Brazil).
[10] ICCPR, art. 20(2).
[11] See also Australian Government, Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, "Defining terrorism: issues paper" (2025), paras. 4.51-4.56.
[12] Canada and New Zealand.

A. Individual criminal responsibility of State officials

13. The International Court of Justice has confirmed that the criminal liability of "any person" under the Terrorist Financing Convention "covers individuals comprehensively" and "applies both to persons who are acting in a private capacity and to those who are State agents".[13] The same interpretation would apply to the other international counter-terrorism conventions and the draft comprehensive convention. This general principle of criminal law – the presumptive equal application of offences to all persons, without blanket exemptions – should also apply to any general definition of terrorism. State officials should be prima facie liable whether they committed terrorist acts privately or in the course of their official duties. General Assembly resolutions have frequently affirmed the criminality of terrorism "by whomever committed".[14] Conduct of equivalent moral culpability should be treated similarly by the criminal law regardless of the identity of the perpetrator if the category of terrorism is to be coherent and legitimate. Various submissions argued that State terrorism is more dangerous than non-State terrorism.

14. The liability of State officials is, however, appropriately subject to any express, specific, and justifiable exceptions defined by law, including the exclusions in the Special Rapporteur's revised model definition of terrorism concerning conduct or armed forces in armed conflict and the activities of State military forces in peacetime (see A/HRC/61/52, paras. 47–55 and 58–59), as well as the chapeau requirement commonly found in terrorism offences that an act must be "unlawful" or criminal under national law, thus excluding conduct committed pursuant to lawful authority and in accordance with international law.

B. Immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction

15. Before the criminal courts of foreign States, State officials enjoy functional immunity for acts performed in their official duties and high-level officials additionally enjoy personal immunity, unless the State expressly waives immunity and consents to the foreign State's exercise of jurisdiction. None of the existing international counter-terrorism conventions expressly lifts these immunities and their drafting does not indicate any intention to do so. To the contrary, various conventions provide that they do not prejudice "other rights, obligations and responsibilities of States and individuals under international law".[15] There is little practice suggesting that the treaty offences could be characterised as non-official acts to which functional immunity would not apply; that their liabilities for "any person" expressly or impliedly waives immunity; or that their offences establish an exception to immunity.

16. In the International Law Commission's work in progress on the immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, there has been insufficient support to recognise terrorism as an international crime entailing lifting of functional immunity[16] due to the definition of terrorism remaining contested (and even international crimes are not regarded as lifting personal immunity). National terrorism laws also generally do not lift functional immunity, although some laws targeting so-called State support

[13] *Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation) (Preliminary Objections)*, 8 November 2019, para. 61; *Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation)*, Judgment, 31 January 2024, para. 56.

[14] E.g. General Assembly Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, annexed to resolution 49/60 (1994).

[15] Terrorist Bombings Convention 1997, art. 19(1); Protocol 2005 to the Maritime Safety Convention 1988 article 3 (adding art. 2 *bis* (1) to the Convention 1988).

[16] See the latest update at A/CN.4/780 (2025).

or sponsorship of terrorism[17] could still apply to private actors, such as members of organised crime groups who are directed by a State to commit terrorism. The International Law Commission also rejected a proposal to lift the criminal immunities of State officials by analogy with the "territorial tort exception" to civil immunity.

17. In principle, the lifting of the functional immunity of State officials for terrorist offences could advance accountability and justice for victims, and some submissions supported their lifting. However, it would first be necessary for there to exist international agreement on the definition of terrorism, followed by the lifting of immunity either expressly by treaty or through State practice recognising terrorism as an international crime for which immunity is lifted.

18. The prosecution of prisoners of war in international armed conflict for alleged participation in a terrorist organisation[18] violates combatant immunity under international humanitarian law.[19]

C. State responsibility

19. While finding that "any person" includes State officials, the Court in *Ukraine v Russia* held that terrorist financing by a State "lies outside the scope of" the Terrorist Financing Convention.[20] The Convention, like the other counter-terrorism conventions, does not impose an obligation directly on States parties not to commit offences; it is limited to imposing individual criminal liability. The Court nevertheless observed that a State party remains responsible for breaches of its obligations under the Convention, including to prevent and suppress terrorist financing by any person.[21] The same rationale applies to other terrorism conventions. States are thus internationally responsible for any failures to criminalise offences, prevent their officials from committing terrorist offences, and investigate, apprehend, prosecute (or extradite) and punish such offenders. The draft convention has thus far rejected proposals to establish State responsibility for the State commission of terrorism.

20. The Court further emphasised that State terrorist financing is unlawful under other international law, including Security Council obligations.[22] The same is true of State commission of, or support for, terrorism generally in violation of other international obligations, including the prohibitions on the use of force[23] and intervention,[24] including where a State supports or tolerates terrorist activity directed at another State,[25] and Security Council obligations reflecting these norms.[26]

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[17] Eg. Canada and Australia, both listing the Iranian Revolutionary Guards as terrorist organisations for criminal law purposes.
[18] The Russian Federation has convicted a number of members of Ukraine's Azov Battalion.
[19] See also A/80/382, para. 127.
[20] *Ukraine v Russia (Preliminary Objections)*, above, para. 59; see also para 61.
[21] Ibid, para. 61.
[22] Ibid, para. 60.
[23] Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, annexed to General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) (1970), Principle of Prohibition on Threat or Use of Force, para. 9 ("Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts, when the acts referred to… involve a threat or use of force").
[24] Ibid, Principle of Non-Intervention, para. 2 ("no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State").
[25] Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, annexed to General Assembly resolution 49/60)1994), para. 5(a) (duty "[t]o refrain from organizing, instigating, facilitating, financing, encouraging or tolerating terrorist activities and to take appropriate practical measures to ensure that their respective territories are not used for terrorist installations or training camps, or for the preparation or organization of terrorist acts intended to be committed against other States or their citizens").
[26] Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), para. 2.

21. Breaches of such obligations attract the usual consequences under the law of State responsibility, including cessation, reparation, and non-repetition, and activate the procedures for invoking responsibility. Such disputes may be addressed through diplomatic protest and dialogue, proportionate counter-measures (such as sanctions), or formal means of peaceful dispute settlement. So-called State terrorism or State sponsorship of terrorism does not give rise to a State's right of self-defence unless the long-standing requirements of the international law on self-defence are met, namely that one State sent an armed group that used armed force of sufficient gravity against another State, or was substantially involved in such attack.[27]

D. Lifting State civil immunity

22. A very few States have lifted the international law immunities from civil suits of foreign "State sponsors" of terrorism and their officials.[28] Such actors are usually designated as terrorist by executive decision, although one State's law permits them to also be identified by a court.[29] A challenge to one such law has been pending before the International Court of Justice since 2023,[30] including to the domestic recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments identifying State sponsors of terrorism.

23. In *Germany v Italy*, the International Court of Justice held that there is no exception to State civil immunity for even serious (and jus cogens) violations of international humanitarian law or international human rights law.[31] State practice does not appear to have appreciably changed since then, let alone recognised a wider exception for terrorism, which is not an international crime proper. The Court left open whether a "territorial tort exception" was available to civil immunity,[32] as is recognised under the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property 2004.[33] Such exception could potentially lift civil immunities for terrorist acts attributable to a foreign State committed in another State's territory, though it would not extend to attacks on that State's nationals or interests abroad.

24. While lifting civil immunities could enable victims of foreign State terrorism to seek compensation, again it would first be necessary for there to exist international agreement on the definition of terrorism (including so as not to allow recovery against self-determination movements lawfully resisting foreign occupation in accordance with international law) and the lifting of immunity. In addition, there would be significant, although not necessarily insurmountable, challenges in enforcing proceedings and judgments against foreign States. There would also be real risks of politicised misuse and economic coercion (with potential human rights impacts on the population of a State whose assets may have been frozen or seized to secure a judgment), resulting in political tensions, retaliation and escalation.

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[27] *Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),* Merits Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, para. 195.

[28] Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (US), 28 USC §1605A (the US has listed Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Syria); State Immunity Act (Canada) and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act (Canada) (Canada has listed Iran); Criminal Code Amendment (State Sponsors of Terrorism) Act 2025 (Australia) (Australia has listed the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps).

[29] Canada.

[30] *Alleged Violations of State Immunities (Islamic Republic of Iran v. Canada)*, https://www.icj-cij.org/case/189.

[31] *Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy; Greece Intervening)*, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2012, p. 99, paras. 81-91.

[32] Ibid, paras. 62-79.

[33] Art. 12. The Convention is not yet in force.

E. Designations concerning "State terrorism"

25. National terrorism listings of foreign States or State entities for the purposes of administrative sanctions (which do not necessarily violate the civil immunities of foreign States), or less commonly to impose individual criminal liabilities related to the listing (while typically preserving the jurisdictional immunities of foreign State officials), are historically rare for various reasons. Many States primarily view terrorism as a non-State phenomenon; inter-State dispute settlement procedures, United Nations mechanisms, and other forms of lawful inter-State sanctions are already available; and criminal liabilities (whether related to terrorist organisations or flowing from breaches of sanctions regimes) could infringe the personal and functional immunities of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction. In addition, listing State entities risks souring bilateral relations and provoking retaliation, while there is limited empirical evidence that counter-terrorism sanctions significantly change the foreign State's behaviour. The breadth of many national definitions of terrorism, and the absence of necessary exceptions, also opens the floodgates to the potential listing of any State which, for example, lawfully uses force to intimidate other Governments in armed conflict for political reasons. At the same time, terrorist listings of States would inevitably be applied in a politicised, selective manner. Some listings would be driven in part by interest group pressure, while States would likely refrain from listing allied States even where they, for example, commit extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detention or torture to intimidate (domestic or foreign) populations or compel Governments.

26. Nonetheless, some States have listed foreign States or their entities as terrorist, both to stigmatise them as "terrorist" and to trigger counter-terrorism powers: under most national laws, there is usually no equivalent designation process and special powers for "State sponsors of international crimes" – whether for war crimes, crimes against humanity or even genocide – despite those crimes often being more serious than terrorism. The United States has listed Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Syria, and Canada has listed Iran, as State sponsors of terrorism. A few States have designated the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps as a terrorist organisation[34] or State sponsor of terrorism.[35] After the European Union listed the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps as a terrorist organisation in 2026, the Islamic Republic of Iran reciprocated by listing all European militaries as terrorist groups. Ukraine has treated the Russian-controlled "occupation administrations" in eastern Ukraine as terrorist entities since 2022. The Russian Federation has listed Ukraine's Azov Battalion as a terrorist organisation.[36] The United States has designated "Cartel de los Soles" as a terrorist organisation, alleging it was headed by the Venezuelan President (until his abduction by the United States) and other high ranking Government officials.[37] Terrorism-specific sanctions on States can be additional to sanctions on the same State on related grounds, such as violations of international humanitarian law or international human rights law. Certain parliaments have also politically accused foreign States of terrorism[38] without imposing legal consequences.

27. Separately, various States have listed non-State entities as terrorist organisations, such as Hezbollah or the Wagner Group,[39] where they are alleged to have ties with

[34] United States, Canada, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Paraguay, and Ecuador.
[35] Australia.
[36] Russian Federation.
[37] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/11/terrorist-designations-of-cartel-de-los-soles#:~:text=The%20Department%20of%20State%20intends,%2C%20effective%20November%2024%2C%202025.
[38] See e.g. European Parliament resolution of 23 November 2022 on recognising the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism (2022/2896(RSP)); and resolutions of the parliaments of Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and The Netherlands.
[39] United Kingdom and Lithuania. The UK listing describes it as a "private military company which has acted as a malign proxy military force on behalf of the Russian state": https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/proscribed-terror-groups-or-organisations--

other States, without listing them as State terrorist entities as such. Various States have at times also listed certain unrecognised, de facto authorities as terrorist groups, including Hamas, Ansar Allah (Houthis),[40] the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and the separatist Donetsk and Luhansk "People's Republics" in Eastern Ukraine from 2015–2022; some of these also reportedly had ties to foreign States. The Security Council has also listed some such entities under its counter-terrorism regime, including the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (when operating as a territorial "caliphate") and Al-Shabaab in Somalia.

28. The consequences of State terrorist listings as outlined in paragraph 26 often go beyond lawful acts qualifying as retorsion, such as restrictions on diplomatic relations or official travel, foreign aid, military assistance, or on economic activity where there is no violation of treaty obligations. Sanctions that involve asset freezing interfere in the foreign State's rights and must be justified under international law. Sanctions can qualify as lawful countermeasures[41] only where the foreign State's support for terrorism constitutes an internationally wrongful act, such as a prohibited use of force or intervention, or a breach of a counter-terrorism treaty or Security Council obligation. The breach of international law, rather than of a national law definition of terrorism, is determinative in the absence of international agreement on the definition of terrorism.

29. There are inevitably risks in the "auto-determination" of a foreign State's wrongdoing for the purposes of counter-measures, including where intelligence assessments relating to responsibility for terrorism are often imperfect. Some sanctions have been maintained in the absence of credible evidence of continuing State support for terrorism, as in the case of United States sanction on Cuba. The United States' listing of Cartel de los Soles was also widely regarded as abusive, both because the existence of such organisation was highly doubtful and the listing appeared to be a precursor to justifying an aggressive armed attack on Venezuela in January 2026 and the abduction and criminal prosecution of its sitting President.

30. Under international law, countermeasures must aim solely to induce compliance with international law (namely, cessation of terrorism and reparation), not to punish or to pursue ulterior purposes, and must be proportionate and temporary.[42] Notice must be given to the other State and countermeasures must not affect dispute settlement procedures. Countermeasures must not involve the prohibited use of force or violate fundamental human rights or humanitarian obligations or peremptory norms. Sanctions must accordingly be carefully targeted and avoid negative effects on the human rights of the population, including their economic and social rights, right to self-determination, and right to development. In this regard, deep concern has been expressed at the unjustified impacts of United States sanctions on the populations of so-called State sponsors of terrorism.

31. Importantly, only an injured State is permitted to impose counter-measures.[43] International law does not appear to allow third party States to collectively enforce international law through sanctions, although there is a growing trend of (mainly Western) non-injured States imposing "Magnitsky-style" sanctions to collectively exert pressure to end grave violations of international law. The proper forum for collective enforcement ordinarily remains, however, the United Nations, including the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and proceedings at the International Court of Justice. The Security Council has previously imposed sanctions, for example, on Sudan, Afghanistan and Libya to prevent

2/proscribed-terrorist-groups-or-organisations-accessible-version#list-of-proscribed-terrorist-groups.

[40] The Security Council imposed sanctions on the Houthis (see resolution 2624 (2022)) but not under its counter-terrorism sanctions regime.

[41] International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 2001, arts. 22 and 49–54.

[42] Ibid.

[43] *Nicaragua* case, above, para. 249.

toleration of or support for terrorism. The chronic failures of the Security Council, and limited acceptance of the Court's contentious jurisdiction, nonetheless tend to understandably fuel resort to third-party unilateral measures as an antidote to prevailing impunity for serious violations of international law; international law does not enforce itself, as victims are painfully aware.

32. In its regular resolutions on "Human rights and unilateral coercive measures", the General Assembly has urged "all States to cease adopting or implementing any unilateral measures not in accordance with international law",[44] particularly coercive measures with extraterritorial effects, and called on States not recognize or apply them and to take measures to counteract them.[45] Resolution 80/209 (2025) (adopted by 122 votes to 56) specifically "[r]equests States to refrain from drawing up illegal and unilateral lists, such as the list of States that allegedly sponsor terrorism, which constitutes an additional unilateral coercive measure and violates fundamental principles of international law, including the principle of the sovereign equality of States, the prohibition of intervention in the internal affairs of States and the principle of peaceful settlement of international disputes".[46]

[44] General Assembly resolution 80/209 (2025), para. 1.
[45] Ibid. para. 5.
[46] Ibid, para. 3.